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This thesis is a study of morale in Thucydidesʼ Histories. As a general 
himself, Thucydides had firsthand knowledge of the importance of soldiersʼ 
morale, and his emphasis on seeing the entirety of the war shows that he was 
also able to observe the collective morale of city-states over the long term 
(5.26.5).  Each chapter investigates the use of one term that relates to morale 
in Thucydidesʼ narrative and earlier literature.  Word studies of andreia, tolma, 
prothumia, and rhome show how the Greek language was being adapted over 
the course of the 5th century to allow greater abstraction and facilitate 
theoretical discourse.  In addition, the results of these studies reveal the 
central role of morale in Thucydidesʼ Histories.  Morale is not just the 
confidence of a single soldier; it has to do with a groupʼs collective response to 
adversity and danger.  The group can be a contingent in an army, an entire 
army, a city-state, or a confederation.  The shared values of the group will 
determine when and how its members willingly risk death, which is the ultimate 
proof of good morale.  Thucydides represents a clash of two very different 
Greek city-states, whose customs and values affect the way they wage war 
and respond on the battlefield.  In books six and seven, morale becomes a 
major theme, as Thucydides repeatedly returns to the mindset of the 
Athenians, Syracusans, Lacedaemonians, and Corinthians.  The confidence 
(rhome) and enthusiasm (prothumia) of Athensʼ enemies keep increasing, until 
 the morale (rhome) of the Athenians in Sicily totally disintegrates because 
Athens shows too much boldness (tolma) rather than courage (andreia).  
Although the terms and methods of analysis constantly evolve, morale 
remains a chief concern even in contemporary conflicts.  The tensions 
between conservative and innovative, daring and cautious that so deeply 
affected the course of the Peloponnesian War have wider resonance.  Despite 
the great differences in time, technology, and resources, the human element of 
warfare remains much the same.  By understanding why the Greeks fought 
and died two and a half millennia ago, we will better recognize our own 
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Á la guerre, les trois quarts sont des affaires morales, la balance des forces 
réelles nʼest que pour un autre quart – Napolean Bonaparte.1 
 
1.1 The Importance of Morale 
Thucydides opens his work: Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε τὸν 
πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων,2 announcing immediately that 
his subject is war.  In fact, following Herodotus and Thucydides, ancient 
historians concentrate primarily on war.3  Thucydidesʼ choice of subject matter 
was so influential that he is even held to be responsible for historiansʼ long 
focus on wars and political affairs to the exclusion of all else.4  And yet, 
Thucydidesʼ work is not simply a narrative of successive battles and political 
meetings; he also frequently relates the thoughts, motivations, and feelings of 
both notable individuals and groups.  Thucydides, himself an Athenian general 
at one time,5 shows a keen appreciation of moraleʼs central role in warfare.  
This view inside the minds of the participants makes a study of morale in 
Thucydides possible, and the overwhelming importance of morale in warfare 
makes this study desirable.  The recent interest in ancient warfare, especially 
                                            
1 Baynes (1967) 94. 
2 Thucydides 1.1.1: “Thucydides the Athenian composed the war of the Peloponnesians and 
the Athenians.”  Translations are my own unless otherwise noted.  Thucydides will hereafter 
be abbreviated T in the footnotes. 
3 Mitchell (1996) 88. 
4 Hornblower (1987) 7, 30. 
5 T 4.104.4, 5.26.5. 
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hoplite warfare, by scholars such as Hanson, Lendon, van Wees, and others 
provides excellent background for my inquiry.6  Studies of morale and courage 
in 20th century conflicts, particularly soldiersʼ accounts, will also be important 
comparanda.7  Despite the great temporal and technological divide, the human 
experience of warfare in the greatest war of the 5th century BCE and the great 
wars of the 20th century CE remains much the same.  As Thucydides himself 
explains, studying his work will benefit anyone who wants to understand the 
past and the future better as long as the human element remains much the 
same.8 
Modern commentators recognize morale as the single most important 
factor in warfare.9  Battle, especially in the pre-modern era, is normally 
decided by soldiersʼ willingness to fight.  Tactics matter less than morale, since 
dispirited men will not execute a plan no matter how brilliant it may be.10  
Likewise, the morale of a city-state or country typically determines victory in 
war.  Often the most successful strategies in war are those that damage an 
opposing city-state or country psychologically rather than militarily or 
economically.  To put it another way, making an enemy think one possesses 
overwhelming force is as good as actually possessing it.  And yet a group with 
good morale can recover even from a defeat that causes great loss of life and 
matériel.11  
                                            
6 Hanson (1991, 2000, 2005), Mitchell (1996), Lendon (2005), van Wees (2000). 
7 Baynes (1967) vii-ix; Moran (1987) xi-xiii; both served in World War I and then ultimately 
published their books after World War II. 
8 T 1.22.4. 
9 Baynes (1967) 92; Moran (1987) xv. 
10 Baynes (1967) 93; Lendon (1999) 290-295, who discusses the privileging of psychological 
factors over τὰ τακτικά in Xenophonʼs works. 
11 For example, Rome after Cannae or the United States after Pearl Harbor. 
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The word morale comes into English, through French, from Latin 
moralis,12 which was coined by Cicero:13 “quia pertinet ad mores, quos ἤθη 
Graeci vocant, nos eam partem philosophiae de moribus appellare solemus. 
Sed decet augentem linguam Latinam nominare moralem.”14  Although Cicero 
coined moralis specifically in reference to moral philosophy, it came to be used 
as the adjective for all the meanings of mos, habit or custom.15  The English 
derivative ʻmoralʼ refers more generally to something related to human 
character or behavior considered as good or bad, but it can be used in the 
specific sense of “[d]esignating the incidental effect of an action or event (e.g. 
a victory or defeat) in producing confidence or discouragement, sympathy or 
hostility, etc;” and it was rarely even used in the now obsolete sense “of or 
relating to morale.”16  Originally, the noun morale, formed by confusion with 
the French feminine noun morale or with the final ʻeʼ added to reflect the 
pronunciation, meant the “morals or morality of a person or group of people; 
moral principles or conduct,” although this sense is now rare.17  Like the 
related French masculine noun moral, the English noun morale is now typically 
restricted to what was once a specialized meaning of the adjective from which 
it is derived, namely “the mental or emotional state (with regard to confidence, 
hope, enthusiasm, etc.) of a person or group engaged in some activity; degree 
of contentment with one's lot or situation.”18  
                                            
12 Oxford English Dictionary Online (s.v. morale, etymology; moral, etymology). 
13 Lewis and Short, Latin Dictionary (s.v. moralis). 
14 Cicero Fat. 1, 1. “Because it pertains to mores, which the Greeks call ethe, we are 
accustomed to call this branch of philosophy de moribus.  But the growing Latin language 
should designate it moral philosophy.” 
15 Lewis and Short, Latin Dictionary (s.v. moralis). 
16 Oxford English Dictionary Online (s.v. moral adj., especially 3d and 8); compare Napoleanʼs 
usage of the French adjective moral on p. 1. 
17 Oxford English Dictionary Online (s.v. morale n.). 
18 Ibid. 
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Often, the ʻactivityʼ mentioned in the Oxford English Dictionary definition 
is war, as the examples it gives attest.  The frequent military undertones are 
suitable because morale is the single most important factor in war, and as 
such is a great concern to military leaders and countries at war.19  Thus, the 
English word morale has come to refer only to a limited subset of a manʼs 
habits and character, namely what is related to his response to danger and 
adversity.  John Baynes concludes his chapter on morale with this definition of 
military morale: 
High morale is the most important quality of a soldier.  It is a quality of 
mind and spirit which combines courage, self-discipline, and 
endurance.  It springs from infinitely varying and sometimes 
contradictory sources, but is easily recognizable, having as its hall-
marks cheerfulness and unselfishness.  In time of peace good morale is 
developed by sound training and the fostering of esprit de corps.  In 
time of war it manifests itself in the soldierʼs absolute determination to 
do his duty to the best of his ability in any circumstances.  At its highest 
peak it is seen as an individualʼs readiness to accept his fate willingly 
even to the point of death, and to refuse all roads that lead to safety at 
the price of conscience.20 
But ʻmental or emotional stateʼ or a ʻquality of mind and spiritʼ is rather vague, 
and it should be possible to identify some of the causes of lasting high morale.  
Herbert Lord, a professor of philosophy writing after World War I, gives a more 
useful definition of morale as “a structure of the mind involving at once and 
together ideas for the intellect, emotions for the heart, and action for the 
hand…. It is a mechanism that ideals set acting into emotions and deeds.”21  
He argues that training and experience are necessary for this structure to 
develop correctly.22  Modern professional armies require extensive training, 
                                            
19 Baynes (1967) 92. 
20 Ibid., 108.  
21 Lord (1918) 146. 
22 Ibid., 106-123. 
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but most ancient Greek soldiers were comparatively untrained.  As its 
etymology suggests, morale is intimately related to habits and character.23 
Morale, therefore, describes the mental state of a soldier on the battlefield, 
where the soldierʼs values and experience determine under what 
circumstances and how long he will privilege his duty over his life. 
 
1.2 Morale in Thucydidesʼ Histories 
 This definition is the most appropriate for a study of morale in 
Thucydidesʼ account of the Peloponnesian War, but it can be applied 
collectively as well as individually.  Morale is not just the confidence of a single 
soldier; it has to do with a groupʼs collective response to adversity and danger.  
The group can be a contingent in an army, an entire army, a city-state, or a 
confederation.  The shared values of the group will determine when and how 
willingly its members risk death, which is the ultimate proof of good morale.  
The ideals of different societies lead to different morales; some morales are 
better both because they are less likely to degrade and because “the deeds 
that characterize them are of higher social value.”24 Thucydides represents a 
clash of two very different Greek city-states, whose customs and institutions 
affect the way they wage war and respond on the battlefield.  Speakers in the 
Histories make this point explicitly.  Before the outbreak of the war, the 
Corinthians warn the Lacedaemonians that they and the Athenians are two 
very different peoples.25  In the funeral oration, Pericles talks at length about 
                                            
23 Ibid., 145; cf. T 2.61.4 
24 Ibid., 145. 
25 T 1.70. 
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the social, political, and technological differences between Sparta and Athens 
and how these affect their citizensʼ mindset in war.26   
My dissertation, therefore, investigates morale in Thucydidesʼ account 
of the Peloponnesian War.  Yet morale in the Peloponnesian War is an 
extremely broad subject, so I have chosen to limit my study in two important 
ways.  First, I focus especially on morale in the war in Sicily, since the 
Syracusansʼ political similarities to the Athenians lead Thucydides to 
emphasize the mental more than the technological or economic differences 
between the two warring cities.27  Second, I strive to keep my analysis firmly 
grounded in the Greek text of Thucydides, since lumping together Greek 
words that can be translated the same way in English (or French) risks 
creating connections that Thucydides himself did not intend.28  Within this 
interpretive framework, I identify and study specific psychological factors that 
Thucydides believed were responsible for individual victories and defeats as 
well as the course of the entire Peloponnesian War.  This project will not, 
therefore, be an exhaustive account of Thucydidesʼ psychological 
vocabulary.29  Instead, I focus on a handful of recurrent word roots that 
represent themes in Thucydidesʼ analysis of the war, in order to show what 
role Thucydides thought the morale of different soldiers and cities played in the 
Peloponnesian War. 
                                            
26 T 2.39. 
27 For instance, T 8.96.5, where Thucydides says that the clash of the Syracusans and the 
Athenians shows how great an advantage the different character of the Lacedaemonians and 
Athenians gave to Athens during the war. 
28 For instance, both Smoes (1995) 88-97 and Balot (2001, 2004) analyze “courage” in 
Thucydides as expressed variously by ἀνδρεία, εὐψυχία, and the phrase κράτιστοι ψυχὴν.   
29 See Huart (1968) for such an account. 
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My dissertation takes the form of a group of thematic studies, each 
focusing on a specific word root that is central to Thucydidesʼ understanding of 
morale.  Every chapter defines a key term that Thucydides uses to describe 
the psychology of war the war in Sicily, although I discuss Thucydidesʼ 
passages from throughout his work.  My primary goal is to elucidate the 
mental qualities that enabled the Syracusans to overcome the greatest military 
expedition of the Classical period, but a complete understanding requires an 
investigation of these themes in all eight books.  In many cases, the terms that 
I identify have nominal, verbal, and adjectival forms.  I tend to refer to the 
concepts by the abstract noun, but I discuss Thucydidesʼ usage in the 
introduction to each chapter.  This project began with an exhaustive study 
using what Martin Ostwald, introducing his study of θεσμός and νόμος, calls 
the “semantic method,” which “proceeds inductively from the particular 
contexts in which each of the … terms is found, in order to define the variety of 
usage of each in different areas of Greek thought and action.”30  This model of 
semantics, essentially formulated by Plato and Aristotle, holds that  
a category has a definition, items in the world either fall under a concept 
or they do not, and all members of a category are equally 
representative of it, because the properties defining the category are 
shared by all members.31 
Yet Ineke Sluiter and Ralph Rosen, in their introduction to an edited volume on 
ἀνδρεία in the ancient world, challenge this model by pointing to research in 
cognitive psychology and linguistics showing that mental categories have an 
internal structure in which some members are “best examples” or 
                                            
30 Ostwald (1969) 10; collection and analysis of all psychological terms in Thucydides has 
been done by Huart (1968), but limiting my study to a few concepts that I can treat with more 
detail, while carefully distinguishing Thucydidesʼ own usage from that of the speeches, will 
enable me to refine Huartʼs work in important ways. 
31 Sluiter and Rosen (2003) 5. 
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“prototypes.”32  They go on to argue that the frequent Socratic interlocutors 
who try to define a concept using examples may not be as wrong as Socrates 
makes them out to be in a number Platoʼs dialogues.33  Whether or not Plato is 
accurately depicting a feature of Pre-Socratic thought shared by Thucydides, 
recognizing certain usages as prototypical is appropriate for analysis of the 
kind of ʻparadigmaticʼ history that Thucydides wrote.34 
In her study of the process of abstraction in Thucydidesʼ work, June 
Allison even lays out some criteria for identifying Thucydidesʼ key usages.  
According to her argument, the abstract nouns formed from a given stem are 
often the most important usages, since they represent higher levels of the 
“cognitive process” that Thucydides invites his reader to share in.35  Although 
she admits that “substitution of the noun for the related verb is common,” 
Allison herself focuses on rarer abstracts and words that appear to be coined 
by Thucydides.36  Nevertheless, she shows that repetition of words from the 
same stem is one of Thucydidesʼ principal methods of highlighting major 
themes, while focusing especially on the abstracts that mark the culmination of 
this thematic repetition.37  Rather than focusing solely on Thucydidesʼ highest 
levels of analysis, I have chosen to trace certain themes throughout the whole 
of the Histories.  My aim is to unpack passages of high level Thucydidean 
analysis relating to morale by following certain thematic repetition throughout 
the work. 
                                            
32 Ibid., 6. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Hornblower (1987) 41-42; see section 1.4 below for more on Thucydidesʼ paradigmatic 
approach to writing history. 
35 Allison (1997a) 17. 
36 Ibid., 24. 
37 Ibid., 35-44. 
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Two passages, one from book six and one from seven, most clearly 
reveal Thucydidesʼ analysis of morale in the latter part of the Peloponnesian 
War.  Both passages contain abstract nouns describing the mental qualities of 
the combatants, and the importance of Thucydidesʼ explicit analysis here has 
led to my choice of chapter topics.  The first explains the Syracusansʼ defeat in 
the first major land battle in Sicily, and the second concerns the morale of the 
Peloponnesians before they begin invading Attica again and fortify Decelea.  A 
comment by Thucydides about the battle of the Athenians and the Syracusans 
at the Anapus River gives a comprehensive view of the mental qualities that 
determined success in this part of the war.  Although Thucydides is addressing 
why the Syracusans lost this particular battle, he also makes a general point 
about Syracusan morale:  
οὐ γὰρ δὴ προθυμίᾳ ἐλλιπεῖς ἦσαν οὐδὲ τόλμῃ οὔτʼ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ 
μάχῃ οὔτʼ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν ἀνδρείᾳ οὐχ ἥσσους ἐς 
ὅσον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἀντέχοι, τῷ δὲ ἐλλείποντι αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν 
βούλησιν ἄκοντες προυδίδοσαν.38 
This sentence occurs in connection with a land battle that serves as a 
paradigm of hoplite battles in this period of the war.39  The first clause 
attributes προθυμία and τόλμα to the Syracusans in this and the other 
battles, which should be taken to include sea battles as well as land battles.  
The second half of the sentence seems to apply only to this battle, since the 
inexperience of the Syracusans is contrasted with the experience of the 
Athenians and their allies in the battle description.40  Although in this instance 
                                            
38 T 6.69.1: “In fact, they were not deficient in enthusiasm or daring either in this battle or in the 
others; and they were no worse in courage as long as their knowledge held out, but when it 
ran short they unwillingly gave up their resolve as well.” 
39 Mitchell (1996) 92; there were light armed troops taking part in this battle, but Thucydides 
dismisses them as unimportant (6.69.2). 
40 T 6.70.1: τοῖς μὲν πρῶτον μαχομένοις (the Syracusans) … τοῖς δʼ ἐμπειροτέροις (the 
Athenians). 
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the battle is decided by knowledge rather than morale, Thucydidesʼ insistence 
on the ἀνδρεία, προθυμία, and τόλμα of the Syracusans reflects their 
ultimate success against the Athenians.  In many cases, τόλμα is associated 
with the Athenians while ἀνδρεία is associated with the Lacedaemonians, so 
the combination of the two qualities is especially significant.41  Furthermore, 
the phrase “neither in this battle nor the others” cues the reader that the 
interplay between the Syracusansʼ knowledge of warfare and their mental 
qualities will become important in later battles, a point driven home by the 
paraphrase of Hermocratesʼ encouragement to spend the winter training.42   
While I return a number of times to the interplay between ἐπιστήμη and 
the other qualities identified above, ἐπιστήμη does not receive separate 
treatment in its own chapter.  Scholars have long recognized that a major 
theme of Thucydidesʼ account of the Sicilian expedition is the Syracusansʼ 
acquisition of the knowledge and skill that allows them to defeat the 
Athenians.43  Although she does not explicitly mention ἐπιστήμη in her 
analysis of the complex of speech and narrative the precedes the Athenian 
defeat in the Great Harbor at Syracuse, she identifies the Syracusansʼ tactical 
calculations in 7.36 as the most important indicator of Thucydidesʼ rationalized 
schema of this crucial battle.44  Thucydides himself summarizes this passage 
as the Syracusansʼ calculations regarding their ἐπιστήμη and δύναμις.45  
Thus, Romillyʼs argument shows that in this episode Thucydides essentially 
confirms the argument of the Corinthians in book one that the Peloponnesians 
                                            
41 Allison (1997a) 33 n30. 
42 T 6.72. 
43 Romilly (1956) 150-161 presents an extremely perceptive argument to this effect.  
44 Ibid., 152. 
45 T 7.37.1: Τοιαῦτα οἱ Συρακόσιοι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ δύναμιν 
ἐπινοήσαντες. 
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can gain ἐπιστήμη and will obliterate the Atheniansʼ advantage in ἐπιστήμη 
with practice.46 
Since it is clear that the acquisition of ἐπιστήμη is crucial to success in 
war, I focus on the other aspects of Syracusan morale mentioned in 6.69 in 
order to show whether or not Thucydides believes they can be acquired or 
lost.  I also seek to find out whether or not these mental qualities are 
necessary for victory and if they can be excessive or harmful.  Finally, I show 
how and when these terms are interrelated.  The results of this line of inquiry 
will reveal not only how the Syracusans maintained their morale in the face of 
the greatest Greek military expedition up to their time but also why an 
Athenian force of such overwhelming power failed so utterly.  At the same 
time, a better understanding of the relationship between προθυμία, τόλμα, 
ἀνδρεία and morale also sheds light on Thucydidesʼ conception of the role of 
menʼs hearts and minds in warfare more generally. 
A second passage enables me to identify one more term that is crucial 
for understanding Thucydidesʼ analysis of morale.  Although this passage 
concerns the spirit of the Lacedaemonians rather than that of the Syracusans 
or Athenians, it also reveals a striking instance of Thucydidean analysis of 
morale.  Furthermore, just as ἀνδρεία and τόλμα form a pair in Thucydidesʼ 
text, this passage reveals that Thucydides pairs προθυμία with the term 
ῥώμη.  A good illustration of the link between being πρόθυμος and having 
ῥώμη is Thucydidesʼ description of Lacedaemonian morale after Alcibiadesʼ 
defection: 
μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐγεγένητό τις ῥώμη, διότι τοὺς 
Ἀθηναίους ἐνόμιζον διπλοῦν τὸν πόλεμον ἔχοντας, πρός τε σφᾶς 
καὶ Σικελιώτας, εὐκαθαιρετωτέρους ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι τὰς σπονδὰς 
                                            
46 T 1.121.4. 
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προτέρους λελυκέναι ἡγοῦντο αὐτούς· ἐν γὰρ τῷ προτέρῳ 
πολέμῳ σφέτερον τὸ παρανόμημα μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι τε ἐς 
Πλάταιαν ἦλθον Θηβαῖοι ἐν σπονδαῖς, καὶ εἰρημένον ἐν ταῖς 
πρότερον ξυνθήκαις ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν, ἢν δίκας ἐθέλωσι διδόναι, 
αὐτοὶ οὐχ ὑπήκουον ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων. καὶ 
διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως δυστυχεῖν τε ἐνόμιζον, καὶ ἐνεθυμοῦντο τήν τε 
περὶ Πύλον ξυμφορὰν καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ 
Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσὶν ἐξ Ἄργους ὁρμώμενοι Ἐπιδαύρου 
τέ τι καὶ Πρασιῶν καὶ ἄλλα ἐδῄωσαν καὶ ἐκ Πύλου ἅμα 
ἐλῃστεύοντο, καὶ ὁσάκις περί του διαφοραὶ γένοιντο τῶν κατὰ τὰς 
σπονδὰς ἀμφισβητουμένων, ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν 
Λακεδαιμονίων οὐκ ἤθελον ἐπιτρέπειν, τότε δὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι 
νομίσαντες τὸ παρανόμημα, ὅπερ καὶ σφίσι πρότερον ἡμάρτητο, 
αὖθις ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὸ αὐτὸ περιεστάναι, πρόθυμοι ἦσαν ἐς 
τὸν πόλεμον.47 
Huart uses this passage to show that ῥώμη and προθυμία are essentially 
synonymous,48 and yet there may be a subtle distinction.  ῾Ρώμη in the first 
sentence describes Lacedaemonian morale based on their judgment of the 
enemyʼs difficult strategic position and their own feelings of moral justification, 
as the parallelism between the clauses introduced by διότι and καὶ ὅτι shows.  
Πρόθυμοι in the later sentence describes the Lacedaemoniansʼ feeling toward 
the war based specifically on the belief that Athens is currently in the wrong.  
Although Thucydides can sometimes use two similar words as synonyms,49 
                                            
47 7.18.2-3: “A certain strength most of all had come to the Lacedaemonians, since they 
believed that Athenians, with a two-front war on their hands, against the Lacedaemonians and 
the Sicilians, would be more easily subdued; and because they thought the Athenians had 
broken the treaty first. In the earlier conflict, they thought they themselves were more at fault, 
since the Thebans attacked Plataea under treaty; and because it was stipulated in the earlier 
treaty that they would not take up arms if the two parties were willing to participate in 
arbitration, but they did not submit to arbitration when the Athenians asked.  Therefore, they 
believed it was right to suffer misfortune, and they took to heart the disaster at Pylos and 
anything else that happened to them.  But after the Athenians setting off from Argos with thirty 
ships were ravaging the lands of Epidaurus, Prasiae, and other places and were mounting 
raids from Pylos, and were not willing to participate in arbitration whenever differences arose 
concerning something agreed in the treaty, even though the Lacedaemonians called for 
arbitration; then the Lacedaemonians considered the same fault that had formerly been their 
own to be the Atheniansʼ and were enthusiastic for war.” 
48 Huart (1968) 417 n 3. 
49 See, for instance, Desmond (2006) 361 n 6 on phobos and deos. 
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the grammatical structure here suggests a significant difference between 
ῥώμη and προθυμία.  Προθυμία describes the combatantsʼ willingness to 
fight based on their emotions and moral outrage.  ῾Ρώμη, on the other hand, 
refers both to the Lacedaemoniansʼ willingness to fight and to their belief, 
based on their knowledge of the Atheniansʼ difficult strategic position,50 that 
they are more likely to win the war than in the initial phase.  The confidence or 
enthusiasm described by ῥώμη may, therefore, have a rational component 
that makes it something like προθυμία combined with concrete reasons for 
expecting success.51   
 
1.3 Scholarly Models of Archaic and Classical Warfare 
Because morale is so deeply linked to values, it is necessary to discuss 
some contemporary scholarsʼ views of how the Greeks of the Archaic and 
Classical periods made war and what beliefs informed these modes of fighting.  
Thucydides himself notes the close connection between agrarian societies and 
the rise of major land wars, explaining that early Greeceʼs lack of static 
populations, surplus capital, and developed agriculture precluded the 
formation of δύναμις on land.52  Warriors in this period wore light armor or 
                                            
50 See also T 6.93.1, where the Lacedaemonians are moved by the advice of Alcibiades to 
fortify Decelea because they understand that he knows best how to combat the Athenians. 
51 A fuller discussion of the differences and similarities between these two terms appears in 
chapters four and five. 
52 Hanson (2000) 203, citing Thucydidesʼ characterization of Archaic Greek cities in 1.2.2: 
νεμόμενοί τε τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστοι ὅσον ἀποζῆν καὶ περιουσίαν χρημάτων οὐκ ἔχοντες 
οὐδὲ γῆν φυτεύοντες, ἄδηλον ὂν ὁπότε τις ἐπελθὼν καὶ ἀτειχίστων ἅμα ὄντων ἄλλος 
ἀφαιρήσεται, τῆς τε καθʼ ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίου τροφῆς πανταχοῦ ἂν ἡγούμενοι 
ἐπικρατεῖν, οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀπανίσταντο, καὶ διʼ αὐτὸ οὔτε μεγέθει πόλεων ἴσχυον οὔτε τῇ 
ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ “cultivating no more of their territory than the exigencies of life required, 
destitute of capital, never planting their land (for they could not tell when an invader might not 
come and take it all away, and when he did come they had no walls to stop him), thinking that 
the necessities of daily sustenance could be supplied at one place as well as another, they 
cared little for shifting their habitation, and consequently neither built large cities nor attained 
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none at all and carried a small shield, fighting in a wide-open formation with no 
distinction between archers and javelin-throwers.53  Modern scholarship on the 
history of Greek warfare has focused on the development and importance of 
the hoplite phalanx, a close formation often linked with the agrarian values of 
the polis.54  The word ὁπλίτης first appears in Pindar and Aeschylus as an 
adjective, and by the second half of the fifth century the noun became 
common.55  The noun refers to a “man comprehensively tooled up, geared up, 
to fight; the man equipped with the full tackle of war.”56  The full hoplite 
panoply consisted of an eight to ten foot thrusting spear, short swords, a 
bronze helmet, bronze greaves, and a cuirass of bronze, linen, or leather; the 
most important part was the circular shield, about thirty inches in diameter, 
with an arm strap and grip at the rim and made of wood or leather faced in 
bronze.57   
The archaeological record shows that hoplite armor was in use by the 
end of the eighth century, which suggests a tactical shift among Greeks in the 
Archaic Period toward close combat.58  Despite typological variations in armor, 
“we can see a continuity from the second half of the eighth century to the 
beginning of the fifth century, and in fact into the Classical and Hellenistic 
                                            
to any other form of greatness.” (trans. Crawley); and 1.15.2-3, which identifies the Lelantine 
war of c. 700 BCE as the first κατὰ γῆν πόλεμος, ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμις παρεγένετο “war by 
land, whence also some sort of empire came about.” 
53 Van Wees (2000) 155. 
54 See especially the works of V. D. Hanson, J. Lazenby, J. E. Lendon, W. K. Pritchett, and H. 
van Wees in the bibliography. 
55 Lazenby and Whitehead (1996) 32: Pindar Isthmian 1.23 (referring to the hoplitodromos); 
Aeschylus Seven Against Thebes 467, 717; cf. Aeschylus Persai 379 πᾶς θʼ ὅπλων 
ἐπιστάτης (referring to the soldiers defeated at Salamis). 
56 Lazenby and Whitehead (1996) 33. 
57 Oxford Classical Dictionary (1993), s. v. hoplites. 
58 Van Wees (2000) 134. 
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Periods to a considerable extent.”59  The full panoply could weigh as much as 
seventy pounds; but not all hoplites wore greaves, and a cuirass of linen or 
leather would be considerably lighter than one of bronze.60  Furthermore, 
literary and iconographical evidence suggests that hoplites in the mid-seventh 
century were equipped with javelins or throwing spears, rather than the 
thrusting spears of the phalanx.61  Yet the lack of depictions of throwing 
spears in the last quarter of the seventh century suggests a decline in the use 
of the javelin relative to the thrusting spear, a development that brings us 
closer to the tactics of the “classical phalanx.”62 
Homer praises the heroes of epic for many qualities, but the physical 
and mental qualities necessary for success in mass formations differ 
somewhat.63  Skill with a bow and swiftness of foot are no longer prized, and 
holding oneʼs ground, what Lendon calls “passive courage,” becomes the 
standard of martial virtue.64  Tyrtaeus, a Spartan poet of the Archaic period, 
gives an explicit definition of martial virtue and the good man, which Lendon 
uses to illustrate his definition of passive courage: 
ἥδʼ ἀρετή, τόδʼ ἄεθλον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἄριστον  
κάλλιστόν τε φέρειν γίνεται ἀνδρὶ νέωι.  
ξυνὸν δʼ ἐσθλὸν τοῦτο πόληΐ τε παντί τε δήμωι,  
ὅστις ἀνὴρ διαβὰς ἐν προμάχοισι μένηι  
νωλεμέως, αἰσχρῆς δὲ φυγῆς ἐπὶ πάγχυ λάθηται,  
ψυχὴν καὶ θυμὸν τλήμονα παρθέμενος,  
θαρσύνηι δʼ ἔπεσιν τὸν πλησίον ἄνδρα παρεστώς·  
οὗτος ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γίνεται ἐν πολέμωι.65 
                                            
59 Jarva (1995) 159. 
60 Rawlings (2000) 246; Jarva (1995) 156-158. 
61 Van Wees (2000) 147-148. 
62 Ibid. 149. 
63 Lendon (2005) 46-49. 
64 Ibid. 50; Lazenby (1991) 103. 
65 Lendon (2005) 50; Tyrtaeus 12.14-20: “This is virtue, this is the best prize among men and 
the most noble for a young man to win.  This is a shared good for the city and all the people: 
when someone has planted his feet firmly and endures among the front ranks unceasingly, 
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Unlike Callinus, Tyrtaeus nowhere in the surviving fragments calls for throwing 
spears, which may be linked to the decline of throwing spears in art noted 
above.66  Yet in the poems of Tyrtaeus the light armed (γυμνήτης) mingle 
freely with the heavy infantry in one, undifferentiated formation, and missiles 
play an important role in combat.67  As formations grew closer at the end of the 
seventh century, the archer was reduced from a prominent and independent 
position to dependence on the hoplite for defense; at the same time, the 
transition from javelins to thrusting spears marks the emergence of the fully 
armed hoplite discussed above.68   
The beginning of the hoplite era is conventionally attributed to the 
Lelantine war between the Chalcidians and the Eretrians, said by Strabo to 
have involved an agreement not to use missiles:69  
Τὸ μὲν οὖν πλέον ὡμολόγουν ἀλλήλαις αἱ πόλεις αὗται, περὶ δὲ 
Ληλάντου διενεχθεῖσαι ... οὐδʼ οὕτωτελέως ἐπαύσαντο ... ὥστʼ ἐν 
τῷ πολέμῳ κατὰ αὐθάδειαν δρᾶν ἕκαστα, ἀλλὰ συνέθεντο ἐφʼ οἷς 
συστήσονται τὸν ἀγῶνα. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ Ἀμαρυνθίῳ 
στήλη τις φράζουσα μὴ χρῆσθαι τηλεβόλοις.70 
As mentioned above, this is the same conflict that Thucydides calls the first 
land war.  Thucydides also probably regarded the combat of three hundred 
picked Spartans and Argives to decide possession of Thyrea as an historical 
                                            
and he totally forgets shameful flight, staking his life and his steadfast spirit, and he 
encourages and inspires the man beside him with his words.  This man is good in war.” 
66 Van Wees (2000) 151. 
67 Ibid., 151, citing Tyrtaeus 11.35-38, 23a10-14, and 19.19-20. 
68 Van Wees (200) 154. 
69 Pritchett 2 (1974) 173, 251-252. 
70 Strabo 10.1.12: “Now in general these cities were in accord with one another, and when 
differences arose concerning the Lelantine Plain they did not so completely break off relations 
as to wage their wars in all respects according to the will of each, but they came to an 
agreement as to the conditions under which they were to conduct the fight. This fact, among 
others, is disclosed by a certain pillar in the Amarynthium, which forbids the use of long 
distance missiles” (tr. H. L. Jones 1924). 
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event.71 This type of warfare is characterized by prearranged battles on open 
plains governed by numerous other conventions.72 
War of the Archaic and Classical periods, before the outbreak of the 
Peloponnesian War, usually consisted not of campaigns but of single infantry 
battles.73  The agrarian character of the polis led to “brutal battles of an hour or 
so defining war between reluctant farmers with harvest responsibilities at 
home.”74  The dominant mode of fighting was the tightly massed formation 
called by modern scholars the “hoplite phalanx.”75  In a typical hoplite battle, 
the two sides drew up their formations opposite one another on level ground.76  
The general often encouraged his troops in some way, and there was always 
a sacrifice.77  Then both sides advanced, but often one side or part of one side 
broke and ran at the first collision or even before.78  If neither side broke, the 
battle then entered the ʻshovingʼ (ὠθισμός) stage, the exact nature of which is 
disputed.79  Eventually, because of gaps in the line or the weight of the 
opponentʼs shove, one side broke and ran (the τροπή).80  Sometimes the rout 
started in a specific part of the line, but the panic usually spread to the whole 
army and resulted in a hasty and disordered retreat.81  In such a battle, morale 
is absolutely central to success.82  The side that loses by retreating, especially 
if no actual blow is struck, simply has more fragile morale.  Once the retreat 
                                            
71 Pritchett 2 (1974) 173, referring to T 5.41. 
72 Ibid.; Hanson (2000) 207-208. 
73 Mitchell (1996) 87; Hanson (1991) 3-4. 
74 Hanson (2005) 19. 
75 Lendon (2005) 43-44. 
76 Mitchell (1996) 94; Lazenby (1991) 88; Lendon (2005) 41. 
77 Encouragement: Lazenby (1991) 89; sacrifice: Mitchell (1996) 94; Lendon (2005) 42. 
78 Lazenby (1991) 91-92.  
79 Ibid., 96-98; van Wees (2000) 131-132. 
80 Lazenby (1991) 100; Lendon (2005) 42. 
81 Lazenby (1991) 100-101.  
82 Ibid., 104.  
 18 
happened, pursuit was limited, and there was little killing of prisoners or 
civilians.83 
Lendon argues that hoplite battle became predominant because of the 
unique appeal it had to the Greek competitive ethos.84  He believes that 
Greeks viewed the phalanx as more fair than other types of battle and so 
preferred it as a means to settle military disputes on even terms.  Hanson links 
hoplite warfare with the agrarian social context of the ancient Greek polis.  The 
Greeks associated societies based in mountainous areas, like Crete or Aetolia 
with ambushes and missile attacks, while cavalry controlled areas of open 
plains, like Thessaly.85  The small valleys and enclaves tucked between 
mountains where the agrarian polis thrives are also the perfect setting for 
hoplite warfare.86  This kind of warfare allowed border conflicts to be frequent 
but not catastrophic to Greek society as a whole, since it greatly limited the 
human and economic destructiveness of war; it is also linked to the political 
dominance of the land-owning classes, who alone could afford the panoply 
and held full voting rights.87 
A number of scholars have theorized about when the model outlined 
above best characterized Greek warfare.88  Some dissenters, however, have 
argued that the hoplite model is not the reality of Greek war, but rather reflects 
romanticized ideas about the past.89  Van Wees concludes, based on literary 
and artistic evidence, that the phalanx had not taken its classical form by 600 
                                            
83 Hanson (2000) 219. 
84 Lendon (2005) 52-57. 
85 Hanson (2000) 209. 
86 Ibid., 208. 
87 Ibid., 219. 
88 See Hanson (2000), Lendon (2005), and van Wees (2000) cited below.  
89 See especially Krentz (2000) and Rawlings (2000). 
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BCE, and may not even have emerged until after the Persian Wars.90  Lendon 
claims that the phalanx had fully developed by the fifth century, with the 
change completed by the Peloponnesian War.91  And yet Hanson argues that 
the Persian Wars sowed the seeds that ended the age of hoplite warfare, 
since the cities that rose to prominence in their aftermath, Athens and Sparta, 
were well equipped to fight wars that consisted of more than single clashes of 
citizen-soldiers.92  He believes that the conventions of hoplite battle continue 
to appear in our historical sources for two reasons: first, because pitched 
battle is an excellent way to ruin an enemy army, whether or not the sides 
have agreed beforehand to honor the outcome; second, because the protocols 
of hoplite battle mostly did survive, such as pre-battle speeches, sacrifice 
before battle, limited pursuit, exchange of the dead, and the erection of 
trophies.93  
Krentz rejects the developmental model of martial ethics, arguing that 
the heroic code from Homer through the Classical Period values deception 
and surprise as well as open and ʻhonestʼ fighting.94  He alludes to the Spartan 
custom of sacrificing a bull for a victory by stratagem or a cock for victory in 
open battle and compiles a list of mythical and historical Spartan deceivers.95  
Krentz also offers a list of mythical and historical Athenian tricksters, starting 
with Theseus, contra Periclesʼ claim in the funeral oration that unlike the 
Lacedaemonians, the Athenians do not trust in deception.96  In fact, 
                                            
90 Van Wees (2000) 155-156. 
91 Lendon (2005) 43-44. 
92 Hanson (2000) 211-212. 
93 Ibid. 222. 
94 Krentz (2000) 172. 
95 Ibid. 175, for the sacrificial custom see Plutarch Mor. 238f. 
96 Ibid. 176, citing T 2.39.1. 
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cleverness and desperation resulted in boldness and deception in all periods; 
when a commander is not confident of defeating an enemy in open battle, 
ambush becomes more appealing.97  Indeed, Lendon admits that much of our 
evidence for the elements of ritualized hoplite battle comes from descriptions 
of later battles that do not fit the paradigm, concluding that “[i]n reality Greek 
hoplite warfare existed in perennial tension between battle conducted 
according to understood rules and the crafty subversion of those rules.”98   
War in the Classical period often little resembled the conventional 
hoplite battle, whether or not it existed in an earlier period, but hoplite 
protocols did govern some aspects of warfare.99  Despite the Peloponnesian 
War differing greatly from these supposed earlier hoplite border conflicts, the 
protocols outlined by Hanson still exerted great influence on the Greeks of 
Thucydidesʼ day.100  And yet Lendon cites examples from Homer all the way 
through Herodotus and Thucydides of generals who were praised for winning 
through stratagem or trickery.101  He argues that Thucydidesʼ ambivalent 
attitude toward trickery reveals that the value of victory by stratagem was hotly 
debated, since it could bring honor to the victorious general but did not allow 
the soldiers to prove their own courage in a symmetrical hoplite contest.102  
Furthermore, most Greeks of the 5th century, including possibly Thucydides 
himself, would have believed in the historicity of the prohibition of missiles in 
                                            
97 Ibid. 177. 
98 Lendon (2005) 83. 
99 Hanson (2000) 222. See also Lendon (2005) 81-82, which argues against the 
developmental model. 
100 For instance, Pritchett 2 194-195 collects a long list of battle arrays described by 
Thucydides. 
101 Lendon (2005) 85-90, statements in favor of trickery are made by an Elean general at 
3.30.4 and Brasidas 5.9.4-5; see also Losada (1972) 129-130, 141. 
102 Lendon (2005) 86-87. 
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the Lelantine War.103  Even if modern scholars reject the idea of development 
in military ethics, the hoplite phalanx would have represented an older and 
fairer type of fighting to Thucydides and others in the 4th and 5th centuries. 
The Peloponnesian War consisted of more than hoplite battles.  The 
citizen who possessed the panoply was trained to be effective in martial 
activities outside the phalanx, and raiding, marine service, and other kinds of 
operation were all a part of war.104  Hanson, in his book about the experience 
of fighting the Peloponnesian War, has chapters on irregular fighting, hoplite 
warfare, sieges, and trireme warfare, among other things.105  In the 
Peloponnesian War, the conventions that governed the limited warfare of 
hoplite battle were ignored, and the total war of sieges, naval assaults, night 
raids, ambushes, and massacres became the norm.106  And yet those 
conventions still have a powerful influence of the values implicit in the 
speeches in Thucydidesʼ account and in his own judgments of individuals and 
battles.  Ultimately, an investigation of these implicit characterizations will 
reveal much about the nature of morale in the Peloponnesian War. 
 
1.4 Subsequent Chapters 
As mentioned above, the chapters will be organized around certain 
recurring themes related to morale in the Peloponnesian War. This thematic 
organization will enable me to identify which psychological factors Thucydides 
finds most important and to show how these various factors function differently 
according to the situation.  Furthermore, my investigation of the relationships 
                                            
103 Strabo 10.1.12, Pritchett 2 173. 
104 Rawlings (2000) 249-250. 
105 Hanson (2005) xvi. 
106 Mitchell (1996) 92; Hanson (1991) 5. 
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between these psychological concepts will determine to what extent 
Thucydides has a schematic view of morale in battle. As Lord explains, the 
differing morales of groups, in his case European nation-states rather than 
Greek city-states, affects how they react not only to war but also to other sorts 
of social or political upheaval; furthermore, there are direct links between 
national morale and the morale of an army.107   
This project carefully distinguishes the narrative and Thucydidesʼ 
statements in his own voice from claims made in direct and indirect speeches, 
in order to illuminate one aspect of Thucydidesʼ historiographical approach to 
battle, namely the role of morale and how it is conceptualized.  That is not to 
say that the speeches cannot represent Thucydidesʼ own view, since they 
often do, but the reader must always remain aware of the form that the 
discourse takes.  A full understanding can come only from looking at the 
narrative and speeches together, noting especially who is deploying the words 
with which this study is concerned and how the narrative implicitly comments 
on the speeches.108  What emerges are certain paradigms, through which 
Thucydides connects specific events to more general themes.  Paradigms in 
the work of Thucydides are not eternal and unchanging patterns; in fact, 
Thucydides emphasizes the differences between events as well as the 
similarities.109  As one reads the History, the presentations of courage and the 
factors that affect morale expand, change, and are refined.  Morale describes 
                                            
107 Lord (1918) 146-153; Lord argues that in times of great upheaval, such as the French 
Revolution or the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, lack of trained skill on the part of those ruling 
leads to the same kind of panic terror felt by an untrained army.  He also contrasts the 
superior national and army morale of France and England with that of Germany during World 
War I. 
108 Hornblower (1987) 66-69; on Thucydidesʼ “implicit” method see also Rawlings (1981) 3-4, 
and Connor (1984) 11-17. 
109 Rawlings (1981) 262-263. 
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not only the mental state of soldiers on the battlefield but also the 
psychological response of cities or nations to the continuing stresses of war.  
Although Greek has no single word equivalent to English morale, the modern 
idea offers a productive framework for investigating Thucydidesʼ account of 
social psychology in the Peloponnesian War.  The following four chapters are 
structured as word studies, beginning with a survey of the word groupʼs history 
in 5th century and earlier literature before a detailed consideration of the main 
ways that Thucydides uses and conceptualizes the word.   
The second chapter investigates how ἀνδρεία, courage or manliness, 
is related to the morale of the participants in the Peloponnesian War.  I show 
how Thucydides himself deploys the word ἀνδρεία and how Athens and 
Sparta conceptualize it differently.  As one of the most positive 5th century 
terms relating to the mental aspects of war, its use reveals what qualities 
leaders and cities value in warfare.  The word ἀνδρεία originated in the 5th 
century, and while Herodotus and the tragedians sometimes used it 
paradoxically of women, Thucydides only applies it to men from Greek city 
states. Thucydidesʼ attribution of ἀνδρεία to the Spartans at Mantinea,110 their 
greatest hoplite victory of the war, shows how he values different types of 
combat, specifically that he is part of the widespread phenomenon of Greek 
“hoplite chauvinism,” which holds that hoplite battle is the best way to settle 
military disputes.111  Lendon argues that hoplite combat held such appeal to 
the Greeks because the clash of hoplite phalanxes was the ultimate 
symmetrical test of both individualsʼ and citiesʼ passive courage, a mental 
                                            
110 T 5.72.2. 
111 Hanson (2000) 219-222.  See also Pritchett 2 173-174, 251-252. 
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quality that men exhibit by standing their ground as a unit.112  In fact, many 
have privileged hand-to-hand combat as the most courageous way to fight 
throughout history, from Homer to the modern day.113   
Yet ἀνδρεία is not one of the main virtues the Athenians claim for 
themselves.  Thucydidean speakers sometimes speak of ἀνδρεία as a natural 
quality rather than something that can be learned, and so the Athenians place 
more emphasis on other qualities.  Thus, one goal of this chapter is 
determining the relationship between ἀνδρεία and ἐπιστήμη.  Furthermore, 
the values reflected in the terms each city uses for valor also manifest 
themselves in the tactics and strategy that both sides use.  The naval power of 
Athens required specially trained seamen with great technical skill, but the 
land army of Sparta required physical strength and experience in hand-to-
hand combat.  Comparison of Spartan and Athenian conceptions of manliness 
to Moranʼs ideas about natural and democratic courage shows the 
timelessness of the struggle between these two different formulations of 
bravery.114  The Spartansʼ reputation as brave liberators is probably their most 
important asset in the war.  It causes most of Greece to favor them at the 
warʼs outset, Brasidas cements it among the subject allies of Athens, and the 
battle of Mantinea wipes away the damage done to it after Pylos.  Sparta 
proves to be deficient in τόλμα throughout the extant Histories, but their 
reputation for ἀνδρεία, except perhaps in the period between Pylos and 
Mantinea, obtains goodwill for them from most of Greece. 
                                            
112 Lendon (2005) 63. 
113 Hanson (2004) 93. 
114 Moran (1987) 3-9. 
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The third chapter will continue the investigation of values and morale 
begun in chapter two, by examining τόλμα, the quality that Thucydides pairs 
with ἀνδρεία in 3.82.  The possession or lack of τόλμα is one of the major 
differences between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians.  This chapter 
looks at τόλμα as a value that is more or less central to a cityʼs ideas about 
how war should be fought.  Thus, I explore how Thucydides develops τόλμα 
as a psychological concept and how it affects both its possessorsʼ and their 
opponentsʼ performance in the war in the short and long term.  Although 
valuing and promoting τόλμα helps the Athenians win many battles, it also 
makes them prone to civil strife.  Authors as early as Homer used τόλμα to 
mean both daring and excessive boldness, but Thucydides explores the 
relationship between positive and negative τόλμα in unprecedented detail.  In 
Thucydidesʼ account, τόλμα brings many immediate benefits to Athens, but an 
excess of τόλμα leads the Athenians to turn against one another and lose the 
war.  Thus, the Spartan policy of shunning daring action contributes to their 
eventual victory, even as it causes them to lose opportunities to end the war 
sooner.  The connection between τόλμα and stasis is so strong that cities 
where τόλμα is valued highly very easily fall prey to civil war.  The 
Syracusansʼ possession of τόλμα makes them more successful adversaries 
for the Athenians than the Lacedaemonians, but it is not an unambiguously 
positive quality. 
The fourth chapter investigates προθυμία, spirit or enthusiasm, which 
the Athenians initially claim as their own based on their actions in the Persian 
Wars but both sides possess in great measure at different times.  Προθυμία 
figures prominently in both Thucydidesʼ analysis of different citiesʼ morale and 
a number of speakersʼ arguments in front of current and potential allies, since 
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it can mean enthusiasm for war or for alliance.  In fact, the text of the treaty 
between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians that ended the Archidamian 
War includes a clause promising that the terms of the treaty will be followed 
enthusiastically.115  In addition, both the Athenians and the Syracusans are 
concerned with their own and their alliesʼ προθυμία during the conflict in Sicily.  
And yet the passage that most indicates the importance of προθυμία is 
Diodotusʼ claim that neither force of law nor anything else terrible can deter a 
man, once he has embarked on a course of action with enthusiasm.116  
Indeed, this sort of enthusiasm motivates a number of the major participants in 
the stasis at Athens after the disaster in Sicily. 
The fifth chapter looks at Thucydidesʼ use of the term ῥώμη, strength or 
force.  The term ῥώμη is sometimes a near synonym for προθυμία, but ῥώμη 
is more decisive in the sense that Thucydides links the possession of ῥώμη to 
victory while προθυμία can be characteristic of those losing a battle.  It also 
comes closer in meaning to English ʻhigh moraleʼ than any other term 
appearing in Thucydides.  Thucydides innovatively uses ῥώμη, which 
originally referred to bodily power, to describe the psychological strength and 
military force of the various states and leaders involved in the Peloponnesian 
War.  Unlike earlier authors, who refer to ῥώμη as a physical in contrast to 
mental quality, Thucydidean ῥώμη often depends on reason as well as 
material power.  Although Euripides innovatively uses ῥώμη to refer to the 
impersonal force of wind and battle, Thucydides considers ῥώμη a purely 
human characteristic.  In Thucydidesʼ Histories, one side or the other typically 
has the edge in ῥώμη, so tracking this concept reveals Thucydidesʼ analysis 
                                            
115 T 5.23.1, 5.23.2. 
116 T 3.45.7. 
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of the psychological and material advantages enjoyed by different cities.  
Thucydides emphasizes the possession or lack of ῥώμη at pivotal moments in 
the war, such as the episode at Pylos, Athensʼ decision to negotiate the Peace 
of Nicias, the departure and failure of the Sicilian Expedition, and Athensʼ 
recovery in book eight.  In addition, the way Thucydides deploys the 
terminology in direct and indirect speech adds to his characterization of 
political and military leaders. The importance of ῥώμη to Thucydidesʼ 
psychology of war is most clear in his account of the Sicilian Expedition, where 
the author carefully uses the term in narrative and speeches to explore how 
and why so great an Athenian force was so utterly destroyed. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
MORALE AND VALUES: ANDREIA 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The word ἀνδρεία, unlike some of the other terms in the present study, 
has been the subject of sustained inquiry.117  Its basic definition is “manliness, 
manly spirit,” since it is the abstract noun formed from the root of ἀνήρ.118  It 
can also be rendered “courage,” which better captures most uses of the 
word.119  The term is post-Homeric and first appears in Aechylusʼ Seven 
Against Thebes.120  For the most part, “war is the prototypical scene for 
manifestations of courage and manliness” in Ancient Greek sources,121 and 
Thucydides is no exception.  Bassi concludes, however, based on the 
evidence of the tragedians and Thucydides, that the concept of ἀνδρεία 
develops in the fifth century “as a political virtue attached to poleis as 
collective entities.”122  She later adds that “andreia is polis specific and part of 
a competitive discourse between rival cities and political systems,” and argues 
that Thucydidesʼ text, especially his discussion of stasis at 3.82, illustrates the 
profound effects of differing evaluations of ἀνδρεία.123  What acts a man 
deems courageous sheds considerable light on his value system, since 
labeling “someone or something ʻcourageousʼ is to commend that person or 
                                            
117 In addition to Huart (1968), Rosen and Sluiter (2003) is a publication of a conference 
entirely on ἀνδρεία in antiquity, and Balot (2001) deals with Athenian democratic courage. 
118 LSJ, s. v. ἀνδρεία. 
119 Chantraine (1999) 88. 
120 Bassi (2003) 32-33. 
121 Sluiter and Rosen (2003) 8. 
122 Bassi (2003) 47. 
123 Ibid. 
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action, and thus has a performative force that far outstrips the merely 
descriptive.”124  Although Bassi proves that Thucydides represents a discourse 
of ἀνδρεία, she does not attempt to identify the definition that Thucydides 
himself favors.  This chapter, therefore, carefully distinguishes uses of 
ἀνδρεία in Thucydidesʼ own voice from occurrences in direct or indirect 
speech, in order to determine how Thucydides himself views ἀνδρεία.  The 
values that different speakers assign ἀνδρεία also reveal Thucydidesʼ implicit 
analysis of their morale, since oneʼs conception of courage informs when and 
how long one will fight. 
 In the text of Thucydides, forms of the abstract noun ἀνδρεία occur 
seven times, and forms of the adjective ἀνδρεῖος occur nine times.125  
Thucydides in his own voice, as distinguished from direct speeches and 
paraphrase of historical persons, does not use the adjective but uses the noun 
four times.  Unlike other authors, who sometimes use the adjective to mean 
“human” or “masculine,” ἀνδρεῖος always relates to courage in Thucydidesʼ 
text.  Thus, I typically translate ἀνδρεία as ʻcourageʼ and ἀνδρεῖος as 
ʻcourageous,ʼ although in some contexts ʻmanlinessʼ and ʻmanlyʼ are 
preferable.  Thucydides also uses the abstract noun εὐψυχία or the adjective 
εὔψυχος as a near synonym of ἀνδρεία, so I translate εὐψυχία as ʻbraveryʼ 
to preserve a formal distinction.  Unlike ἀνδρεία, Thucydides only uses 
εὐψυχία in direct and indirect speeches, never in the narrative.126  Although I 
                                            
124 Sluiter and Rosen (2003) 2. 
125 ἀνδρεία: T 2.39.4, 2.87.4, 3.82.4, 5.72.2, 6.69.1, 6.72.2, 6.72.4; ἀνδρεῖος: 2.39.1, 2.87.3 
(twice), 2.89.2, 4.126.5, 4.126.6; ἀνδρείως: 2.64.2, 4.120.3, 5.9.9. 
126 εὐψυχία and εὔψυχος, often in the neuter singular as an abstract, occur a total of eleven 
times: 1.84.3 (Archidamus), 1.121.4 (Corinthians), 2.11.5 (Archidamus), 2.43.4 (Pericles), 
2.39.1 (Pericles), 2.87.4 (Cnemus, Brasidas, et al.), 2.89.3 (Phormio), 4.126.6 (Brasidas), 
5.9.1 (Brasidas), 6.72.4 (Hermocrates), 7.64.2 (Nicias). 
 30 
will discuss some occurrences of εὐψυχία, I seek to avoid conflating 
Thucydidesʼ use of ἀνδρεία and εὐψυχία simply because the English word 
ʻcourageʼ can translate both. 
 A number of scholars have explored the relationship between εὐψυχία 
and knowledge or reason, but the relationship between ἀνδρεία and 
ἐπιστήμη is less well established.  Huart argues that εὐψυχία is a kind of 
courage combined with experience that is equivalent to ἀνδρεία combined 
with ἐπιστήμη.127  In her study of courage from Homer to Aristotle, Smoes 
identifies Thucydides with a form of rational courage that developed out of 
Athenian intellectualism and also found expression in the Laches and 
Protagoras of Plato, but she does not relate this kind of courage to 
ἀνδρεία.128  Similarly, Balotʼs argument that democratic courage in the 
speeches of Pericles is a composite virtue requiring knowledge and a properly 
habituated character focuses on εὐψυχία and the phrase κράτιστοι τὴν 
ψυχήν.129  Thus, ἀνδρεία in Thucydides still merits some exclusive attention, 
since the Anglo-French concept of courage has led scholars to discuss 
ἀνδρεία and εὐψυχία indiscriminately.  The exact relationship between 
knowledge or experience and ἀνδρεία still needs to be determined, and 
Thucydidesʼ own view should be distinguished from claims reportedly made by 
                                            
127 Huart (1968) 404-439. 
128 Smoes (1995) 88-97; she mentions Huart arguing that εὐψυχία is ἀνδρεία plus ἐπιστήμη, 
but she never discusses any instances of ἀνδρεία in Thucydidesʼ text. 
129 Balot (2001) 505-525, who extensively discusses εὐψυχία but only mentions two instances 
of ἀνδρεία, at 2.39.4 and 2.87.4.  Although he does not discuss Huartʼs argument, Balot 
refers to Periclesʼ use of ἀνδρεία at T 2.39.4 as natural courage (512-513).  Based on 2.87.4, 
Balot also argues that Brasidas sees courage as “that feature of character that allows people 
to maintain their technical knowledge in circumstances where they are apt to forget it through 
fear of losing their lives” (518).  Balot (2004) 407-408 defends his practice of identifying 
κράτιστοι τὴν ψυχήν, ἀνδρεία, and other Greek words and phrases as “courage” but does 
not explicitly discuss ἀνδρεία in Thucydides. 
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the speakers.  This chapter will discuss a few instances of εὐψυχία, but the 
main focus will be on ἀνδρεία and its derivatives, in order to minimize the risk 
of creating connections based on modern lexical values that Thucydides did 
not intend. 
This chapter first shows how Thucydidesʼ predecessors and 
contemporaries used ἀνδρεία and derivatives, in order to understand the 
range of meaning of ἀνδρεία and the various contexts in which it typically 
appears.  Then, I investigate the ways in which Thucydides himself uses 
ἀνδρεία before progressing to a discussion of ἀνδρεία in the speeches.  
Although Thucydides alerts the reader that different groups have their own 
definitions of ἀνδρεία in his description of stasis (3.82), he otherwise 
advances a fairly limited view of ἀνδρεία as the virtue that enables members 
of a Greek polis to defend it on the battlefield.  Rhetorical ἀνδρεία appears 
most frequently in the speeches of Pericles and Brasidas.  Both leaders 
caricature and attack their opponentsʼ ἀνδρεία in order to confirm the 
ἀνδρεία of their listeners.  At the same time, the uses of ἀνδρεία in the 
speeches also enable Thucydides to explore the relationship between 
ἀνδρεία and other qualities like τόλμα and ἐμπειρία. 
 
2.2 ἀνδρεία in Other Authors 
Because Thucydides uses somewhat ἀνδρεία differently from his 
predecessors and contemporaries, an investigation of the termʼs relatively 
short history before Thucydides is instructive.  Bassi prefaces her discussion 
of 3.82 with some examples of ἀνδρεία from the Attic dramatists and 
Herodotus, but her examples are not exhaustive; she concentrates on proving 
the existence of a discourse of ἀνδρεία rather than revealing the full extent of 
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this discourse.  Thus, the current chapter deals at length with the ways in 
which Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, and Herodotus use 
ἀνδρεία.  The word ἀνδρεία is post-Homeric, occurring for the first time in 
Aeschylusʼ Seven Against Thebes, when the Argive warriors are described as 
having θυμὸς burning with ἀνδρεία: σιδηρόφρων γὰρ θυμὸς ἀνδρείαι 
φλέγων / ἔπνει λεόντων ὣς Ἄρη δεδορκότων.130  Here, ἀνδρεία is one of 
many attributes of the fearsome Argive warriors, and Aeschylus uses the word 
to reinforce the martial prowess of the men he describes.  Except for the new 
word ἀνδρεία, the lines otherwise have a Homeric flavor, especially “the 
metaphorical use of πνέω and the lion simile.”131 
One of two appearances of ἀνδρεία in the extant plays of Sophocles 
describes Electra,132 who tries to convince her sister to join in plotting revenge 
by imagining aloud how the townspeople would praise the sisters for killing 
their mother and her lover: 
ἴδεσθε τώδε τὼ κασιγνήτω, φίλοι, 
ὣ τὸν πατρῷον οἶκον ἐξεσωσάτην, 
ὣ τοῖσιν ἐχθροῖς εὖ βεβηκόσιν ποτὲ 
ψυχῆς ἀφειδήσαντε προυστήτην φόνου. 
τούτω φιλεῖν χρή, τώδε χρὴ πάντας σέβειν· 
τώδʼ ἔν θʼ ἑορταῖς ἔν τε πανδήμῳ πόλει 
τιμᾶν ἅπαντας οὕνεκʼ ἀνδρείας χρεών.133 
Despite the strategy of distancing that Electra employs by putting her self-
praise in the mouth of an imaginary other, Electra is envisioning public 
                                            
130 Aeschylus Seven Against Thebes 52-53: “Their iron-hearted spirit burning with courage 
breathed war, like lions with flashing eyes.” 
131 Bassi (2003) 38. 
132 In addition, there is an adjectival form meaning ʻhuman,ʼ which describes the hybrid body of 
the river Achelous at Trachiniae 12. 
133 Sophocles Electra 977-983: “Look at these two sisters, friends, who saved their paternal 
house, who risking their lives presided over slaughter for their once prospering enemies. We 
should love them, we should all revere them, we should all honor them in festivals and with the 
whole city because of their courage.” 
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recognition or kleos modeled on Achillesʼ glory for avenging Patroclusʼ 
death.134  And yet, ἀνδρεία is used by and of a woman, despite the 
etymological paradox of feminine manliness.  Therefore, Sophocles is here 
calling attention to “the emergence of a manliness that is no longer anêr 
specific.”135 
The only other appearance of ἀνδρεία in Sophocles has a more 
traditionally martial connotation.  In a fragment of the satyr play Trackers, 
Silenus remonstrates with the chorus: 
εἰ δέ που δέῃ, 
π̣ι̣σ̣τ̣οὶ λόγοισιν ὄντες ἔργα φεύγετε, 
τοιοῦ̣[δ]ε πατρός, ὦ κάκιστα θηρίων, 
οὗ πόλλʼ ἐφʼ ἥβης μνήματʼ ἀνδρείας ὕπο  
κ[ε]ῖται παρʼ οἴκοις νυμφικοῖς ἠσκημένα, 
οὐκ εἰς φυγὴν κλίνοντος, οὐ δειλ[ο]υμένου, 
οὐδὲ ψόφοισι τῶν ὀρειτρόφων βοτῶν 
[π]τήσσοντος, ἀλλʼ α[ἰχ]μαῖσιν ἐξει[ρ]γασμένου 
[ἃ] νῦν ὑφʼ ὑμῶν λάμ[πρʼ ἀ]π̣ορρυπαίνεται 
[ψ]όφῳ νεώρει κόλακ[ι] ποιμένων π[ο]θέν.136 
Although Silenus further defines ἀνδρεία as not fleeing or showing cowardice, 
the passage is not free from comic undertones, since the courageous person 
Silenus praises is himself.  Thus, Sophocles uses ἀνδρεία with what appears 
to be a traditional and epic-style connotation of ʻcourage,ʼ but both 
occurrences are somewhat ambivalent.  The poor preservation of Sophoclesʼ 
work prevents any firm conclusions, since numerous counter examples may 
                                            
134 Bassi (2003) 41. 
135 Ibid. 42. 
136 Sophocles Frag. 314 (Radt) 151-160: “And if somehow it should be necessary, be trusty in 
words and avoid actions, worst of beasts, even though your father was such a man.  There 
are many tricked out memorials at the shrine of the nymphs for him because of his courage in 
the time of his youth, when he did not turn to flight, did not show cowardice, did not even 
cower at the sounds of the mountain bred beasts, but accomplished with the spear brilliant 
deeds which are now tarnished by you shepherds from somewhere or other with your recent 
flattery.” 
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once have existed, but Sophocles may have viewed ἀνδρεία as a mock-
serious word.137 
The plays of Euripides contain many more references to ἀνδρεία, but 
they present a concept whose definition changes according to the context.  
Like Thucydides, Euripides seems to have some interest in the relationship 
between courage and knowledge.  Yet the nature of his medium allows him to 
advance many different views, some of them contradictory.  Often, ἀνδρεία 
appears as one attribute in a number of positive qualities.  One fragment reads 
γνώμης σόφισμα καὶ χέρʼ ἀνδρείαν ἔχων / δύσμορφος εἴην μᾶλλον ἢ 
καλὸς κακός.138 In this statement, the adjectival form describes a body part, 
so ἀνδρεία describes the physical aspect of goodness.  Similarly, a 
messenger in the Orestes describes an unnamed citizen who couples courage 
and other positive qualities with ugliness:  
ἄλλος δʼ ἀναστὰς ἔλεγε τῶιδʼ ἐναντία, 
μορφῆι μὲν οὐκ εὐωπός, ἀνδρεῖος δʼ ἀνήρ, 
ὀλιγάκις ἄστυ κἀγορᾶς χραίνων κύκλον, 
αὐτουργός, οἵπερ καὶ μόνοι σώιζουσι γῆν, 
ξυνετὸς δέ, χωρεῖν ὁμόσε τοῖς λόγοις θέλων, 
ἀκέραιον ἀνεπίπληκτον ἠσκηκὼς βίον·139 
This portrait of the courageous yeoman farmer, on whom the well being of the 
city depends, reflects many of the aspects of the hoplite ideal.140  Furthermore, 
unlike the description in Iphigenia at Aulis, discussed below, this man unifies 
                                            
137 Compare the wordsʼ usage in Aristophanes, discussed below. 
138 Euripides Frag. 842 (Nauck) 1-2: “I would rather be ugly with wisdom of the mind and a 
courageous hand than beautiful and bad.” 
139 Euripides Orestes 917-922: “Another man stood up and spoke against that man.  He was 
not good looking in form, but we was a courageous man, rarely in contact with town and the 
circuit of the marketplace; he was a farmer, those who alone protect the land. He was clever 
and willing to come together in arguments, and he had lived a life without stain and 
irreproachable.” 
140 Hanson (2000) 208-209.  He also seems somewhat similar to Alcibiadesʼ portrait of the 
ugly yet noble Socrates in Platoʼs Symposium (215a-222b), especially in his readiness to 
debate while avoiding politics. 
 35 
intelligence and courage.  In Trojan Women, Andromache laments the 
husband she lost: σὲ δʼ, ὦ φίλʼ Ἕκτορ, εἶχον ἄνδρʼ ἀρκοῦντά μοι / ξυνέσει 
γένει πλούτωι τε κἀνδρείαι μέγαν.141 Here again ἀνδρεία occurs as a term 
of praise alongside mental ability, this time joined by wealth and good 
breeding.  In another fragment, the speaker uses ἀνδρεία to redefine 
εὐγένεια as something relating to character rather than birth: ἐγὼ μὲν <οὖν> 
οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅτῳ σκοπεῖν χρεὼν / τὴν εὐγένειαν· τοὺς γὰρ ἀνδρείους φύσιν / 
καὶ τοὺς δικαίους τῶν κενῶν δοξασμάτων, / κἂν ὦσι δούλων, 
εὐγενεστέρους λέγω.142  In this passage, φύσις could refer to strictly 
physical but more likely refers to character.143  Thus, the pairing with δίκαιος 
probably combines goodness in war with goodness in peace. 
 In the Andromache, Euripides explicitly relates ἀνδρεία to war.  Hector 
advances a rather sophistic argument that the Trojan War was ultimately 
beneficial to the Greeks: 
Ἑλένη δʼ ἐμόχθησʼ οὐχ ἑκοῦσʼ ἀλλʼ ἐκ θεῶν, 
καὶ τοῦτο πλεῖστον ὠφέλησεν Ἑλλάδα· 
ὅπλων γὰρ ὄντες καὶ μάχης ἀίστορες 
ἔβησαν ἐς τἀνδρεῖον· ἡ δʼ ὁμιλία 
πάντων βροτοῖσι γίγνεται διδάσκαλος.144 
Here ἀνδρεία is comes from experience with war, so Menelaus implies that it 
can be gained or learned.  In the Iphigenia at Aulis, the character Menelaus 
advances a different point of view: μηδένʼ ἀνδρείας ἕκατι προστάτην 
                                            
141 Euripides Trojan Women 673-674: “Dear Hector, I had in you a husband sufficient for me, 
great in intelligence, lineage, wealth, and courage.” 
142 Euripides Frag. 495 (Nauck) 40-43: “I do not know in what way it is necessary to look at 
nobility. I say the courageous in constitution and the just, even if they are offspring of slaves, 
are more noble than empty opinions.” 
143 LSJ, s.v. φύσις. 
144 Euripides Andromache 680-684: “Helen did not fool around willingly but because of the 
gods, and it benefitted Hellas very much.  Men ignorant of weapons and battle advanced in 
courage.  Association is the teacher or all things to mortals.” 
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θείμην χθονὸς / μηδʼ ὅπλων ἄρχοντα· νοῦν χρὴ τὸν στρατηλάτην ἔχειν / 
πόλεος· ὡς ἀρκῶν ἀνὴρ πᾶς, ξύνεσιν ἢν ἔχων τύχηι.145  Thus, courage is 
less useful than intelligence, and by implication one can exist without the 
other.  In this passage, ἀνδρεία seems not even to be a particularly positive 
quality. 
 In the Suppliant Women, the Theban herald advances an incompatible 
definition of andreia, as a synonym of being clear-sighted or sensible. 
φιλεῖν μὲν οὖν χρὴ τοὺς σοφοὺς πρῶτον τέκνα, 
ἔπειτα τοκέας πατρίδα θʼ, ἣν αὔξειν χρεὼν 
καὶ μὴ κατᾶξαι. σφαλερὸν ἡγεμὼν θρασὺς 
νεώς τε ναύτης· ἥσυχος καιρῶι, σοφός. 
καὶ τοῦτό τοι τἀνδρεῖον, ἡ προμηθία.146 
Yet the context, with the servant of a foreign ruler attempting to project his will 
in Athens, shows that the idea of courage as forethought is mere rhetoric.  The 
messenger is essentially calling it courageous to avoid war.  Later in the play, 
Adrastus describes the warrior Hippomedon:  
ὁ δʼ αὖ τρίτος τῶνδʼ Ἱππομέδων τοιόσδʼ ἔφυ· 
παῖς ὢν ἐτόλμησʼ εὐθὺς οὐ πρὸς ἡδονὰς 
Μουσῶν τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ μαλθακὸν βίου, 
ἀγροὺς δὲ ναίων σκληρὰ τῆι φύσει διδοὺς 
ἔχαιρε πρὸς τἀνδρεῖον, ἔς τʼ ἄγρας ἰὼν 
ἵπποις τε χαίρων τόξα τʼ ἐντείνων χεροῖν, 
πόλει παρασχεῖν σῶμα χρήσιμον θέλων.147 
                                            
145 Euripides Iphigenia at Aulis 373-375: “May I never appoint an overseer of the land or a 
leader of armies for courage; a leader of the army should have a brain, since every man is 
sufficient, if he happens to have sense.”  
146 Euripides Suppliant Women 506-510: “The wise should love their children first, then their 
parents and fatherland, which they should augment rather than destroy. A bold leader or sailor 
of a ship are a hindrance; the wise man is quiet at the right time.  And this too is courage, 
forethought.” 
147 Euripides Suppliant Women 881-887: “And the third of these men, Hippomedon, was such 
a man: while a boy he did not dare to turn to the pleasures of the Muses and the soft life; 
haunting the fields and giving his hardships to his constitution, he took pleasure in manliness.  
And going into the fields and delighting in horses and bending the bow with his hands, he 
wanted to make his body useful for the city.” 
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This description contrasts a life of courage and usefulness to the city with the 
soft life of a poet.  Much like the messenger in the Orestes, Adrastus here 
praises a traditional lifestyle characterized by physical hardship, though not 
that of a laborer since horses are mentioned. 
Despite these instances of ἀνδρεία signifying a seemingly conservative 
manliness, Bassi argues that the appearances of ἀνδρεία in the Electra 
signify a divide between epic heroes and the characters of tragedy.148  The 
messenger recounts that Orestes and Pylades show ἀνδρεία by threatening 
an army of household slaves after dispatching Aegisthus.149  Since the slaves 
give up once Orestes identifies himself, this is not truly an act of heroic 
courage.150  Later, Electra taunts the corpse of Aegisthus and compares it to 
the ἀνδρεία of her imagined husband.151  She also compares her and 
Orestesʼ actions with deeds of war.  Thus, the messenger and Electra 
appropriate the vocabulary of courage to liken revenge murders to heroic acts.  
In a play with no true heroes and no “heroism traditionally defined, andreia 
signifies once again the irrevocable absence of a ʻtrueʼ or unambiguous 
manliness.”152 
The vocabulary of manliness is even more common in Aristophanes 
than Euripides, with twenty four occurrences in the extant plays.  The word 
ἀνδρεία is not necessarily comic, but Aristophanes often uses it for parody 
and with connotations of emasculation.153  In fact, Aristophanic characters 
delight in calling attention to the ἀνδρεία of both women and cowardly or 
                                            
148 Bassi (2003) 42-44. 
149 Euripides Electra 844-847. 
150 Bassi (2003) 44-45. 
151 Euripides Electra 948-949. 
152 Bassi (2003) 45. 
153 Bassi (2003) 44. 
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effeminate men.  In addition, Aristophanes uses ἀνδρεία and its cognates to 
help define his utopian comic fantasy, like a suggested repurposing of the 
speakerʼs platform as a place for children to recite poetry about courageous 
men.154  This section will focus on the four plays where ἀνδρεία and 
derivatives appear most commonly, since the other usages conform to the 
same basic patterns.155  Three of the four plays in which ἀνδρεία or 
derivatives appear three or more times are about women, and some of the 
instances of courageous or manly women function both as puns and as 
signifiers of the inverted values of the comic fantasy.   
Two of the three occurrences of the adjective ἀνδρεῖος in the 
Lysistrata are superlatives describing the title character, and the contrast 
between them and the single use describing men is telling.  The chorus of 
women addresses Lysistrata as both ὦ τηθῶν ἀνδρειοτάτη καὶ μητριδίων 
ἀκαληφῶν and ὦ πασῶν ἀνδρειοτάτη.156  On the other hand, the magistrate 
names men who arm themselves for a trip only to the agora ἀνδρείους, while 
Lysistrata calls them derisible (γέλοιον).157  Making a woman the true 
embodiment of ἀνδρεία in this play both puns on its etymological sense and 
suggests, like Sophoclesʼ Electra, that courage is not ἀνήρ specific.  Bassi 
argues that, in the context of the failure of the Sicilian expedition and the 
intrigue surrounding the recall of Alcibiades, Lysistrata presents a comic 
                                            
154 Aristophanes Ecclesiazusae 679. 
155 In addition to the instances discussed at length, andreia and derivatives appear at 
Aristophanes Birds 91 (ἀνδρεῖος) and 1349 (ἀνδρεῖόν), Clouds 511 (ἀνδρείας) and 1052 
(ἀνδρειότερος) Knights 268 (ἀνδρείας), Peace 498 (ἀνδρείως) and 732 (ἀνδρείως), and 
Wasps 1200 (ἀνδρειότατόν). 
156 Aristophanes Lysistrata 549: “O most courageous of grandmothers and maternal stinging-
nettles,” 1108: “O most courageous of all women.” 
157 Aristophanes Lysistrata 559. 
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fantasy of peace with victory for both sides, “but only when andreia in its 
superlative form can be predicated of a woman.”158  
Like Lysistrata, Thesmophoriazusae both jokes about unmanly ἀνδρεία 
and uses it to differentiate the comic utopia from reality.  It first appears when 
Agathon argues that he has no trouble writing about manly things (Ἀνδρεῖα), 
since he has that element in his body, but he must acquire through mimesis 
what he doesnʼt possess.159  This is both a joke, since the notoriously 
effeminate Agathon claims to be manly while cross dressing, and a serious 
point about poetic technique.  Later, in a more straightforward pun, the chorus 
leader talks about the female chorus ʻmanfullyʼ (κἀνδρείως) taking off their 
himatia to search for the interloping man.160  Finally, as part of the new order, 
the chorus leader proposes that the mothers of cowardly men sit behind 
mothers of children with ἀνδρεία.161  Thus, the honor a woman received from 
the city would be directly related to the contribution of her children to the 
common good. 
Similarly, Ecclesiazusae makes a repeated meta-theatrical joke of male 
actors dressed as female characters cross-dressing in menʼs clothes,162 but 
the play also progresses to more serious use of ἀνδρεία as part of a new kind 
of civic life.  Later, Praxagora asks the chorus to stay on as advisors, since 
they were so courageous in helping her: καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ μοι / ἐν τῷ θορύβῳ καὶ 
τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδρειόταται γεγένησθε.163  Thus, the ἀνδρεία of the chorus 
                                            
158 Bassi (2003) 44. 
159 Aristophanes Thesmophoriazusae 154. 
160 Aristophanes Thesmophoriazusae 656. 
161 Aristophanes Thesmophoriazusae 839, the men with andreia are specified at 832-3 as 
xrhstos to the city, a taxiarch or strategos. 
162 Aristophanes Ecclesiazusae 26, 75, 275. 
163 Aristophanes Ecclesiazusae 518-519: “In my eyes, you were very courageous in the chaos 
and troubles there.” 
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has developed from an element of their comic disguise to a serious mental 
attribute.  And yet, just as in Lysistrata, the utopian comic fantasy requires that 
women be the most manly people in this new social order.  As Praxagora 
shows later, more traditional martial ἀνδρεία then becomes a matter for 
children to sing about.  In fact, Praxagora suggests using the bema as a place 
for childrenʼs recitations about courage and cowardice:  
τοὺς κρατῆρας καταθήσω  
καὶ τὰς ὑδρίας, καὶ ῥαψῳδεῖν ἔσται τοῖς παιδαρίοισιν  
τοὺς ἀνδρείους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, κεἴ τις δειλὸς γεγένηται,  
ἵνα μὴ δειπνῶσʼ αἰσχυνόμενοι.164  
In this newly reorganized city, the equipment of the old political system is put 
to different uses that will reinforce the value system managed by Praxagora 
and the other women.  Aristophanesʼ use of ἀνδρεία in this play reflects that 
theme, since ἀνδρεία changes from an external feature of the women to a 
mental quality that they actually show.  Then the final appearance of ἀνδρεία 
in the play defines a new polis-specific ἀνδρεία for the reformed city. 
In the Frogs, the only extant play of Aristophanes not about women 
where the vocabulary of ἀνδρεία is common,165 the word occurs in jokes 
about both bodily functions and the function of poetry.  In an episode that is 
“the stuff of slapstick and parody,”166 Xanthias congratulates Dionysus for 
andreia when he soils himself in fright an calls for a sponge.167  The god then 
retorts that his slave should put on the Herakles costume himself since he is 
                                            
164 Aristophanes Ecclesiazusae 677-679: “I will store mixing bowls and water jugs [in the 
bema], and it will be a place for little ones to make poetry about men courageous in war, and if 
someone has gone soft, [to make poetry about him] so that he does not share a meal from 
shame.” 
165 In addition to the instances discussed in detail, the chorus once mentions marching 
courageously (ἀνδρείως, 372) and  
166 Bassi (2003) 44. 
167 Aristophanes Frogs 491. 
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manly (κἀνδρεῖος) and fearless (ἀφοβόσπλαγχος).168  This passage 
emphasizes the bodily nature of comic ἀνδρεία, both because it depends on 
donning a certain costume and because ἀφοβόσπλαγχος has a visceral 
meaning despite its metaphorical sense.169  Later, ἀνδρεία is again related to 
the Herakles costume, when Xanthias claims that he will show ἀνδρεῖον τὸ 
λῆμα  if Dionysus tries to take it back.170  Sluiter and Rosen even argue that 
this comic association of Herakles and ἀνδρεία implies Aristophanes claims 
he himself is the true exemplar of andreia when he talks in the parabases of 
Wasps and Peace about his own fearlessness and invokes Herakles.171  
Finally, when Aeschylus speaks about the good effects of the Seven Against 
Thebes, Dionysus retorts that it made Athensʼ enemies the Thebans more 
courageous (ἀνδρειοτέρους).172  This type of ἀνδρεία is open to suspicion 
both because it is a function of mimesis and because it belongs to enemies of 
Athens.173 
Herodotus also shows concern with the relationship between gender 
and ἀνδρεία, but he does not limit andreia to any one gender or ethnicity.174  
In Herodotusʼ version of the Egyptian priestsʼ account, ἀνδρεία is contrasted 
with behavior explicitly marked as womanly: 
Ὁτέοισι μέν νυν αὐτῶν ἀλκίμοισι ἐνετύγχανε καὶ δεινῶς 
μαχομένοισι περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίης, τούτοισι μὲν στήλας ἐνίστη ἐς 
τὰς χώρας διὰ γραμμάτων λεγούσας τό τε ἑωυτοῦ οὔνομα καὶ τῆς 
                                            
168 Aristophanes Frogs 494-496. 
169 Bassi (2003) 45. 
170 Aristophanes Frogs 602 “courageous spirit.” 
171 Sluiter and Rosen (2003) 17-19. 
172 Aristophanes Frogs 1024.  It is interesting the Aristophanes jokes about the ἀνδρεία-
causing effects of the play in which the word may have been coined. 
173 Bassi (2003) 45. 
174 Note, however, that the adjective ἀνδρεῖος appears once in contrast to ʻfeminineʼ in a 
phrase contrasting two different types of pipe: αὐλοῦ γυναικηίου τε καὶ ἀνδρηίου 
(Herodotus 1.17). 
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πάτρης καὶ ὡς δυνάμι τῇ ἑωυτοῦ κατεστρέψατό σφεας· ὅτεων δὲ 
ἀμαχητὶ καὶ εὐπετέως παρέλαβε τὰς πόλις, τούτοισι δὲ ἐνέγραφε 
ἐν τῇσι στήλῃσι κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ τοῖσι ἀνδρηίοισι τῶν ἐθνέων 
γενομένοισι καὶ δὴ καὶ αἰδοῖα γυναικὸς προσενέγραφε, δῆλα 
βουλόμενος ποιέειν ὡς εἴησαν ἀνάλκιδες.175 
The use of female genitals to signify cowardice shows that Herodotus assigns 
importance to the etymological derivation of ἀνδρεία, especially since there is 
no other evidence for the stelai Herodotus describes.176  
On other occasions, Herodotus connects ἀνδρεία with a woman and 
an effeminate man, although S. E. Harrell has shown that he marks these off 
as special cases by expressing his amazement at these individualsʼ 
exploits.177  The woman who shows ἀνδρεία in the eyes of Herodotus is 
Artemisia, the ruler of his native city, Halicarnassus: 
Τῶν μέν νυν ἄλλων οὐ παραμέμνημαι ταξιάρχων ὡς οὐκ 
ἀναγκαζόμενος, Ἀρτεμισίης δέ, τῆς μάλιστα θῶμα ποιεῦμαι ἐπὶ 
τὴν Ἑλλάδα στρατευσαμένης γυναικός, ἥτις, ἀποθανόντος τοῦ 
ἀνδρὸς αὐτή τε ἔχουσα τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ παιδὸς ὑπάρχοντος 
νεηνίεω, ὑπὸ λήματός τε καὶ ἀνδρηίης ἐστρατεύετο, οὐδεμιῆς οἱ 
ἐούσης ἀναγκαίης.178 
The perceived oxymoron of feminine manliness also leads Herodotus to 
express wonder at the courageous actions of Telines, who was reputed to be 
quite effeminate: 
Θῶμά μοι ὦν καὶ τοῦτο γέγονε πρὸς τὰ πυνθάνομαι, 
κατεργάσασθαι Τηλίνην ἔργον τοσοῦτο· τὰ τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἔργα οὐ 
πρὸς [τοῦ] ἅπαντος ἀνδρὸς νενόμικα γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ψυχῆς 
                                            
175 Herodotus 2.102.4-5: “Whenever he happened upon those who were valiant and fought 
amazingly for their freedom, he set up stelae in their lands saying in letters his own name, his 
country, and how he subdued them with his own power.  Whenever he took the cities of men 
easily and without fighting, for them he inscribed stelae just like for the brave men and also 
added the genitals of a woman, wishing to show clearly how cowardly they were.” 
176 Marincola (2003) 640 n 58. 
177 Harrell (2003) 77. 
178 Herodotus 7.99.1: “I have not mentioned other commanders since it is not necessary, but [I 
must mention] Artemisia, at whom I marvel since she, a woman, campaigned against Greece.  
She, holding the tyranny when her husband died despite having a son of age, campaigned 
because of her resolution and courage, although there was no necessity.” 
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τε ἀγαθῆς καὶ ῥώμης ἀνδρηίης· ὁ δὲ λέγεται πρὸς τῆς Σικελίης 
τῶν οἰκητόρων τὰ ὑπεναντία τούτων πεφυκέναι θηλυδρίης τε καὶ 
μαλακώτερος ἀνήρ.179  
Although Artemisiaʼs femininity and Telinesʼ effeminacy cause Herodotus to 
express amazement at their courage, he nevertheless does not decline to call 
them ʻmanly.ʼ  Thus, Herodotus takes some notice of the wordʼs etymology, 
but he does not let the derivation of the word dominate its meaning in his text. 
Furthermore, Herodotus often uses superlative forms of the adjective 
with no relation to questions of gender.  Herodotusʼ account of the history of 
Hegesistratos shows that Herodotus, like Thucydides, sees a link between 
ἀνδρεία and τόλμα: 
Ὡς γὰρ δὴ ἐδέδετο ἐν ξύλῳ σιδηροδέτῳ, ἐσενειχθέντος κως 
σιδηρίου ἐκράτησε, αὐτίκα δὲ ἐμηχανᾶτο ἀνδρηιότατον ἔργον 
πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν· σταθμωσάμενος γὰρ ὅκως ἐξελεύσεταί 
οἱ τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ ποδός, ἀπέταμε τὸν ταρσὸν ἑωυτοῦ. Ταῦτα δὲ 
ποιήσας, ὥστε φυλασσόμενος ὑπὸ φυλάκων, διορύξας τὸν τοῖχον 
ἀπέδρη ἐς Τεγέην, τὰς μὲν νύκτας πορευόμενος, τὰς δὲ ἡμέρας 
καταδύνων ἐς ὕλην καὶ αὐλιζόμενος. Οὕτω ὥστε Λακεδαιμονίων 
πανδημεὶ διζημένων τρίτῃ εὐφρόνῃ γενέσθαι ἐν Τεγέῃ, τοὺς δὲ 
ἐν θώματι μεγάλῳ ἐνέχεσθαι τῆς τε τόλμης, ὁρῶντας τὸ ἡμίτομον 
τοῦ ποδὸς κείμενον κἀκεῖνον οὐ δυναμένους εὑρεῖν.180 
Herodotus himself names the actions ἀνδρηιότατον at the beginning, and he 
says at the end of the story that the Tegeans were in awe of the τόλμα of 
cutting off his foot, implying that τόλμα and ἀνδρεία are synonymous.  And 
                                            
179 Herodotus 7.153.3: “In view of what I hear, it is amazing to me that Telines accomplished 
so great a deed, since I have always thought that such deeds did not belong to all men, but to 
a good soul and courageous strength; but the opposite of these things is said by the 
inhabitants of Sicily, that he was an effeminate and rather soft man.” 
180 Herodotus 9.37.2-3: “When he was bound in iron stocks, he laid hold of an iron weapon 
that was brought in somehow and contrived the most courageous deed of all those which I 
know about: calculating how he could save the rest of his foot, he cut off part of it. After doing 
this, since he was guarded by guards, he dug through the wall and escaped to Tegea, 
travelling by night, hiding in the woods and holing up by day.  In this way, while the 
Lacedaemonians were hunting him in full force, he reached Tegea on the third night.  The 
Lacedaemonians were in a state of great amazement at his boldness, since they saw half a 
foot lying cut off and could not find the man.” 
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yet, Herodotus could also be including Hegesistratusʼ ability to avoid discovery 
as well as his self mutilation in what he terms most courageous.  Flower and 
Marincola argue that the construction with a form of οἶδα and the superlative 
adjective ἀνδρηιότατον emphasize the uniqueness of the “sheer physical 
bravery of Hegesistratus.”181  And yet they also claim that Hegesistratusʼ 
history does not have particular “thematic resonance or importance for the 
story” because he disappears from the following action, but rather the 
anecdote is included so that the Persiansʼ seer seems to be a worthy match 
for the Greeksʼ seer, Teisamenus.182   
In another passage, Herodotus mentions that the extreme ἀνδρεία of 
the youthful Cyrus motivates Harpagus to seek his aid.  Harpagus, looking for 
an ally to help take revenge against Astyages, courts Cyrus: Κύρῳ δὲ 
ἀνδρουμένῳ καὶ ἐόντι τῶν ἡλίκων ἀνδρηιοτάτῳ καὶ προσφιλεστάτῳ 
προσέκειτο ὁ Ἅρπαγος δῶρα πέμπων, τείσασθαι Ἀστυάγεα ἐπιθυμέων.183  
As in other passages, Cyrusʼ ἀνδρεία is more an incidental attribute than a 
major part of the narrative.  Herodotus also uses the superlative adjective to 
introduce the most fearsome ethnic group of a certain area, yet those he 
labels courageous do not necessarily gain victory.  When introducing the 
Lydians, Herodotus says, Ἦν δὲ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἔθνος οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ 
Ἀσίῃ οὔτε ἀνδρηιότερον οὔτε ἀλκιμώτερον τοῦ Λυδίου.184  Similarly, 
Herodotus says that οἱ δὲ Γέται πρὸς ἀγνωμοσύνην τραπόμενοι αὐτίκα 
                                            
181 Flower and Marincola (2002) 177. 
182 Ibid. 175. 
183 Herodotus 1.123.1: “To Cyrus, when he became a man and was the most manly and 
popular of his agemates, Harpagus paid court by sending gifts, zealous to avenge himself on 
Astyages.” 
184 Herodotus 1.79.3: “There was during this time no race in Asia more courageous and mighty 
than the Lydian.” 
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ἐδουλώθησαν, Θρηίκων ἐόντες ἀνδρηιότατοι καὶ δικαιότατοι.185  The 
loss the Getae suffer at Dariusʼ hands shows that ἀνδρεία is not a decisive 
martial quality in the eyes of Herodotus.  In fact, those with ἀνδρεία often lose 
in Herodotusʼ narrative. 
 
2.3 Thucydides on Courage 
Unlike Sophocles and Herodotus, Thucydides reserves ἀνδρεία for 
Greek men alone.  And yet Thucydides does not use ἀνδρεία as a marker of 
gender; instead, ἀνδρεία is a virtue associated with the kind of war that Greek 
men fight.  Out of a total of sixteen occurrences of ἀνδρεία and derivatives in 
Thucydides, only four appear outside of direct or indirect speeches: in 
Thucydidesʼ analysis of stasis at 3.82.4, during the battle of Mantinea at 
5.72.2, during the first major land battle in Sicily at 6.69.1, and in his 
description of Hermocrates at 6.72.2. This section will investigate what this 
one section of abstract analysis, two battle narratives, and description of an 
individual reveal about Thucydidesʼ conception of ἀνδρεία. 
Table 2.1 – Thucydides on ἀνδρεία 
3.82.4 – In stasis, irrational daring is considered partisan courage (ἀνδρεία) 
5.72.2 – The Lacedaemonians at Mantinea, after being bested in all respects in skill, then 
showed themselves to be no less superior in courage (ἀνδρείᾳ) 
6.69.1 – In this battle and in the others, the Syracusans were no worse in courage to the 
extent that their knowledge held out (ἀνδρείᾳ) 
6.72.2 – Hermocrates was in other respects inferior to no man in knowledge and in military 
affairs sufficient in experience and brilliant in courage (ἀνδρείᾳ) 
Thucydidesʼ general remarks on stasis, which show that this episode is 
meant to act as a paradigm for the many instances of stasis that occurred 
across Greece as a result of the Peloponnesian War,186 pair ἀνδρεία and 
                                            
185 Herodotus 4.93: “the Getae turned to folly [by resisting Darius] and were enslaved 
immediately, although they were the most courageous and just of the Thracians.” 
186 Hornblower 1 490. 
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tolma. Thucydides explains how civic and martial values are confused by men 
embroiled in factional conflict: καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς 
τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει. τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία 
φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη.187  That is, when a man who is involved in civil war 
performs an act of irrational daring, the members of his party praise him for his 
courage on their behalf.  Thus, his description of stasis sheds more light on 
how Thucydides conceptualizes τόλμα, since this is the quality that these men 
reevaluate as ἀνδρεία.   
Although Bassi argues that Thucydidesʼ use of ἀνδρεία at 3.82 is 
decisive, claiming that it “colors all other occurrences of the word in the 
History,”188 I believe the usage at 5.72 better shows how Thucydides himself 
conceives of manly courage.  The meaning of ἀνδρεία is indeed contested 
both within and among cities in Thucydidesʼ account of the war,189 so it is 
crucial to disentangle Thucydidesʼ own statements about ἀνδρεία from the 
instances of ἀνδρεία in direct and indirect speech.  In fact, Thucydides 
provides an object example of his own conception of ἀνδρεία in his 
description of the battle of Mantinea.  Identifying the use of ἀνδρεία at 5.72 as 
prototypical makes ἀνδρεία a wholly martial virtue, but Thucydides does not 
explicitly vouch for a political conception of ἀνδρεία.  Indeed, the theme of 
                                            
187 T 3.82.4: “Further, they exchanged their usual verbal evaluations of deeds for new ones, in 
the light of what they now thought justified; thus irrational daring was considered courage for 
the sake of the Party.” (tr. Wilson). See Allison (1997a) 168 and Bassi (2003) 28 for other 
recent literal translations of this sentence. 
188 Bassi (2003) 49.  Her point, however, that 3.82 proves different cities and different groups 
within cities struggled over the meaning of ἀνδρεία is certainly valid, and one must 




ἀνδρεία in the Histories appears primarily in martial contexts, and only 3.82 
explicitly discuss the political ramifications of oneʼs conception of ἀνδρεία.   
The battle of Mantinea offers a vivid portrayal of the difference between 
the Lacedaemoniansʼ morale and that of the other Greeks, and it also sheds 
great light on the relationship between ἀνδρεία and success in battle. In his 
description of the battle, Thucydides includes much “paradigmatic material 
about ancient hoplite battles,”190 and this battle is closer than any other in his 
work to the ideal hoplite clash discussed in chapter one.  Especially 
noteworthy is the explanation that one side triumphed through ἀνδρεία,191 
since Thucydidesʼ attribution of courage to the Lacedaemonians in this battle 
shows his preference for a “fair” hoplite battle.  Of the terms discussed in this 
thesis, ἀνδρεία has by far the most positive connotations, so its association 
with victory in a hoplite battle is indicative of Thucydidesʼ own valuations of 
various types of combat.   
As the battle begins, Thucydides claims that the Argive advance greatly 
shocked the Lacedaemonians: μάλιστα δὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς ὃ ἐμέμνηντο 
ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ ἐξεπλάγησαν.192  Their ability to overcome this great 
shock and maintain order is part of the reason Thucydides credits them with 
ἀνδρεία.  Unlike the Argives and their allies, who advanced intensely and with 
passion, the Lacedaemonians proceeded in slow order to the tune of the 
aulos, which helped them stay in perfect order.193  The Spartan King, Agis, 
                                            
190 Hornblower 3 163-164. 
191 T 5.72.2. 
192 T 5.66.2: “At this time, the Lacedaemonians were the most shocked that they 
remembered.”  Hornblower 3 173-174 notes that this sentence marks the focalization of this 
entire section as essentially Spartan and that the emphatic claim may reflect exaggeration on 
the part of Thucydidesʼ informants. 
193 5.70. 
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decided to try a last minute maneuver to prevent his men from being 
outflanked, so he ordered the troops on the left wing to open a gap and some 
regiments from the right to go fill it.194  The troops from the right did not go to 
plug the gap, and so the left wing of the Lacedaemonian line was surrounded 
and put to flight.  The Lacedaemonian right, however, held their ground and 
routed the Argives and allies opposed to them, many of whom did not even 
endure the first clash before running.195  The Argive line was now cut in two, 
and the victorious Argives also took to flight when they saw their allies 
defeated and the Lacedaemonians bearing down on them.196   
The outcome of this battle hinged entirely on the morale of the two 
sides.  The Argive and Athenian side had poor morale: many of them broke 
even before a blow was struck and the successful wing could not endure the 
sight of the rest fleeing.  The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, had very 
good morale:197 they kept order, and most of the line stood firm despite the 
rout of the left wing, which was made up of helots and others rather than 
actual Spartans.198  After explaining the failed maneuver but before describing 
the outcome of the battle, Thucydides gives his own judgment of what 
happened: ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δὴ κατὰ πάντα τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ Λακεδαιμόνιοι 
ἐλασσωθέντες τότε τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἔδειξαν οὐχ ἧσσον περιγενόμενοι.199 
The tense of the participles shows that the failure in ἐμπειρία applies only to 




197 Lazenby (1991) 104 cites Epameinondas for the opinion that is was very hard to find men 
who could endure seeing part of their own army fleeing (Xenophon Hellenica 7.5.24). 
198 See Hornblower 3 79 and 174-175 for a discussion of the precise identities of the Sciritae, 
Brasideioi, and Neodamodeis. 
199 5.72.2: “The Lacedaemonians, after being bested in all respects in skill, then showed 
themselves to be no less superior in courage.”   
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this battle, the implication being that the Spartans normally won through a 
combination of ἐμπειρία and ἀνδρεία.200  The key to understanding 
Thucydidesʼ point is recognizing why he placed this sentence here.  It comes 
in the midst of the battle account and functions as a descriptive turning point.  
What preceded, the unsuccessful maneuver, constitutes the Spartan failure in 
ἐμπειρία,201 and what follows, the actual fighting, shows their triumph in 
ἀνδρεία.  Therefore, Thucydides conceives of ἀνδρεία as the quality that 
enables the Spartan phalanx to win even when discipline fails.  In addition, this 
Spartan victory enables Thucydides to return to the questions raised about the 
relationship between ἐμπειρία and ἀνδρεία in the paired speeches at 
Naupactus.  Whereas the episode at Naupactus shows that the 
Lacedaemonians are mistaken about the relative importance of experience 
and ἀνδρεία in a sea battle, they show something at Mantinea like the innate 
ἀνδρεία that does not require ἐμπειρία claimed by Cnemus, Brasidas, and 
the generals.202   
And yet this structural parallelism leads Thucydides to use ἐμπειρία in 
a sense that has elicited comment from numerous scholars.  Gomme et al. 
find the use of ἐμπειρία in this sentence strange, since the Spartans showed 
their ʻprofessional skillʼ or ʻexperienceʼ in this battle as much as their 
courage.203  Hornblower notes that ἐμπειρία here must mean something like 
professional or tactical skill here, since the Spartansʼ experience in war is not 
                                            
200 Gomme et al. (1970) 121. 
201 Classen (1882) 139. 
202 See the next section for a discussion of ἀνδρεία and ἐμπειρία at Naupactus. 
203 Ibid. 120-121, where Gomme et al. argue that ἀνδρεία is emphasized here to contrast the 
surrender on Sphacteria, which they call a clear failure of ἀνδρεία, with the important victory 
here. 
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at issue and has been emphasized as recently as 5.69.2.204  Classen is 
perhaps the most convincing, explaining that ἐμπειρία here is the agility and 
dexterity won through experience and practice, which can also fail depite 
general proficiency.205  Furthermore, Thucydides uses empeiria in a similar 
sense elsewhere, such as when he describes the difficulty of the 
Lacedaemonian hoplites on Sphacteria: τοῖς μὲν οὖν ὁπλίταις οὐκ 
ἐδυνήθησαν προσμεῖξαι οὐδὲ τῇ σφετέρᾳ ἐμπειρίᾳ χρήσασθαι.206 
The Spartansʼ ἀνδρεία is important not only because it enables the 
Spartans to endure but also because it prevents the Argives and their allies 
from standing their ground.  That is, one sideʼs reputation for ἀνδρεία can 
shake the morale of the other side.207  Despite the damage of the surrender on 
Sphacteria to the Spartansʼ reputation, their opponents barely withstand the 
first clash.  Clearly, the Argives and others who faced the Lacedaemonian 
army as it calmly advanced in good order did not believe the soldiers were 
cowards.  Furthermore, the victory at Mantinea restored the reputation of the 
Spartans among the rest of the Greeks, as well: τύχῃ μέν, ὡς ἐδόκουν, 
κακιζόμενοι, γνώμῃ δὲ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἔτι ὄντες.208  And yet Thucydidesʼ contrast 
of their successful andreia and unsuccessful empeiria at Mantinea proves that 
it was the Lacedaemoniansʼ reputation for courage rather than tactical skill that 
was restored.209 
                                            
204 Hornblower 3 189. 
205 Classen (1882) 139. 
206 T 4.33.2: “It was not possible for the hoplites to fight hand-to-hand and use their skill won 
through practice.” 
207 Compare Luginbill (1999) 89-90, who explains how τόλμα encourages its possessors and 
produces fear in others. 
208 5.75.3: “They [the Spartans] were worsted by fortune, as it seemed [to the other Greeks], 
but they were still the same men in mindset.” 
209 Gomme et al. (1970) 121. 
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Thucydidesʼ attribution of ἀνδρεία to the Spartans in their greatest 
hoplite victory of the war shows also much about how he values different types 
of combat, specifically that he is part of the widespread phenomenon of Greek 
“hoplite chauvinism,” which holds that hoplite battle is the best way to settle 
military disputes.210  Lendon argues that hoplite combat held such appeal to 
the Greeks because the clash of hoplite phalanxes was the ultimate 
symmetrical test of both individualsʼ and citiesʼ passive courage, a mental 
quality that men exhibit by standing their ground as a unit.211  In fact, many 
have privileged hand-to-hand combat as the most courageous way to fight 
throughout history, from Homer to the modern day.212  
The comment by Thucydides on Syracusan morale at the battle of the 
Anapus River gives another example of the link between τόλμα, ἀνδρεία, and 
other mental qualities.  Although Thucydides is addressing why the 
Syracusans lost this particular battle, he also makes a general point about 
Syracusan morale:  
οὐ γὰρ δὴ προθυμίᾳ ἐλλιπεῖς ἦσαν οὐδὲ τόλμῃ οὔτʼ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ 
μάχῃ οὔτʼ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν ἀνδρείᾳ οὐχ ἥσσους ἐς 
ὅσον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἀντέχοι, τῷ δὲ ἐλλείποντι αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν 
βούλησιν ἄκοντες προυδίδοσαν.213 
This sentence occurs in connection with a land battle that serves as a 
paradigm of hoplite battles in this period of the war.214  The first clause 
attributes προθυμία and τόλμα to the Syracusans in this and the other 
                                            
210 Hanson (2000) 219-222.  See also Pritchett 2 173-174, 251-252. 
211 Lendon (2005) 63. 
212 Hanson (2004) 93. 
213 T 6.69.1: “In fact, they were not deficient in eagerness or daring either in this battle or in the 
others; and they were no worse in courage as long as their knowledge held out, but when it 
ran short they unwillingly gave up their resolve as well.” 
214 Mitchell (1996) 92; there were light armed troops taking part in this battle, but Thucydides 
dismisses them as unimportant (6.69.2). 
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battles, which should be taken to include sea battles as well as land battles.  
Thus, Thucydides himself prepares the theme of Syracusan τόλμα which later 
proves so effective against the Athenian expedition.215  The second half of the 
sentence seems to apply especially to this battle, since the inexperience of the 
Syracusans is contrasted with the experience of the Athenians and their allies 
in the battle description.216  Although in this instance the battle is decided by 
knowledge rather than ἀνδρεία, Thucydidesʼ insistence on the ἀνδρεία, 
προθυμία, and τόλμα of the Syracusans prefigures their ultimate success 
against the Athenians.  In fact, the phrase “neither in this battle nor the others” 
cues the reader that the interplay between the Syracusansʼ knowledge of 
warfare and their mental qualities will become important in later battles, a point 
driven home by the paraphrase of Hermocratesʼ encouragement to spend the 
winter training.217 Intelligence and skill, which presuppose some sort of training 
or experience, are crucial to morale in battle and in other aspects of life.218 
Thucydidesʼ judgment of Hermocrates returns to the relationship 
between ἀνδρεία and ἐμπειρία, since Thucydides calls him ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐς 
τἆλλα ξύνεσιν οὐδενὸς λειπόμενος καὶ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐμπειρίᾳ τε 
ἱκανὸς γενόμενος καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ ἐπιφανής.219  This description is close to the 
highest praise that Thucydides gives, and it is noteworthy that Hermocrates is 
                                            
215 See the next chapter for more on Syracusan τόλμα. 
216 T 6.70.1: τοῖς μὲν πρῶτον μαχομένοις (the Syracusans) … τοῖς δʼ ἐμπειροτέροις (the 
Athenians).  Hornblower 3 477-481 argues a different interpretation, that Thucydides is 
contrasting groups of more and less experienced men on both sides. 
217 T 6.72.4, where Hermocrates tells the Syracusans that they already have andreia but must 
train and add experience to it. 
218 Lord (1918) 146. 
219 T 6.72.2: “a man in other respects short of no one and in war both sufficient in experience 
and outstanding in courage.” See Hornblower 3 485, which points to the contrast of 
Hermocratesʼ union of experience and courage and the Spartansʼ deficiency in one at 
Mantinea. 
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said to combine ἐμπειρία and ἀνδρεία, while the Spartans at Mantinea were 
deficient in one.220  Thucydidesʼ statement here also draws a clear distinction 
between war and non-war, since ξύνεσις is the outstanding quality of 
Hermocrates outside of war, but ἐμπειρία and ἀνδρεία enable him to achieve 
victory for himself and his city.  Thus, here also Thucydides identifies ἀνδρεία 
as a martial virtue.  Since one of the themes of the Sicilian expedition is the 
Syracusansʼ lack of ἐμπειρία at the beginning of the conflict, Thucydides is 
already setting up their success by showing how their leader will make up for 
their deficiencies.  Indeed, it is this union of intelligence, courage, and skill that 
enables Hermocrates to manage the Syracusans even as they match the 
Athenians in boldness. 
 
2.4 Courage and Knowledge: Naupactus and Syracuse 
Thucydides explores the relationship between ἀνδρεία and ἐπιστήμη 
or ἐμπειρία in more depth through the complex of speeches and narrative 
describing the sea battles near Naupactus, and he returns to Syracusan 
ἀνδρεία and ἐπιστήμη in an indirected speech of Hermocrates that is a 
reaction to the Syracusan defeat discussed above.  Although each of these 
occurrences is in the voice of a speaker rather than Thucydides, the 
interaction of the narrative with these speeches still sheds light on Thucydidesʼ 
conception of ἀνδρεία.  Although the arguments of the Peloponnesian 
commanders suggest that ἀνδρεία is an innate attribute, Thucydides implies 
that ἀνδρεία does not exist without experience in his account of the fighting at 
Naupactus and Syracuse. 
                                            
220 Hornblower 3 485, claiming that the ἀρετή and ξύνεσις predicated of Brasidas (4.81.2) 
represent Thucydidesʼ “highest accolade.” 
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Table 2.2 – Knowledge and ἀνδρεία in Thucydides 
Speeches of Athenians Speeches of Peloponnesians and Allies  
 2.87.3 – the Peloponnesian commanders 
argue that when courage is present, men 
would not likely put forward inexperience as 
an excuse (ἀνδρείου) 
 2.87.3 – the Peloponnesian commanders 
argue that men can be hindered by fortune, 
but the courageous are always the same in 
their mindset (ἀνδρείους) 
 2.87.4 – the Peloponnesian commanders 
argue that knowledge, with courage and 
memory, can accomplish amidst danger what 
it has learned (ἀνδρείαν) 
2.89.2 – Phormio argues that the 
Peloponnesians trust that being courageous 
belongs to them only because of their 
experience of winning on land (ἀνδρείοις) 
 
 6.72.4 – Hermocrates argues that the 
Syracusans should train, since they already 
had courage, and this would add discipline in 
action to it (ἀνδρείας) 
 The two sea battles near Naupactus reinforce the paradigmatic 
elements of fighting at sea that Thucydides introduced in the account of 
Sybota.221  Although Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other commanders claim that 
their superior ἀνδρεία and τόλμα will match the Atheniansʼ superior 
ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη, the Peloponnesiansʼ inexperience ultimately causes 
both defeats.  Brasidas and the others try to convince their men that they have 
an innate advantage that the Athenians cannot beat:  
ὥστε οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν κακίαν τὸ ἡσσᾶσθαι προσεγένετο, 
οὐδὲ δίκαιον τῆς γνώμης τὸ μὴ κατὰ κράτος νικηθέν, ἔχον δέ τινα 
ἐν αὑτῷ ἀντιλογίαν, τῆς γε ξυμφορᾶς τῷ ἀποβάντι ἀμβλύνεσθαι, 
νομίσαι δὲ ταῖς μὲν τύχαις ἐνδέχεσθαι σφάλλεσθαι τοὺς 
ἀνθρώπους, ταῖς δὲ γνώμαις τοὺς αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ ὀρθῶς ἀνδρείους 
εἶναι, καὶ μὴ ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἀνδρείου παρόντος προβαλλομένους 
εἰκότως ἂν ἔν τινι κακοὺς γενέσθαι. ὑμῶν δὲ οὐδʼ ἡ ἀπειρία 
τοσοῦτον λείπεται ὅσον τόλμῃ προύχετε· τῶνδε δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἣν 
μάλιστα φοβεῖσθε, ἀνδρείαν μὲν ἔχουσα καὶ μνήμην ἕξει ἐν τῷ 
δεινῷ ἐπιτελεῖν ἃ ἔμαθεν, ἄνευ δὲ εὐψυχίας οὐδεμία τέχνη πρὸς 
                                            
221 T 1.49.2-3, especially the explanation that sea battles are typically decided by ἐπιστήμη. 
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τοὺς κινδύνους ἰσχύει. φόβος γὰρ μνήμην ἐκπλήσσει, τέχνη δὲ 
ἄνευ ἀλκῆς οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐμπειρότερον αὐτῶν 
τὸ τολμηρότερον ἀντιτάξασθε, πρὸς δὲ τὸ διὰ τὴν ἧσσαν δεδιέναι 
τὸ ἀπαράσκευοι τότε τυχεῖν.222 
The Peloponnesian commanders minimize the importance of their 
inexperience in the initial defeat,223 but Thucydides himself mentions it as a 
significant factor in the rout once one of the generalsʼ ships is sunk.224  
Instead, Brasidas and the others are mostly concerned with the 
Peloponnesiansʼ ἀνδρεία in both the previous and coming sea battles, since 
they have no cause for fear if they have not shown cowardice.225  The most 
notable claim of the Peloponnesians for this study is that ἐπιστήμη is nothing 
without ἀνδρεία, because knowledge and expertise are quickly forgotten 
unless courage is also present.226  The argument also implies that ἀνδρεία is 
the ability to exercise knowledge in in the face of fear or pain.227  Thus, 
Brasidas and the others claim that the Athenians have ἐπιστήμη but not 
ἀνδρεία, the opposite of Thucydidesʼ description of the Syracusans, who 
initially have ἀνδρεία but not ἐπιστήμη.  The narrative here shows that the 
                                            
222 T 2.87.3-5: “It was not, therefore, cowardice that produced our defeat, nor ought the 
determination which force has not quelled, but which still has a word to say with its adversary, 
to lose its edge from the result of an accident; but admitting the possibility of a chance 
miscarriage, we should know that courageous men are always the same in mindset, and while 
courage is present it is unseemly to put forward inexperience as an excuse for misconduct. 
Nor are you so behind the enemy in experience as you are ahead of him in daring; and 
although the science of your opponents would, if courage accompanied it, have also the 
presence of mind to carry out at an emergency the lesson it has learnt, yet a faint heart will 
make all art powerless in the face of danger. For fear takes away presence of mind, and 
without bravery art is useless. Against their superior experience set your superior daring, and 
against the fear induced by defeat the fact of your having been then unprepared” (adapted 
from Crawleyʼs translation). 
223 T 2.87.2. 
224 T 2.84.3. 
225 Hunter (1973) 47. 
226 T 2.87.4. 
227 Balot (2001) 518. 
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Peloponnesians are wrong to value ἀνδρεία over experience or skill,228 so 
Thucydidesʼ later statement that ἀνδρεία fails when ἐπιστήμη runs out shows 
the more correct understanding of ἀνδρεία.  Pericles, for his part, claims that 
the Athenians have something like the combination of thought and action that 
the Peloponnesian leaders say they lack, and the results of the battle validate 
Pericles rather than the Peloponnesians.229 
Phormio, seeming to answer a Peloponnesian speech he could not 
have heard,230 argues that the Peloponnesiansʼ courage depends on 
experience and is not an inborn trait.  The result of the second sea battle 
proves that Phormio understands the nature of fighting at sea better than the 
Peloponnesian commanders, but Phormioʼs claims have universal resonance.  
Phormio begins by attacking the Peloponnesiansʼ claim to ἀνδρεία: 
ἔπειτα ᾧ μάλιστα πιστεύοντες προσέρχονται, ὡς προσῆκον σφίσιν 
ἀνδρείοις εἶναι, οὐ διʼ ἄλλο τι θαρσοῦσιν ἢ διὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ πεζῷ 
ἐμπειρίαν τὰ πλείω κατορθοῦντες, καὶ οἴονται σφίσι καὶ ἐν τῷ 
ναυτικῷ ποιήσειν τὸ αὐτό. τὸ δʼ ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου ἡμῖν μᾶλλον νῦν 
περιέσται, εἴπερ καὶ τούτοις ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἐπεὶ εὐψυχίᾳ γε οὐδὲν 
προφέρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἑκάτεροί τι εἶναι ἐμπειρότεροι θρασύτεροί 
ἐσμεν.231 
He argues that the Peloponnesians do not have innate ἀνδρεία, rather each 
side is more confident where they have experience.  Like 5.72 and 4.33, 
ἐμπειρία in this sentence must refer to the skill that experience imparts rather 
than experience itself.  That is, Phormio argues that the Lacedaemonians 
                                            
228 Hunter (1973) 48-49. 
229 Hornblower 1 367-368. 
230 Hornblower 1 368. 
231 T 2.89.2-3: “Next, as to that upon which they most rely, the courage which they suppose 
constitutional to them, their confidence here only arises from the success which their skill from 
experience in land service usually gives them, and which they fancy will do the same for them 
at sea. But this advantage will in all justice belong to us on this element, if to them on that; as 
they are not superior to us in bravery, but we are each of us more confident in whatever we 
are more skillful” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
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typically win on land because they have cultivated the necessary skills, not 
simply because they remember winning in the past.  Thus, morale in this battle 
depends more on skill developed through experience than native courage.232  
Furthermore, although the Peloponnesians claim that they possesses τόλμα, 
Thucydides clearly shows that he believes τόλμα belongs to the Athenians in 
these two battles, especially since they dare to fight at a significant numerical 
disadvantage.  Thus, Phormioʼs claim that the Athenians have both the daring 
and experience necessary for victory rings true: πολλὰ δὲ καὶ στρατόπεδα 
ἤδη ἔπεσεν ὑπʼ ἐλασσόνων τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ, ἔστι δὲ ἃ καὶ τῇ ἀτολμίᾳ· ὧν 
οὐδετέρου ἡμεῖς νῦν μετέχομεν.233  Although Thucydides does not believe 
that daring and experience are the only determinants of victory, a lack of either 
quality is a hindrance.  Despite their claims to the contrary, their clear 
inferiority in τόλμα and ἐμπειρία leads to the Peloponnesiansʼ defeat in the 
battles here.  The thematic resonances between the two speeches and the 
clear superiority of Phormioʼs reasoning confirms Romillyʼs argument that the 
outcome of the battle is prefigured in these paired speeches.234 
In the actual battle, the Peloponnesians successfully execute a naval 
maneuver, but their disordered pursuit and an unexpected counter attack 
leads to another rout.  Just like in the first battle, the numerical advantage of 
the Peloponnesians brings initial success, but a single setback crushes their 
morale: 
ἰδόντες δὲ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι κατὰ μίαν ἐπὶ κέρως παραπλέοντας 
καὶ ἤδη ὄντας ἐντὸς τοῦ κόλπου τε καὶ πρὸς τῇ γῇ, ὅπερ 
ἐβούλοντο μάλιστα, ἀπὸ σημείου ἑνὸς ἄφνω ἐπιστρέψαντες τὰς 
                                            
232 Hunter (1973) 50. 
233 T 2.89.7: “Many have already fallen to less numerous opponents because of inexperience, 
and some also because of lack of daring; but we have a share in neither of these things.” 
234 Romilly (1956) 140-150. 
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ναῦς μετωπηδὸν ἔπλεον, ὡς εἶχε τάχους ἕκαστος, ἐπὶ τοὺς 
Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἤλπιζον πάσας τὰς ναῦς ἀπολήψεσθαι. τῶν δὲ 
ἕνδεκα μέν τινες αἵπερ ἡγοῦντο ὑπεκφεύγουσι τὸ κέρας τῶν 
Πελοποννησίων καὶ τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν· τὰς δʼ 
ἄλλας ἐπικαταλαβόντες ἐξέωσάν τε πρὸς τὴν γῆν ὑποφευγούσας 
καὶ διέφθειραν, ἄνδρας τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπέκτειναν ὅσοι μὴ 
ἐξένευσαν αὐτῶν.235 
This successful maneuver shows that the Peloponnesians did prepare better 
for the second battle, as their speech claims.  The quick reversal, however, 
shows that they still lack ἐμπειρία and validates Phormioʼs argument in his 
speech: 
τοῖς μὲν οὖν Πελοποννησίοις γενομένου τούτου ἀπροσδοκήτου 
τε καὶ παρὰ λόγον φόβος ἐμπίπτει, καὶ ἅμα ἀτάκτως διώκοντες διὰ 
τὸ κρατεῖν αἱ μέν τινες τῶν νεῶν καθεῖσαι τὰς κώπας ἐπέστησαν 
τοῦ πλοῦ, ἀξύμφορον δρῶντες πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ὀλίγου ἀντεφόρμησιν, 
βουλόμενοι τὰς πλείους περιμεῖναι, αἱ δὲ καὶ ἐς βράχεα ἀπειρίᾳ 
χωρίων ὤκειλαν.236 
Although Thucydides only explicitly mentions ἀπειρία of the area causing 
some to run aground, the fleetʼs inability to endure the unexpected, in contrast 
to the flexibility of the Athenian force in this battle, shows that inexperience 
was a major hindrance to the Peloponnesians here.  In fact, the outcome of 
the battle validates Phormioʼs assertion that confidence in battle is based on 
experience of victory. 
                                            
235 T 2.90.4-5: “The Peloponnesians seeing him coasting along with his ships in single file, and 
by this inside the gulf and close in shore as they so much wished, at one signal tacked 
suddenly and bore down in line at their best speed on the Athenians, hoping to cut off the 
whole squadron. The eleven leading vessels, however, escaped the Peloponnesian wing and 
its sudden movement, and reached the more open water; but the rest were overtaken as they 
tried to run through, driven ashore and disabled; such of the crews being slain as had not 
swum out of them” (tr. Crawley). 
236 T 2.91.4: “An exploit so sudden and unexpected produced a panic among the 
Peloponnesians; and having fallen out of order in the excitement of victory, some of them 
dropped their oars and stopped their way in order to let the main body come up—an unsafe 
thing to do considering how near they were to the enemy's prows; while others ran aground in 
the shallows, in their ignorance of the localities” (tr. Crawley). 
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The remarks of Thucydides about the ἀνδρεία of the Syracusans and 
Hermocrates discussed above are also accompanied by a reported speech of 
Hermocrates.  Just as the final battle in the Great Harbor allows Thucydides to 
reconsider the links between τόλμα and ἐπιστήμη/ἐμπειρία established in the 
Naupactus episode,237 the first land battle in Sicily gives him an opportunity to 
revisit the relationship between ἀνδρεία and ἐπιστήμη/ἐμπειρία.  Indeed, 
one of the major themes of the early part of the war in Sicily is the contrast 
“between the ἐπιστήμη of the Athenians and the mere courage of the 
enemy.”238  Thucydides does not just assess Syracusan ἐπιστήμη and 
ἀνδρεία in his own voice, he also paraphrases a speech of Hermocrates that 
cites the ἀνδρεία of the Syracusans and encourages them to train and make 
up for their lack of experience and skill.  This episode is such a paradigmatic 
account of active preparation for war that Pritchett uses the battle at the 
Anapus River and the subsequent actions of the Syracusans as evidence for 
the nature of Greek military training.239 Hermocratesʼ reported words give a 
clear idea of the relationship between ἀνδρεία and military skill, and their 
similarity to Thucydidesʼ nearby statements about the Syracusansʼ and 
Hermocratesʼ ἀνδρεία shows that the author is in basic agreement with the 
advice: 
ἢν δὲ ὀλίγοι τε στρατηγοὶ γένωνται ἔμπειροι καὶ ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι 
τούτῳ παρασκευάσωσι τὸ ὁπλιτικόν, οἷς τε ὅπλα μὴ ἔστιν 
ἐκπορίζοντες, ὅπως ὡς πλεῖστοι ἔσονται, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ μελέτῃ 
προσαναγκάζοντες, ἔφη κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς κρατήσειν σφᾶς τῶν 
ἐναντίων, ἀνδρείας μὲν σφίσιν ὑπαρχούσης, εὐταξίας δʼ ἐς τὰ 
ἔργα προσγενομένης· ἐπιδώσειν γὰρ ἀμφότερα αὐτά, τὴν μὲν 
                                            
237 See section 3.5 for a discussion of the battle in the Great Harbor. 
238 Finley (1967) 150. 
239 Pritchett 2 (1974) 212; Hornblower 3 474 also notes that many parts of 7.69-71, which 
contain Thucydidesʼ remarks on Syracusan ἀνδρεία, are paradigmatic. 
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μετὰ κινδύνων μελετωμένην, τὴν δʼ εὐψυχίαν αὐτὴν ἑαυτῆς μετὰ 
τοῦ πιστοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης θαρσαλεωτέραν ἔσεσθαι.240 
This relationship between Hermocrates and ἀνδρεία, both in his own rhetoric 
and in Thucydidesʼ description, suggests that Hermocrates is responsible for 
or emblematic of the ἀνδρεία that Thucydides himself attributes to the 
Syracusans in war.  Although ἀνδρεία is not simply the experience of 
winning,241 Hermocratesʼ statement here shows that ἐμπειρία is a necessary 
complement for ἀνδρεία.  Furthermore, as Thucydides subtly prepares for the 
shift from Athenian to Syracusan preeminence, “Hermocrates criticizes 
Syracusan mistakes in terms that leave hope for future improvements and 
eventual success, a critique later indeed confirmed by events.”242  This indirect 
speech, especially since Thucydides says the man who gave it combined 
andreia and empeiria, enables Thucydides to revisit the link between episteme 
and andreia; and yet the focus this time is on the hopes for Syracuseʼs 
success rather than its failure. 
 
2.5 The Rhetoric of Courage: Pericles and Brasidas 
 Besides the author in his own voice, Pericles and Brasidas account for 
most other uses of ἀνδρεία and derivatives.  In the Funeral Oration, Pericles 
contrasts the meaning of ἀνδρεία at Sparta and Athens.  Not only does 
Brasidas use Spartaʼs reputation for ἀνδρεία to encourage his allies, he also 
makes a lengthy attack on the conception of ἀνδρεία implied by irregular 
                                            
240 T 6.72.4: “He said that if there were a few experienced generals and during the winter they 
prepared their hoplite forces, both giving weapons to those who had none, so that the hoplites 
would be as numerous as possible, and increasing the toughness in their other training, that 
then they would likely conquer their opponents, since they already had courage and discipline 
in action would be added.  It would benefit both of these, the latter being trained amidst 
dangers, and their bravery becoming bolder in proportion to their trust in their knowledge.” 
241 As Phormio argues (T 2.89.2). 
242 Dewald (2005) 252. 
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fighting.  Rather than describing their own versions of ἀνδρεία directly, both 
Pericles and Brasidas talk about the inferior ἀνδρεία of the enemy and how it 
differs from the ἀνδρεία of their listeners.  Pericles a constructs a version of 
Spartan ἀνδρεία as a rhetorical straw man, while he relates Athenian 
ἀνδρεία to the τόλμα that they show.  Similarly, Brasidas explains how his 
non-Greek enemies have flawed ἀνδρεία because they do not fight like Greek 
hoplites.  And yet he encourages his allies to act with ἀνδρεία while he 
prefers to tell each of his Spartan soldiers to be an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς.  Although 
Pericles gives a funeral speech before citizen men, women, and children while 
Brasidas speaks as a general on military campaign, their speeches deal with 
some of the same themes.  Both leaders reveal a general association of 
ἀνδρεία with Sparta, Pericles by speaking contemptuously of it and Brasidas 
by implying he can confirm it in allies, but these rhetorical usages also 
enhance our understanding of the tension over the meaning of ἀνδρεία in 5th 
century Greece.   
Table 2.3 – Pericles and Brasidas on ἀνδρεία 
Speeches of Pericles Speeches of Brasidas 
2.39.1 – In his Funeral Oration, Pericles 
claims that the Spartans chase courage 
(ἀνδρεῖον) with toilsome training as soon as 
they are youths 
 
2.39.4 – In his Funeral Oration, Pericles 
claims that with their easiness of spirit and 
the courage (ἀνδρείας) of their character, 
the Athenians come to dangers no less 
daring than their enemies do 
 
2.64.2 – In his last speech, Pericles says that 
it is right to bear divine things with 
compulsion and things from the enemy 
courageously (ἀνδρείως) 
 
 4.120.3 – Brasidas says that the Skionaiansʼ 
willing revolt was a sign that they would 
courageously (ἀνδρείως) undergo anything 
 4.126.5 – Brasidas argues that flight and 
attack having equal reputation among the 
barbarians gives no test of courage 
(ἀνδρεῖον) 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
 4.126.6 – Brasidas argues that such a mob 
shows its courage (ἀνδρεῖον) with threats 
from a distance, if one endures its first assault 
 5.9.9 – Brasidas says “Spartans, be good 
men; and you, allies, follow courageously” 
(ἀνδρείως) 
Pericles is the only speaker in the Histories to attribute ἀνδρεία to the 
Athenians, using ἀνδρεία or derivatives a total of three times.  In the Funeral 
Oration, he outlines not only his conception of Athenian ἀνδρεία but also 
explains how it differs from Spartan ἀνδρεία.  First, Pericles contrasts the way 
the Spartans cultivate ἀνδρεία with Athenian practices: 
τήν τε γὰρ πόλιν κοινὴν παρέχομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε ξενηλασίαις 
ἀπείργομέν τινα ἢ μαθήματος ἢ θεάματος, ὃ μὴ κρυφθὲν ἄν τις 
τῶν πολεμίων ἰδὼν ὠφεληθείη, πιστεύοντες οὐ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς 
τὸ πλέον καὶ ἀπάταις ἢ τῷ ἀφʼ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐς τὰ ἔργα εὐψύχῳ· καὶ 
ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει εὐθὺς νέοι ὄντες τὸ 
ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀνειμένως διαιτώμενοι οὐδὲν 
ἧσσον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰσοπαλεῖς κινδύνους χωροῦμεν.243 
Hornblower takes issue with this depiction of the Athenians as doing no 
training, since Pericles himself mentions the long practice required for naval 
warfare (1.142) and some form of ephebeia may have existed in the fifth 
century.244  And yet it is quite clear that the Athenians and the Spartans have 
very different ideas about how to attain courage, since Pericles claims the 
Athenians naturally possess what the Spartans strive for all their lives.  In fact, 
Bassi shows that Periclesʼ argument reveals how different poleis have their 
own competing conceptions of ἀνδρεία, just as 3.82 shows that different 
factions have their own competing versions of ἀνδρεία.245 
                                            
243 T 2.39.1: “We have an open city and never shut anyone out with decrees barring foreigners 
from learning or watching something that some enemy might benefit from if it is not hidden, 
since we trust do not trust in preparation and tricks more than bravery for action from 
ourselves.  In education, they chase courage with toilsome practice from early youth, but we 
lead relaxed lives and come to equal dangers no worse.” 
244 Hornblower 1 303-304. 
245 Bassi (2003) 47-49. 
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Later, Pericles explicitly mentions the ἀνδρεία of character that the 
Athenians possess, and his proof is the τόλμα that they show in action.  Thus, 
Pericles argues from results that the Athenians are in no way inferior to the 
Spartans:246 
καίτοι εἰ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ πόνων μελέτῃ καὶ μὴ μετὰ νόμων τὸ 
πλέον ἢ τρόπων ἀνδρείας ἐθέλομεν κινδυνεύειν, περιγίγνεται 
ἡμῖν τοῖς τε μέλλουσιν ἀλγεινοῖς μὴ προκάμνειν, καὶ ἐς αὐτὰ 
ἐλθοῦσι μὴ ἀτολμοτέρους τῶν αἰεὶ μοχθούντων φαίνεσθαι, καὶ ἔν 
τε τούτοις τὴν πόλιν ἀξίαν εἶναι θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἄλλοις.247 
By this argument, ἀνδρεία is a kind of natural courage stemming from the 
Atheniansʼ τρόποι (ʻhabitsʼ or ʻcharacterʼ).248  Pericles does not offer a 
satisfactory explanation of how Athenian character is formed, but instead 
emphasizes how they have a courageous character coupled with an easy 
lifestyle.249  He simply claims that Athens is amazing because the Athenians 
show no less daring than their enemies, who train and toil constantly 
(ἀτολμοτέρους).  The implication of Periclesʼ argument here is that the 
ἀνδρεία in Athenian character is beneficial insofar as it enables them to show 
τόλμα amidst danger.  Thus, even when praising his countrymenʼs ἀνδρεία, 
Pericles still concentrates on the beneficial effects of τόλμα.  Periclesʼ claim 
that the Athenians have ἀνδρεία because they often show τόλμα comes 
dangerously close to the mistaken beliefs that Thucydides attributes to 
partisans in stasis (3.82), and the juxtaposition of Periclesʼ speech with the 
plague, which is the first time Thucydides shows the negative effects of 
                                            
246 Rusten (1990) 149. 
247 T 2.39.4: “And yet if with habits not of labor but of ease, and courage not of art but of 
character, we are still willing to encounter danger, we have the double advantage of escaping 
the experience of hardships in anticipation and of facing them in the hour of need with no less 
daring than those who are never free from them.  In these things and still others, our city is 
worthy of admiration.” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation).  
248 Balot (2001) 512-513. 
249 Ibid. 
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τόλμα,250 casts doubt on the definition of ἀνδρεία that Pericles advances.  
Compared to Thucydidesʼ own conception of ἀνδρεία, Pericles is attempting a 
radical redefinition, and so his Athenian ἀνδρεία turns out to be a rhetorical 
phantom.   
When Pericles speaks again after the plague has stricken Athens, he 
makes a more traditional appeal to the Atheniansʼ courage: φέρειν δὲ χρὴ τά 
τε δαιμόνια ἀναγκαίως τά τε ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνδρείως· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν 
ἔθει τῇδε τῇ πόλει πρότερόν τε ἦν νῦν τε μὴ ἐν ὑμῖν κωλυθῇ.251  This 
statement points to a more limited definition for ἀνδρεία as ʻcourage in war,ʼ 
and Pericles even specifies that this is closer to how the Athenians of the past 
viewed ἀνδρεία.  And yet the context of this sentence does not prove that 
Pericles has refined his conception of ἀνδρεία; rather, it shows that he is 
using every rhetorical tool at his disposal to improve public opinion. 
Like Pericles, Brasidas also uses exhortations to act courageously, but 
the two men speak at very different occasions.  Furthermore, Brasidas directs 
his appeals to ἀνδρεία at his allies rather than his own countrymen.  In fact, 
Brasidas twice uses the Spartansʼ reputation for ἀνδρεία in rhetoric designed 
to confirm the spirits of his allies.  In the first, Brasidas makes it clear that he 
too sees a relationship between ἀνδρεία and τόλμα: 
περαιωθεὶς δὲ καὶ ξύλλογον ποιήσας τῶν Σκιωναίων ἔλεγεν ἅ τε 
ἐν τῇ Ἀκάνθῳ καὶ Τορώνῃ, καὶ προσέτι φάσκων ἀξιωτάτους 
αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐπαίνου, οἵτινες τῆς Παλλήνης ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ 
ἀπειλημμένης ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων Ποτείδαιαν ἐχόντων καὶ ὄντες οὐδὲν 
ἄλλο ἢ νησιῶται αὐτεπάγγελτοι ἐχώρησαν πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν 
καὶ οὐκ ἀνέμειναν ἀτολμίᾳ ἀνάγκην σφίσι προσγενέσθαι περὶ τοῦ 
                                            
250 See section 3.2 for more on τόλμα and the plague. 
251 T 2.64.2: “We should bear supernatural occurrences with reservation and the actions of the 
enemy with courage; for that is how it was it customarily was in this city before, and it should 
not be hindered by you.” 
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φανερῶς οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ· σημεῖόν τʼ εἶναι τοῦ καὶ ἄλλο τι ἂν 
αὐτοὺς τῶν μεγίστων ἀνδρείως ὑπομεῖναι·252 
Just like Pericles, Brasidas here uses his listenersʼ actions to make a point 
about their character.  Since they boldly revolted, they must be courageous.  
And yet the strategic situation to which Brasidas alludes suggests that the 
Scionaeansʼ actions are more bold than brave. 
The general mindset of a soldier with good morale appears in another 
one of Brasidasʼ exhortations about ἀνδρεία.  Before his last battle at 
Amphipolis, Brasidas orders his Spartan troops to be “good men” while telling 
his allies to follow courageously:  
καὶ αὐτός τε ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γίγνου, ὥσπερ σε εἰκὸς ὄντα 
Σπαρτιάτην, καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες ξύμμαχοι, ἀκολουθήσατε 
ἀνδρείως, καὶ νομίσατε <τρία> εἶναι τοῦ καλῶς πολεμεῖν τὸ 
ἐθέλειν καὶ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ <τὸ> τοῖς ἄρχουσι πείθεσθαι.253   
The exhortation to be a good man seems to be typical at Sparta,254 but the 
separate address to the allies makes ἀνδρεία seem like a lesser virtue, 
especially since he tells them to follow courageously.  At the same time, the 
three infinitives that make up fighting well (καλῶς πολεμεῖν) show how a 
soldier with high morale reacts in battle: with readiness to act (ἐθέλειν), a 
sense of honor (αἰσχύνεσθαι), and obedience to his superiors (τοῖς ἄρχουσι 
πείθεσθαι).  The emphasis on obedience and a sense of shame is typically 
                                            
252 T 4.120.3: “His passage effected, he called a meeting of the Scionaeans and spoke to the 
same effect as at Acanthus and Torone, adding that they merited the utmost commendation in 
that, in spite of Pallene within the isthmus being cut off by the Athenian occupation of Potidaea 
and of their own practically insular position, they had of their own free will gone forward to 
meet their liberty instead of timorously waiting until they had been by force compelled to their 
own manifest good. This was a sign that they would courageously undergo any trial, however 
great” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
253 T 5.9.9: “Each of you be a good man yourself, just as befits you as a Spartiate; and you, 
allies, follow courageously, and consider fighting well to be three things: willingness, a sense 
of shame, and obeying the officers.” 
254 Hornblower 2 444 compares Tyrtaeus 10.2 (West). 
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Spartan,255 but good discipline is important for a soldier of any nationality or 
time period.256  Furthermore, Balot shows that Pericles also relates a sense of 
shame to the proper development of Athenian character.257  Brasidas, 
however, draws a clear distinction between the Peloponnesians under his 
command and the Athenians and allies on the other side at the beginning of 
this speech:  
Ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι, ἀπὸ μὲν οἵας χώρας ἥκομεν, ὅτι αἰεὶ διὰ 
τὸ εὔψυχον ἐλευθέρας, καὶ ὅτι Δωριῆς μέλλετε Ἴωσι μάχεσθαι, 
ὧν εἰώθατε κρείσσους εἶναι, ἀρκείτω βραχέως δεδηλωμένον.258 
This contrast of Dorians and Ionians appears elsewhere in Thucydides,259 but 
Pericles also relates bravery to freedom in his Funeral Oration.260  Thus, even 
when emphatically distinguishing himself and his men from the Athenians, 
Brasidas uses rhetoric that recalls the speeches of Pericles. 
The advance of Brasidas and his expedition against non-Greek forces 
gives Thucydides the chance to delve further into the relationship between 
courage and ethnicity while comparing the tactics of a hoplite army and light-
armed troops.  This account of Brasidas and his Peloponnesian soldiers facing 
the Illyrians contains an explicit evaluation of the manliness of different fighting 
                                            
255 Compare Herodotus 9.71.3, where the Spartans decline to give the prize for valor at 
Plataea to Aristodemus because he left his post and rushed the enemy. 
256 See, for instance, the chapter on discipline in Moran (1987), who wrote about his 
experience in the First World War. 
257 Balot (2001) 514-515. 
258 T 5.9.1: “Peloponnesians, the character of the country from which we have come, one 
which has always owed its freedom to bravery, and the fact that you are Dorians and the 
enemy you are about to fight Ionians, whom you are accustomed to beat, are things that do 
not need further comment” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
259 For the sentiment that Dorians are braver than Ionians, Hornbower 2 443 compares T 
8.25.3, where the Dorian Argives look down on the Ionian Milesians; Thucydides himself, 
however, explicitly notes at 8.25.5 that this was one battle where the Ionians on both sides 
beat the Dorians. 
260 T 2.43.4; see also Balot (2001) 511. 
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styles.  Although the warlike Illyrians terrify their non-Greek allies, Brasidas 
and his men keep their cool:  
καὶ ἐν τούτῳ διαφερομένων αὐτῶν ἠγγέλθη ὅτι οἱ Ἰλλυριοὶ μετʼ 
Ἀρραβαίου προδόντες Περδίκκαν γεγένηνται· ὥστε ἤδη 
ἀμφοτέροις μὲν δοκοῦν ἀναχωρεῖν διὰ τὸ δέος αὐτῶν ὄντων 
ἀνθρώπων μαχίμων, κυρωθὲν δὲ οὐδὲν ἐκ τῆς διαφορᾶς ὁπηνίκα 
χρὴ ὁρμᾶσθαι, νυκτός τε ἐπιγενομένης, οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες καὶ τὸ 
πλῆθος τῶν βαρβάρων εὐθὺς φοβηθέντες.261 
Rather than attributing ἀνδρεία to non-Greeks like Herodotus does, 
Thucydides typically calls other ethnicities who perform well in battle μάχιμοι, 
or warlike.  Another example is the Aetolians, who are also described as light 
armed and living in unwalled villages.262  Demosthenes leads a hoplite force 
made up of the best men (βέλτιστοι) from Athens against them and suffers a 
great defeat.  The contrast between the βέλτιστοι Athenians and their 
μάχιμοι enemies shows that ἀνδρεία has no place in this kind of irregular 
combat in a wooded area.  V. D. Hanson argues that the application of 
βέλτιστοι to these Athenians shows “the aristocratic Thucydides, like Plato 
later, particularly abhorred this type of combat, when good infantry found no 
conventional theater to showcase their training and bravery.”263   
The speech of Brasidas before facing the Illyrians assumes that his 
troops share this same preference for hoplite battle.  In fact, Brasidas defines 
and then dismisses the supposed ἀνδρεία of the light troops they face.  In his 
                                            
261 T 4.125.1: “And while they were quarreling at this time, it was announced that the Illyrians 
had betrayed Perdiccas and gone over the Arrabaeus. So, as a result, both sides decided they 
should retreat because of their fear of these warlike men; but, when no decision was made on 
where to go, and since night had come, the Macedonians and many of the barbarians 
straightaway took fright.” 
262 T 3.94.4: τὸ γὰρ ἔθνος μέγα μὲν εἶναι τὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ μάχιμον, οἰκοῦν δὲ κατὰ 
κώμας ἀτειχίστους, καὶ ταύτας διὰ πολλοῦ, καὶ σκευῇ ψιλῇ χρώμενον οὐ χαλεπὸν 
ἀπέφαινον, πρὶν ξυμβοηθῆσαι, καταστραφῆναι. “The race of the Aetolians is great and 
warlike, and they dwell in unwalled villages across a large area. Since they use light 
equipment, they appear easy to subdue before they join together.” 
263 Hanson (2005) 98. 
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pre-battle exhortation, Brasidas dwells at length on the implication of both 
sidesʼ tactics:  
οὔτε γὰρ τάξιν ἔχοντες αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἂν λιπεῖν τινὰ χώραν 
βιαζόμενοι ἥ τε φυγὴ καὶ ἡ ἔφοδος αὐτῶν ἴσην ἔχουσα δόξαν τοῦ 
καλοῦ ἀνεξέλεγκτον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἔχει (αὐτοκράτωρ δὲ μάχη 
μάλιστʼ ἂν καὶ πρόφασιν τοῦ σῴζεσθαί τινι πρεπόντως πορίσειε), 
τοῦ τε ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν πιστότερον τὸ ἐκφοβῆσαι ὑμᾶς 
ἀκινδύνως ἡγοῦνται· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ἂν πρὸ τούτου ἐχρῶντο. σαφῶς 
τε πᾶν τὸ προϋπάρχον δεινὸν ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ὁρᾶτε ἔργῳ μὲν βραχὺ 
ὄν, ὄψει δὲ καὶ ἀκοῇ κατασπέρχον. ὃ ὑπομείναντες ἐπιφερόμενον 
καί, ὅταν καιρὸς ᾖ, κόσμῳ καὶ τάξει αὖθις ὑπαγαγόντες, ἔς τε τὸ 
ἀσφαλὲς θᾶσσον ἀφίζεσθε καὶ γνώσεσθε τὸ λοιπὸν ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι 
ὄχλοι τοῖς μὲν τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον δεξαμένοις ἄπωθεν ἀπειλαῖς 
τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μελλήσει ἐπικομποῦσιν, οἳ δʼ ἂν εἴξωσιν αὐτοῖς, κατὰ 
πόδας τὸ εὔψυχον ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ ὀξεῖς ἐνδείκνυνται.264 
In this battle, the Illyriansʼ reputation as μάχιμοι is functionally identical to the 
Spartansʼ reputation for andreia at Mantinea, since both groups scare their 
opponents into retreating before battle is fully joined.  And yet, their tactics are 
very different, leading Thucydides to call one group courageous and the other 
μάχιμοι.  The similarity between Thucydidesʼ comments on the battle in 
Aetolia and the arguments of Brasidas here imply that Thucydides generally 
agrees with this speech. 
J. E. Lendon argues that this type of irregular fighting was not appealing 
to the Greeks because it did not properly test the excellence of a warrior; 
instead, they preferred the phalanx, which allowed for a fair test of what 
                                            
264 T 4.125.5-6: “Having no order, they are not ashamed to leave a spot under pressure, and 
retreat and attack having equal reputation for nobility also causes their courage to be 
untested, since fighting where everyone commands himself most of all provides an excuse for 
someone to save himself honorably. And they believe that scaring you without danger is a 
surer bet than coming to blows, or else they would have tried it already. See clearly that 
everything fearsome from them that exists beforehand is actually trifling and urgent only to the 
eyes and ears. By enduring this when it comes on and, when the time is right, withdrawing 
again in orderly ranks, you will more quickly reach safety and know for the future that such 
mobs, when you endure their first assault, boast of their courage to come with threats from 
afar. But if you yield to them, they are quick to show their spirit on foot without risk.” 
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Lendon terms “passive courage,” basically the soldierʼs ability to stay in his 
place in the battle line.265  Lendon claims that hoplite battle became 
predominant because of the unique appeal it had to the Greek competitive 
ethos.266  He believes that Greeks viewed the phalanx as more fair than other 
types of battle and so preferred it as a means to settle military disputes on 
even terms.  Hanson links hoplite warfare with the agrarian social context of 
the ancient Greek polis, since the Greeks associated societies based in 
mountainous areas, like Crete or Aetolia, with ambushes and missile attacks, 
while the small valleys and enclaves tucked between mountains where the 
agrarian polis thrives are the perfect setting for hoplite warfare.267  This kind of 
warfare allowed border conflicts to be frequent but not catastrophic to Greek 
society as a whole, since it greatly limited the human and economic 
destructiveness of war; it is also linked to the political dominance of the land-
owning classes, who alone could afford the panoply and held full voting 
rights.268 
Brasidasʼ speech also has implications for the relationship between 
ἀνδρεία and knowledge or experience, and the battleʼs outcome validates 
Brasidasʼ claims.  Although Brasidas combines his “instruction” with repeated 
appeals to his Lacedaemonian audienceʼs “native virtue,” the speech still 
clearly shows the importance of ἐπιστήμη and ἐμπειρία to the different 
formulations of ἀνδρεία just discussed.269  Brasidas cannot give his troops 
experience fighting light-armed opponents, but the knowledge he imparts can 
                                            
265 Lendon (2005) 53. 
266 Lendon (2005) 52-57. 
267 Hanson (2000) 208-209. 
268 Ibid. 219. 
269 Instruction: διδαχὴ ἀληθὴς (T 4.126.4); native virtue: οἰκείαν ἀρετήν (4.126.2). 
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seemingly replace it.270  Brasidasʼ claim that he will teach his troops not to fear 
their opponents is especially relevant:  
βαρβάρους δὲ οὓς νῦν ἀπειρίᾳ δέδιτε μαθεῖν χρή, ἐξ ὧν τε 
προηγώνισθε τοῖς Μακεδόσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀφʼ ὧν ἐγὼ εἰκάζω τε καὶ 
ἄλλων ἀκοῇ ἐπίσταμαι, οὐ δεινοὺς ἐσομένους.271  
Brasidas links his menʼs fear to their ἀπειρία, but he aims to relieve them of 
their fear with his ἐπιστήμη.  Although Brasidas only knows about their 
opponents true strength from report (ἀκοῇ), typically a less than perfect 
method of inquiry in Thucydidesʼ eyes,272 the barbarians do turn out to be less 
fearsome than they appear.273  In fact, Brasidas explicitly says that the enemy 
is scary only in sound and appearance: 
οὔτε γὰρ τάξιν ἔχοντες αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἂν λιπεῖν τινὰ χώραν 
βιαζόμενοι ἥ τε φυγὴ καὶ ἡ ἔφοδος αὐτῶν ἴσην ἔχουσα δόξαν τοῦ 
καλοῦ ἀνεξέλεγκτον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἔχει (αὐτοκράτωρ δὲ μάχη 
μάλιστʼ ἂν καὶ πρόφασιν τοῦ σῴζεσθαί τινι πρεπόντως πορίσειε), 
τοῦ τε ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν πιστότερον τὸ ἐκφοβῆσαι ὑμᾶς 
ἀκινδύνως ἡγοῦνται· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ἂν πρὸ τούτου ἐχρῶντο. σαφῶς 
τε πᾶν τὸ προϋπάρχον δεινὸν ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ὁρᾶτε ἔργῳ μὲν βραχὺ 
ὄν, ὄψει δὲ καὶ ἀκοῇ κατασπέρχον. ὃ ὑπομείναντες ἐπιφερόμενον 
καί, ὅταν καιρὸς ᾖ, κόσμῳ καὶ τάξει αὖθις ὑπαγαγόντες, ἔς τε τὸ 
ἀσφαλὲς θᾶσσον ἀφίζεσθε καὶ γνώσεσθε τὸ λοιπὸν ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι 
ὄχλοι τοῖς μὲν τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον δεξαμένοις ἄπωθεν ἀπειλαῖς 
τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μελλήσει ἐπικομποῦσιν, οἳ δʼ ἂν εἴξωσιν αὐτοῖς, κατὰ 
πόδας τὸ εὔψυχον ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ ὀξεῖς ἐνδείκνυνται.274 
                                            
270 Hunter (1973) 24-25. 
271 T 4.126.3: “Inexperience now makes you afraid of barbarians; and yet the trial of strength 
which you had with the Macedonians among them, and my own judgment, confirmed by what I 
hear from others, should be enough to satisfy you that they will not prove formidable” (tr. 
Crawley). 
272 Compare Thucydidesʼ dismissal of accepting ἀκοή at 1.20.1 when he first addresses the 
mistaken beliefs about Harmodius and Aristogiton. 
273 Hornblower 2 400, 401. 
274 T 4.126.5: “Having no order, they are not ashamed to leave a spot under pressure, and 
retreat and attack having equal reputation for nobility also causes their courage to be 
untested, since fighting where everyone commands himself most of all provides an excuse for 
someone to save himself honorably. And they believe that scaring you without danger is a 
surer bet than coming to blows, or else they would have tried it already. See clearly that 
everything fearsome from them that exists beforehand is actually trifling and urgent only to the 
eyes and ears. By enduring this when it comes on and, when the time is right, withdrawing 
 71 
Again, fear is linked with inexperience, but Brasidasʼ main point is that the 
tactics of their light-armed opponents cannot compare to the hoplite phalanx.  
Indeed, Brasidas highlights the totally different conceptions of ἀνδρεία that 
the two sides in this battle hold.  The non-Greeksʼ lack of a fixed order 
prevents battle from acting as a symmetrical test of courage like the hoplite 
phalanx does.275  Therefore, Brasidas denies that the enemy will show 
courage against the Lacedaemonians.  Despite his army not being composed 
of full Spartiates, Brasidas exhorts his troops with the rhetoric of native 
courage and hoplite valor that must have been very effective at Sparta.  The 
notable element, however, is the emphasis Brasidas also places on 
knowledge. 
 Pericles and Brasidas relate ἀνδρεία to many of the same themes, 
although the two men have much different relationships with their listeners, 
since Pericles is speaking in the assembly or at a public funeral and Brasidas 
is addressing soldiers before battle.  Nevertheless, both Pericles and Brasidas 
claim that their listeners possess ἀνδρεία because they show τόλμα (2.39, 
4.120), and both leaders argue that courage is related to knowledge (2.40, 
4.125).276  And yet Brasidas is not representative of the typical Spartan; he is, 
rather, the most exception Spartan leader.277  In general, Thucydides seems to 
                                            
again in orderly ranks, you will more quickly reach safety and know for the future that such 
mobs, when you endure their first assault, boast of their courage to come with threats from 
afar. But if you yield to them, they are quick to show their spirit on foot without risk.” 
275 Lendon (2004) 53. 
276 See Balot (2001) 506 for more on courage and knowledge in the Funeral Oration.  He 
argues that Pericles advances a new democratic conception of courage, since Periclesʼ 
“emphasis on intellectual insight adds something new to the traditional notion of courage, but 
he combines the intellect with character rather than making courage equivalent to knowledge.”  
Although Balot talks about the English concept ʻcourageʼ and does not relate it to ἀνδρεία in 
the Funeral Oration, the passages of Plato which he claims also reflect this notion of 
democratic courage do use the term ἀνδρεία. 
277 Westlake (1968) 148. 
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think ἀνδρεία is more typical of the Spartans and τόλμα more typical of the 
Athenians, but the most dynamic leaders embody both qualities.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 Unlike other authors, Thucydides restricts ἀνδρεία to a very specific 
context and meaning, since he links ἀνδρεία with war and especially the 
hoplite soldiers of a fully developed and functional polis.  Thucydides differs 
from Sophocles and Herodotus by not applying ἀνδρεία to women and non-
Greeks, even though his Histories include accounts of fearsome barbarians 
and valiant women.  Thucydidesʼ account of stasis shows that it is a mistake to 
confuse ἀνδρεία with τόλμα, since this leads to radicalized and extreme 
behavior.  At the same time, Thucydidesʼ semantic analysis alerts the reader 
to expect different cities and leaders to have different formulations of 
ἀνδρεία.278  Although Thucydides himself attributes ἀνδρεία to the Spartans 
but never the Athenians, Brasidas is the only Spartan who attempts to instill 
their ἀνδρεία in others.  The Syracusans also show ἀνδρεία, but they do so 
even before the arrival of Gylippus from Sparta.  Thus, it is questionable 
whether or not a leader or an ally can instill ἀνδρεία.  Ultimately, Thucydides 
shows how he believes ἀνδρεία must be coupled with knowledge by exploring 
the role of ἀνδρεία in Syracusan morale and how the guidance of 
Hermocrates affected his countrymenʼs morale (6.69, 6.72).  
 Thucydidesʼ other authorial statements on ἀνδρεία deal with the 
relationship between courage and experience or knowledge.  When he 
describes the battle of Mantinea, Thucydides shows that ἀνδρεία can bring 
                                            
278 Bassi (2005) 
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success, at least to the Lacedaemonians, even when ἐμπειρία fails.  Yet at 
the Anapus River, Syracusan ἀνδρεία cannot make up for a lack of ἐπιστήμη.  
Finally, Thucydidesʼ judgment of Hermocrates shows that one leader with 
ἀνδρεία and ἐμπειρία can help his people overcome their deficiency in 
knowledge, showing that a city ideally wages war with a combination of 
courage and skill.  If he had completed his work, Thucydides might also have 
shown how the Lacedaemonians were able to add ἐμπειρία to their ἀνδρεία.  
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CHAPTER 3  
 
MORALE AND VALUES: TOLMA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Scholars have recently emphasized the importance of τόλμα in 
Thucydidesʼ analysis of social psychology during the Peloponnesian War.279  
Although many of them have noted that this generally positive trait appears as 
a negative quality in certain passages, especially 3.82.4, no one has yet fully 
explored the thematic significance of Thucydidesʼ deployment of this term.  Of 
the mental qualities key to success in battle, τόλμα may be the most 
ambivalent.  The other concepts discussed in this thesis are clearly beneficial 
or harmful in war, but τόλμα can be helpful or damaging depending on the 
situation. Unlike ἀνδρεία, which is always a positive quality and cannot be 
overabundant, τόλμα can change from a virtue to a vice when it leads to 
radical behavior.  Although Thucydides repeatedly emphasizes how a lack of 
τόλμα hindered the Peloponnesians, the elevation of τόλμα to the chief virtue 
during stasis is more destructive than any external threat.  This chapter will 
examine how τόλμα characterizes the Athenians, how important a role it plays 
in stasis, and how it affects the campaign in Sicily.   
Unlike some of the other terms in this study, τόλμα had a well 
established meaning by the end of the fifth century that Thucydides did not 
significantly expand or change.  Instead, Thucydidesʼ deployment of words 
with the tolm- root is notable because he develops it as such an important 
                                            
279 Allison (1997a) 33, 54, 168-172, 182-186; Bassi (2003) 27-32; Luginbill (1999) 87-96, 173-
184; Meyer (2008) 19-26. 
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theme in his work.  The word refers to “the action of taking it upon oneself to 
do something” or “daring,” so “courage, boldness” in a positive context or 
“audacity, impulsiveness” in a negative context.280  The verb τολμάω first 
occurs in Homer, and from the beginning it can have a positive or negative 
connotation.281  The noun τόλμα is post-Homeric, first appearing in Pindar 
with the meaning of daring or courage,282 and then appearing in tragedy and 
comedy with the additional meanings of boldness and act of boldness, 
sometimes with a negative connotation.283  Pierre Huart concludes that 
Thucydides uses words in the τόλμα family to refer to “la confiance et la 
hardiesse” or “lʼaudace,” depending on whether the usage has a positive or 
negative connotation.284 
In Thucydides, the abstract noun τόλμα occurs seventeen times, the 
concrete noun τόλμημα occurs three times, the substantive τολμητής occurs 
once, the adjective τολμηρός occurs six times, the adverb τολμηρῶς 
appears twice, and the verb τολμάω occurs thirty times.285  In addition, the 
compound verb ἀντιτολμάω occurs twice, and the compound verb 
ἀποτολμάω occurs a single time.286  Thucydides uses this word group to 
                                            
280 Chantraine (1999) s.v. τόλμη. 
281 LSJ, s.v. τολμάω. 
282 Slater (1969), s.v. τόλμα; the lack of any negative connotations in Pindar could have more 
to do with his genre than his conception of the word. 
283 LSJ, s.v. τόλμα. 
284 Huart (1968) 431. 
285 Huart (1968) 431-436; τόλμα: 1.90.1, 1.144.4, 2.41.4, 2.62.5, 2.87.4, 2.89.5, 3.45.4, 
3.82.4, 5.7.2, 5.10.6, 6.31.6, 6.33.4, 6.36.1, 6.59.1, 6.68.2, 6.69.1, 7.28.3; τόλμημα: 2.25.2, 
6.54.1, 7.43.6; τολμητής: 1.70.3; τολμηρός: 1.74.2, 1.102.3, 2.87.5, 4.126.4, 7.21.3, 8.96.4; 
τολμηρῶς: 3.74.1, 3.83.3; τολμάω: 1.32.5, 1.74.4, 1.91.5, 1.93.4, 1.124.1, 2.40.3, 2.43.1, 
2.53.1, 2.83.3, 2.93.3, 3.22.6, 3.36.2, 3.56.5, 3.79.2, 3.82.6, 3.82.8, 4.28.2, 4.68.6, 4.73.4, 
4.98.6, 4.123.2, 5.76.3, 5.107.1, 6.34.8, 6.34.9, 6.40.1, 6.56.2, 6.82.4, 6.86.4, 7.21.4, 7.59.3, 
8.24.5, 8.96.3; ἀντιτολμάω: 2.89.6, 7.21.3; ἀποτολμάω: 7.67.1. 
286 Huart (1968) 432-433. 
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indicate an individual or groupʼs willingness to take risks.287  In Thucydides, 
τόλμα is noteworthy not only because it refers to a lack of fear in its possessor 
but also because it causes fear in others.288  And yet tracing Thucydidesʼ 
careful deployment of the positive and negative connotations of this word 
group shows that this quality often becomes more harmful to the city that 
possesses it than to its enemies. 
 
3.2 Τόλμα, Pericles, and the legacy of the Persian Wars 
From very early in the Histories, τόλμα is associated especially with the 
Athenians.  In speeches during the first meeting at Lacedaemon, both the 
Corinthians and the Athenians themselves link τόλμα with the Athenians. The 
Athenians claim τόλμα as their particular virtue, based especially on their 
evacuation of the city during the Persian Wars, and Pericles attributes Athensʼ 
greatness to this τόλμα.  When the Corinthians explain the great difference in 
Spartan and Athenian character, they use the rare word τολμητής to describe 
the Athenians: αὖθις δὲ οἱ μὲν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ καὶ παρὰ 
γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες.289  This speech is one 
of the few statements by a speaker that clearly corresponds to Thucydidesʼ 
views, and this positive portrayal of Athenian temperament gains credibility 
because it is spoken by their enemies.290  See Table 3.1, on the next page, for 
a catalogue of instances of τόλμα related to Athens and the Persian Wars.  
                                            
287 Luginbill (1999) 89.  See also Sluiter and Rosen (2003) 8-9, where they explain that one of 
the necessary elements of “courage” is facing danger.  Τόλμα fulfils this requirement but lacks 
the exclusively positive connotations that Sluiter and Rosen explain is also an element of 
courage. 
288 Luginbill (1999) 90. 
289 T 1.70.3: “Furthermore, they are daring beyond their power, risk-takers against their 
judgment, and hopeful amidst dangers.” 
290 Hornblower 1 114. 
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The early exploration of Athenian and Spartan character helps establish the 
paradigmatic contrasts between the two major powers in the Peloponnesian 
War,291 and nearly every usage of τόλμα early in Thucydidesʼ work is positive.  
The notable exception is the appearance of negative τόλμα in the account of 
the Plague, allowing Thucydides to question Periclesʼ glowing praise of this 
psychological quality. 
Table 3.1 – Pericles, Athenian τόλμα, and the legacy of the Persian Wars 
direct speech or paraphrase of Athenians non-Athenian or authorial statements 
 1.70.3 – the Corinthians tell the 
Lacedaemonians that the Athenians are daring 
beyond their power, venturesome beyond their 
judgment, and sanguine amidst dangers 
(τολμηταὶ) 
1.74.2 – the Athenian speaker argues that his 
city showed by far the most daring patriotism 
against the Persians (τολμηροτάτην) 
 
1.74.4 – the Athenian speaker argues that 
Athensʼ refusal to give in to Persia and daring 
to embark on the ships allowed Greece to 
resist the invasion (ἐτολμήσαμεν) 
 
 1.90.1 – the Lacedaemoniansʼ allies feared the 
size of the Athenian navy and the daring they 
had shown against Persia (τόλμαν) 
1.91.5 – Themistocles argues that the 
Athenians decided to show daring and take to 
the sea alone, and so will make their own 
decisions (τολμῆσαι) 
 
 1.93.4 – Themistocles was the first who dared 
to tell the Athenians that they must stick to the 
sea, and he laid the foundations for the empire 
(ἐτόλμησεν) 
 1.102.3 – fearing the Atheniansʼ boldness and 
revolutionary spirit, the Lacedaemonians 
dismissed them alone of the allies (τολμηρὸν) 
1.144.4 – Pericles says that the previous 
generation drove out the Persians with 
resolution greater than fortune and more daring 
than power (τόλμῃ) 
 
2.39.4 – Pericles claims that Athens is amazing 
because the Athenians show no less daring 
than their enemies, who train and toil 
constantly (ἀτολμοτέρους) 
 
                                            
291 Hornblower 1 108; Rood (1998) 43-45. 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
2.40.3 – Pericles argues that the Athenians are 
unique in combining daring with calculation 
(τολμᾶν) 
 
2.41.4 – Pericles says the Athenians have 
compelled all land and sea to become a path 
for their daring (τόλμῃ) 
 
2.43.1 – Pericles urges the survivors to pray for 
more safety than the fallen but to believe that 
they should have no less daring an intent 
against the enemy (ἀτολμοτέραν) 
 
2.43.1 – Pericles exhorts the Athenians to 
become lovers of the city and to recognize that 
its greatness comes from men daring, knowing 
what is necessary, and having a sense of 
propriety (τολμῶντες) 
 
 2.53.1 – the plague was the beginning of a 
great deal of lawlessness for the city in other 
respects, since a man more easily dares his 
secret desires when he sees sudden changes 
in fortune and death all around (ἐτόλμα) 
2.62.5 – Pericles argues that knowledge of 
their own superiority should fortify the 
Atheniansʼ daring (τόλμαν) 
 
 2.83.3 – the Corinthian fleet did not believe the 
Athenians would dare to fight against greater 
than 2-to-1 odds (τολμῆσαι) 
2.89.7 – Phormio argues that armies are 
sometimes defeated by lesser opponents 
because of inexperience or lack of daring, but 
the Athenians suffer from neither (ἀτολμίᾳ) 
 
3.45.4 – Diodotus argues that poverty will 
always breed daring by necessity (τόλμαν) 
 
 3.56.4 – the Plataeans argue that those who 
dared the noblest things against the Persians 
are more praiseworthy (τολμᾶν) 
In their speech in the first conference at Sparta, the Athenians appeal to 
their actions against Persia on behalf of Greece, and the Athenian apologia 
reinforces the Corinthiansʼ characterization.  They claim in particular that they 
showed προθυμία with the most τόλμα: προθυμίαν δὲ καὶ πολὺ 
τολμηροτάτην ἐδείξαμεν.292  Although all the Greeks who resisted the 
                                            
292 T 1.74.2: “We showed by far the most daring patriotism.” 
 79 
Persians exhibited προθυμία,293 τόλμα is specifically Athenian because they 
abandoned Athens to the invading Persians and staked it all on the battle of 
Salamis.  Luginbill argues that this accurately portrays the Athenians, since 
the Athenian speech confirms and expands the Corinthians characterization of 
Athenians as τολμηταὶ.294  In fact, this set of speeches establishes the 
dichotomy of Spartan and Athenian character, which Thucydides maintains 
and refines throughout the rest of the Histories.295   
Near the end of the work, Thucydides expresses the same sentiment in 
his own voice, when he discusses a missed opportunity to assault Piraeus.  
This occasion also allows Thucydides to note how possessing τόλμα made 
the Syracusans much better against the Athenians than the Lacedaemonians 
were.296 Yet again, a lack of τόλμα robs the Peloponnesian fleet of an easy 
victory, and their fleet actually had the experience to have capitalized on the 
Atheniansʼ weak position at this point in the war: 
μάλιστα δʼ αὐτοὺς καὶ διʼ ἐγγυτάτου ἐθορύβει, εἰ οἱ πολέμιοι 
τολμήσουσι νενικηκότες εὐθὺ σφῶν ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἐρῆμον ὄντα 
νεῶν πλεῖν· καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἐνόμιζον αὐτοὺς παρεῖναι. ὅπερ ἄν, 
εἰ τολμηρότεροι ἦσαν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐποίησαν, καὶ ἢ διέστησαν ἂν ἔτι 
μᾶλλον τὴν πόλιν ἐφορμοῦντες ἤ, εἰ ἐπολιόρκουν μένοντες, καὶ 
τὰς ἀπʼ Ἰωνίας ναῦς ἠνάγκασαν ἂν καίπερ πολεμίας οὔσας τῇ 
ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τοῖς σφετέροις οἰκείοις καὶ τῇ ξυμπάσῃ πόλει βοηθῆσαι· 
καὶ ἐν τούτῳ Ἑλλήσποντός τε ἂν ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ Ἰωνία καὶ αἱ νῆσοι 
καὶ τὰ μέχρι Εὐβοίας καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἡ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχὴ πᾶσα. ἀλλʼ 
οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναίοις πάντων δὴ 
ξυμφορώτατοι προσπολεμῆσαι ἐγένοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις 
πολλοῖς· διάφοροι γὰρ πλεῖστον ὄντες τὸν τρόπον, οἱ μὲν ὀξεῖς, οἱ 
δὲ βραδεῖς, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπιχειρηταί, οἱ δὲ ἄτολμοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐν 
ἀρχῇ ναυτικῇ πλεῖστα ὠφέλουν. ἔδειξαν δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι· 
                                            
293 See 3.65.5, where the Plataeansʼ also claim to have shown προθυμία against the 
Persians. 
294 Luginbill (1999) 92-96. 
295 Hornblower 1 114; Rood (1998) 43-45. 
296 See section 2.5 for more on Syracusan τόλμα. 
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μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμοιότροποι γενόμενοι ἄριστα καὶ 
προσεπολέμησαν.297 
Thucydides uses the verbal form of θόρυβος to show how much distress the 
proximity of a hostile fleet caused to the Athenians. This passage confirms late 
in Thucydidesʼ work that the author himself agrees with the basic dichotomy 
between the τολμηταί Athenians and ἄτολμοι Spartans that was first 
introduced in the Corinthiansʼ speech.298  
In addition to statements about Athenian τόλμα by Thucydides himself 
and non-Athenian speakers, the Athenians, particularly Pericles, argue that 
τόλμα is one of their most important qualities.  In fact, τόλμα is a major theme 
of the Funeral Oration, with words from that root appearing five times in the 
speech.299  The previous chapter argued that Pericles emphasizes tolma over 
andreia in this speech.300  In addition, Virginia Hunter has noted that Pericles 
claims γνώμη and τόλμα are the essence of Athenian character in all three of 
his speeches,301 and this is the key to understanding why Athenian τόλμα is 
                                            
297 T 8.96.3-5: “Meanwhile their greatest and most immediate trouble was the possibility that 
the enemy, more daring because of his victory, might make straight for them and sail against 
Piraeus, which they had no longer ships to defend; and every moment they expected him to 
arrive. This, with a little more daring, he might easily have done, in which case he would either 
have increased the dissensions of the city by his presence, or if he had stayed to besiege it 
have compelled the fleet from Ionia, although the enemy of the oligarchy, to come to the 
rescue of their country and of their relatives, and in the meantime would have become master 
of the Hellespont, Ionia, the islands, and of everything as far as Euboea, or, to speak roundly, 
of the whole Athenian empire. But here, as on so many other occasions the Lacedaemonians 
proved the most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to be at war with. The wide 
difference between the two characters, the slowness and lack of daring of the 
Lacedaemonians as contrasted with the dash and enterprise of their opponents, proved of the 
greatest service, especially to a maritime empire like Athens. Indeed this was shown by the 
Syracusans, who were most like the Athenians in character, and also most successful in 
combating them” (modified from Crawleyʼs translation).  See Hornblower 3 1030-1031 for the 
importance of this type of counter-factual sentence for narratological approaches with related 
bibliography. 
298 Luginbill (1999) 92-95, see also 88, 174 for more on the significance of this passage for 
“national character.” 
299 T 2.39.4, 2.40.3, 2.41.4, 2.43.1 (x2). 
300 See section 2.5. 
301 Hunter (1973) 59-60, citing 1.114.4, 2.40.2-3, and 2.62.5. 
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nearly always positive early in the war.  In the absence of a leader like 
Pericles, who can work against the infirmity of the Peopleʼs γνώμη,302 too 
much τόλμα leads to destructive behavior.  It is precisely Periclesʼ γνώμη, 
meaning not simply his policy but his rational policy,303 and his ability to control 
the Atheniansʼ passions that enables Athens to rely so much on τόλμα without 
becoming radicalized and immoderate. 
At the same time, Thucydidesʼ account of the plague shows that τόλμα 
leading to harmful and transgressive behavior already exists in Athens, 
although Pericles is able to ameliorate the effects of the Plague with his final 
speech.  Since the Plague results in a general breakdown of social and moral 
constraints,304 it gives a preview of the role τόλμα will play in the subsequent 
breakdown of morals in stasis:  
Πρῶτόν τε ἦρξε καὶ ἐς τἆλλα τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ πλέον ἀνομίας τὸ 
νόσημα. ῥᾷον γὰρ ἐτόλμα τις ἃ πρότερον ἀπεκρύπτετο μὴ καθʼ 
ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν, ἀγχίστροφον τὴν μεταβολὴν ὁρῶντες τῶν τε 
εὐδαιμόνων καὶ αἰφνιδίως θνῃσκόντων καὶ τῶν οὐδὲν πρότερον 
κεκτημένων, εὐθὺς δὲ τἀκείνων ἐχόντων.305 
This passage explicitly links τόλμα with ἀνομία, since an abundance of daring 
with no fear of consequences leads to transgressive behavior.  Hornblower 
even compares this passage to the mood of the Corcyraean stasis description, 
based especially on the repetition of ἡδονὴν.306   
                                            
302 As Pericles himself claims to do at T 2.61.2; see also 1.140.1 where Pericles claims he is 
always the same in γνώμη. 
303 Edmunds (1975a) 8-10.  
304 Rusten (1989) 189. 
305 T 2.53.1: “Nor was this the only form of lawless extravagance which owed its origin to the 
plague. Men now coolly dared what they had formerly done in a corner, and not just as they 
pleased, seeing the rapid transitions produced by persons in prosperity suddenly dying and 
those who before had nothing succeeding to their property” (modified from Crawleyʼs 
translation). 
306 Hornblower 1 326, 486; see below, section 2.4, for more on how passions lead to 
unrestrained and negative τόλμα. 
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3.3 Τόλμα and stasis 
Despite the strategic importance of Athenian τόλμα in the Archidamian 
War, the intimate links of τόλμα with civil discord highlight this qualityʼs 
negative aspects.  Thucydidesʼ famous description of stasis includes what 
Karen Bassi calls a “negative discourse of τόλμα” that “reveals a military 
virtue turned into a political vice.”307  Both in his description of the actual 
fighting and in his more theoretical discussions of the nature and effects of 
stasis, Thucydides makes it clear that τόλμα defines this type of conflict.  See 
Table 2.2, below, for instances of τόλμα linked with stasis at Corcyra and 
elsewhere in Greece.  During internal fighting, τόλμα is the quality that men 
value most highly, and Thucydides himself concedes that it is of more practical 
use than intelligence.308  Because τόλμα is so prevalent in and important to 
stasis, analysis of how τόλμα manifests during internal dissension is essential 
to identifying prototypical τόλμα.  Moreover, the confusion of words and their 
referents during stasis enables Thucydides to delve into the lexicon of civic 
and martial virtues in fifth century Greek city-states.309   
Table 3.2 – Τόλμα and stasis 
3.74.1 – the Corcyraean women boldly joined in the factional fighting, throwing tiles from the 
rooftops and enduring the chaos of battle contrary to their nature (τολμηρῶς) 
3.82.4 – in stasis, irrational daring is considered loyal courage (τόλμα) 
3.82.6 – in stasis, men become more ready to dare to transgress the law (τολμᾶν) 
3.82.8 – the cause of all the evils of stasis is ambition and lust for power, since men seek 
prizes for themselves in nominally serving the common interest; as the fight in every way to 
overcome one another, they dare the most terrible things and ascend to greater and greater 
heights of vengeance (ἐτόλμησαν) 
3.83.3 – in stasis, men of lesser judgment usually win out, since they fear the intelligence of 
their enemies and more quickly take bold action (τολμηρῶς) 
4.68.6 – the pro-Athenian conspirators inside Megara did not betray the city and did not show 
much daring earlier either (οὐδὲ…τολμῆσαι) 
                                            
307 Bassi (2003) 31 n 19. 
308 T 3.83.3. 
309 Bassi (2003) 32, discussing 3.82.4. 
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5.76.3 – after much discussion, the pro-Spartan party, who now dared to act openly, 
persuaded the Argives to accept a peace treaty (τολμῶντες) 
 During Thucydidesʼ initial account of the stasis at Corcyra, the womenʼs 
participation in the fighting helps mark the confusion of the normal order. In 
fact, T. E. J. Wiedemann argues that, throughout the Histories, the 
appearance of women in anything other than a passive role highlights the non-
rational features of an episode.310  Thucydides does not associate these 
women with ἀνδρεία but with τόλμα:  
διαλιπούσης δʼ ἡμέρας μάχη αὖθις γίγνεται καὶ νικᾷ ὁ δῆμος 
χωρίων τε ἰσχύι καὶ πλήθει προύχων· αἵ τε γυναῖκες αὐτοῖς 
τολμηρῶς ξυνεπελάβοντο βάλλουσαι ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκιῶν τῷ κεράμῳ 
καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ὑπομένουσαι τὸν θόρυβον.311 
The bold participation of even women shows how awry the city has gone, 
especially since Thucydides describes it as παρὰ φύσιν.312  Associating this 
action with ἀνδρεία would have strengthened the claim that the women acted 
contrary to their nature, yet Thucydides avoids this, even though women 
enduring the θόρυβος of battle might be described as brave.  In fact, Crawley 
translates the phrase as “supporting the melee with a fortitude beyond their 
sex.”  Thucydides, however, does not label them as ἀνδρειαί because women 
typically join in the fighting only against a background of social or political 
upheaval, and 3.82.4 shows that these are the very situations in which notions 
of ἀνδρεία are confounded.313  Thucydidesʼ account of the incorrect 
evaluation of actions in stasis implies that the Corcyraeans could have 
                                            
310 Wiedemann (1983) 169. 
311 T 3.74.1: “Battle began again after a day passed, and the People were victorious because 
of the strength of their position and their advantage in numbers; and the women boldly joined 
them by attacking from the roofs with tile and enduring the chaos beyond their nature.” 
312 T 3.74.2 even says the city itself was nearly destroyed by fire in the fighting. 
313 Loraux (1985) 18-20. 
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associated these women with ἀνδρεία, but Thucydides avoids the 
etymological pun. 
Thucydides follows his description of the happenings at Corcyra with an 
explanation of how stasis generally works, showing that this passage is meant 
to act as a paradigm for the many instances of stasis that occurred across 
Greece as a result of the Peloponnesian War.314  The most famous of 
Thucydidesʼ pronouncements on stasis is his explanation of how civic and 
martial values are confused by men embroiled in factional conflict: καὶ τὴν 
εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει. 
τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη.315  In other 
words, when a man who is involved in civil war performs an act of irrational 
daring, the members of his party praise him for his courage on their behalf.  
This is the second time that ἀνδρεία appears with τόλμα, but here τόλμα 
replaces ἀνδρεία.316  The partisans in civil war still speak of ἀνδρεία, but 
every action they label ʻcourageousʼ is in reality motivated by an irrational 
impulsiveness.  The position of this equivalency first shows that ἀνδρεία is the 
virtue most threatened by stasis,317 and Thucydides relates it with τόλμα 
because τόλμα becomes the most valued characteristic during stasis.  Yet the 
application of the clearly negative adjective ἀλόγιστος clearly shows that 
τόλμα, which often has a positive connotation in Thucydides, is a negative 
quality during stasis.318  When τόλμα instead of ἀνδρεία is the most highly 
                                            
314 Hornblower 1 490. 
315 T 3.82.4: “Further, they exchanged their usual verbal evaluations of deeds for new ones, in 
the light of what they now thought justified; thus irrational daring was considered courage for 
the sake of the Party” (tr. Wilson 1982).  See Allison (1997a) 168 and Bassi (2003) 28 for 
other recent literal translations of this sentence. 
316 The first is at 2.39.4; see section 4.5 for further discussion of that passage. 
317 Loraux (1986) 101. 
318 Bassi (2003) 31. 
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valued quality in a city, it is symptomatic of a more general breakdown of 
values within the city. 
The three further mentions of τόλμα in Thucydidesʼ paradigmatic 
account of stasis shows why it should not be elevated to the chief virtue.  
During stasis, factional ties become the most important, trumping even 
kinship, so partisans will dare anything for their party:  
καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τοῦ ἑταιρικοῦ ἀλλοτριώτερον ἐγένετο διὰ 
τὸ ἑτοιμότερον εἶναι ἀπροφασίστως τολμᾶν· οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τῶν 
κειμένων νόμων ὠφελίας αἱ τοιαῦται ξύνοδοι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοὺς 
καθεστῶτας πλεονεξίᾳ. αὶ τὰς ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πίστεις οὐ τῷ θείῳ 
νόμῳ μᾶλλον ἐκρατύνοντο ἢ τῷ κοινῇ τι παρανομῆσαι.319 
This complete breakdown of all laws and customs, reminiscent of the terrible 
effects of the plague on Athens, shows how destructive τόλμα can be when it 
goes too far.  Thucydides subsequently describes how this spirals out of 
control and the cycle of greater and greater τόλμα becomes self-perpetuating: 
τὰ μὲν κοινὰ λόγῳ θεραπεύοντες ἆθλα ἐποιοῦντο, παντὶ δὲ τρόπῳ 
ἀγωνιζόμενοι ἀλλήλων περιγίγνεσθαι ἐτόλμησάν τε τὰ δεινότατα 
ἐπεξῇσάν τε τὰς τιμωρίας ἔτι μείζους, οὐ μέχρι τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῇ 
πόλει ξυμφόρου προτιθέντες, ἐς δὲ τὸ ἑκατέροις που αἰεὶ ἡδονὴν 
ἔχον ὁρίζοντες.320 
Thus, the τόλμα of partisans in stasis is motivated by the pursuit of immediate 
pleasure, in much the same way that a focus on instant gratification caused 
lawlessness in Athens during the Plague.  This subversion of the public good 
by the leaders of the different factions is one of the worst effects of internal 
                                            
319 T 3.82.6: “Even blood became a weaker tie than party, from the superior readiness of those 
united by the latter to dare everything without reserve; for such associations had not in view 
the blessings derivable from established institutions but were formed by ambition for their 
overthrow; and the confidence of their members in each other rested less on any religious 
sanction than upon complicity in crime” (tr. Crawley). 
320 T 3.82.8: “[The leaders] sought prizes for themselves in those public interests which they 
pretended to cherish, and, recoiling from no means in their struggles for ascendancy, dared 
the most terrible things; in their acts of vengeance they went to even greater lengths, not 
stopping at what justice or the good of the state demanded, but limiting themselves only to 
what was pleasurable to each at any given moment” (modified from Crawleyʼs translation). 
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conflict, and the Oresteia of Aeschylus, to name only one example, shows that 
the danger of reciprocal acts of revenge was well understood in fifth century 
Athens.  Yet τόλμα is not only the most highly valued quality during stasis, it is 
also the most useful, enabling the less intelligent to triumph over their betters 
in the climate of fear and escalating violence: 
καὶ οἱ φαυλότεροι γνώμην ὡς τὰ πλείω περιεγίγνοντο· τῷ γὰρ 
δεδιέναι τό τε αὑτῶν ἐνδεὲς καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ξυνετόν, μὴ 
λόγοις τε ἥσσους ὦσι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πολυτρόπου αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμης 
φθάσωσι προεπιβουλευόμενοι, τολμηρῶς πρὸς τὰ ἔργα 
ἐχώρουν.321 
Here Thucydides explicitly differentiates the τόλμα of stasis, which men who 
lack γνώμη use for personal gain, from Periclean τόλμα, which was tightly 
controlled by the γνώμη of Pericles.  Furthermore, the impulsive τόλμα of 
stasis also causes its possessors to act quickly (φθάσωσι) as well as without 
deliberation.  Although speedy action without forethought is advantageous in 
civil war, it ultimately destroys the city.  Thus, Thucydides pairs ἀνδρεία and 
τόλμα for two reasons.  First, courage becomes rashness when it is 
unrestrained, and the breaking of all restraints is characteristic of stasis.  
Second, just as ἀνδρεία is the most important virtue in a properly functioning 
polis, acts of τόλμα are evaluated as the most virtuous by men under the 
influence of stasis.  In Periclesʼ formulation, ἀνδρεία and τόλμα coexist; but in 
stasis, τόλμα replaces ἀνδρεία. 
 
                                            
321 T 3.83.3: “In this contest, those lesser in wisdom were most successful. Apprehensive of 
their own deficiencies and of the cleverness of their antagonists, they feared to be worsted in 
debate and to be surprised by the combinations of their more versatile opponents, and so at 
once boldly had recourse to action” (tr. Crawley). 
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3.4 Athenian τόλμα and the campaign in Sicily 
Thucydides carefully uses the positive and negative connotations of 
τόλμα and related words developed earlier in the work to comment on 
Athenian and Syracusan morale during the war in Sicily.  My analysis shows 
that Athenian τόλμα in Sicily is extreme and unrestrained, but Hermocrates 
prevents Syracusan τόλμα from becoming radical and irrational.  Indeed, 
Hermocrates advocates showing τόλμα against the Athenians from his first 
appearance, but it is tempered by the precautions he suggests and the 
prudence of other generals.  Thus, Thucydides foreshadows the failure of the 
expedition by associating the Athenians with excessive, negative τόλμα and 
the Syracusans with moderate, positive τόλμα.  See Table 3.3 below for a 
catalogue of Athenian and Syracusan τόλμα in books six and seven of 
Thucydides.  Two authorial observations by Thucydides show that τόλμα is 
one of the psychological qualities most important to the outcome of the war in 
Sicily.  When explaining the Syracusansʼ loss in their first full-scale battle with 
the Athenians, Thucydides denies that the Syracusans were inferior in 
προθυμία or τόλμα in any of their battles.322 Thucydidesʼ later analysis of the 
Lacedaemonians and the Syracusans qua opponents of Athens shows that 
both sidesʼ possession of τόλμα in Sicily greatly affected the outcome of those 
hostilities.323  In contrast to the ἄτολμοι Lacedaemonians, the Syracusans 
μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμοιότροποι γενόμενοι ἄριστα καὶ προσεπολέμησαν.324  This 
statement, Thucydidesʼ most explicit concerning the character of the 
                                            
322 T 6.69.1. 
323 T 8.96.4-5. 
324 T 8.96.5: “Since the Syracusans were most like the Athenians in character, they also 
warred against them best.” 
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Syracusans, the Lacedaemonians, and the Athenians,325 suggests that 
Thucydides meant τόλμα to be an important motif in his account of the Sicilian 
expedition.   
 
 
Table 3.3 – Τόλμα in Sicily 
Athenian τόλμα Syracusan τόλμα 
6.31.6 – the expedition to Sicily was no less 
famous for its amazing daring and brilliant 
appearance than for the superiority of the 
armament compared to those they attacked, 
and because the voyage from home was so 
very great and it was undertaken with the 
greatest hope for the future compared to the 
present state of things (τόλμης) 
 
6.33.4 – Hermocrates exhorts anyone who 
believes the Athenians are coming not to be 
shocked at their daring and power (τόλμαν) 
 
 6.34.8 – Hermocrates argues that unexpected 
Syracusan daring will shock the Athenians 
more than their actual power (τολμήσαντας) 
 6.34.9 – Hermocrates exhorts the Syracusans 
to listen to him and show daring 
(τολμήσαντες) 
 6.36.1 – Athenagoras says he does not 
marvel at the daring of the men talking about 
the Athenians but rather at their stupidity, if 
they do not think what they are doing is 
obvious (τόλμης) 
 6.39.2 – Athenagoras attacks his opponents 
as extremely unjust if they knowingly spread 
such falsehoods (τολμᾶτε) 
6.54.1 – the bold deed of Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton came about because of an 
incident relating to a love affair (τόλμημα) 
 
6.56.3 – the conspirators thought that, if they 
showed daring, others would spontaneously 
join in freeing themselves from the tyrants 
(τολμήσειαν) 
 
6.59.1 – in this way through a lover's grief, 
the beginning of the plot and irrational daring 
came to Harmodius and Aristogeiton from 
great fear (τόλμα) 
 
                                            
325 See Luginbill (1999) 88, 174 on this passagesʼ significance for judging “national character.”   
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
 6.68.2 – Nicias urges his picked troops to 
expect victory over the Sicilians, who may act 
superior but will never stand firm because 
they have less skill than daring (τόλμης) 
 6.69.1 – the Syracusans did not fall short in 
zeal or daring in this fight or any other 
(τόλμῃ) 
6.82.4 – Euphemus argues that the Ionians 
deserve to be Athenian subjects, since they 
joined the Persians in attacking their mother 
city, Athens, and did not dare to revolt and 
lose their homes like the Athenians did 
(ἐτόλμησαν) 
 
 6.86.4 – Euphemus slanders the Syracusans 
for daring to attack the power that is holding 
them back from hegemony over Sicily 
(τολμῶσιν) 
7.21.3 – Hermocrates argues that against 
daring men like the Athenians, matching their 
daring with your own in most effective 
(τολμηρούς) 
7.21.3 – Hermocrates argues that against 
daring men like the Athenians, matching their 
daring with your own in most effective 
(ἀντιτολμῶντας) 
 7.21.4 – Hermocrates argues that Syracusan 
daring will counteract Athenian experience 
(τολμῆσαι) 
7.28.3 – the other Greeks held such a 
mistaken assessment of Athenian power and 
daring that they held out not one or two or 
three years but already seventeen since the 
first Peloponnesian invasion (τόλμης) 
 
7.43.6 – because of the unexpected daring of 
the night attack by the Athenians, the 
Syracusans fought back in a state of panic 
and at first did not stand their ground 
(τολμήματος) 
 
7.59.3 – the Syracusans prepared 
themselves in case the Athenians dared to 
fight more by sea (τολμήσωσι) 
 
 7.67.1 – Gylippus explains to the Syracusans 
that they will be even mightier, since they had 
daring before they gained skill, and now their 
experience gives them double reason to 
expect victory (ἀπετολμήσαμεν) 
 During the Sicilian expedition, the Athenians maintain their great τόλμα, 
but the quality that had served them so well militarily against the 
Peloponnesians yields to outbursts of excessive τόλμα that ultimately 
contribute to Athensʼ downfall.  Thucydides explicitly links τόλμα with the 
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sending of the expedition and Athensʼ continued efforts when the expedition 
gets into trouble, yet its negative aspects become clear in the tyrannicide 
digression and Demosthenesʼ failed assault on Epipolae.  After showing how 
τόλμα is important in the genesis of the expedition and helps Athens 
withstand one of historyʼs great military disasters, this section will argue that 
one of the main purposes of the tyrannicide digression is to set the stage for 
the later outbreak of stasis at Athens by showing how the Athenians are 
incorrectly elevating τόλμα into the chief political virtue.  Thucydides clearly 
indicates the ambivalence of one of the Atheniansʼ main character traits in his 
account of the triumphs and failures resulting from the cityʼs greatest martial 
undertaking. 
 At two crucial moments in books six and seven, Thucydides attributes 
τόλμα to the Athenians.  In his vivid description of the departure of the 
expedition, Thucydides relates τόλμα to its fame among the Greeks:  
καὶ ὁ στόλος οὐχ ἧσσον τόλμης τε θάμβει καὶ ὄψεως λαμπρότητι 
περιβόητος ἐγένετο ἢ στρατιᾶς πρὸς οὓς ἐπῇσαν ὑπερβολῇ, καὶ 
ὅτι μέγιστος ἤδη διάπλους ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας καὶ ἐπὶ μεγίστῃ ἐλπίδι 
τῶν μελλόντων πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπεχειρήθη.326 
Although some have found this statement to foreshadow Athensʼ spectacular 
defeat, the focalization of this whole paragraph, and especially the adjective 
περιβόητος, show that Thucydides is here referring to the impressions and 
emotions of the crowd described at 6.31.1.327  Athens is at the peak of its 
                                            
326 T 6.31.6: “Indeed the expedition became not less famous for its wonderful boldness and for 
the splendor of its appearance, than for its overwhelming strength as compared with the 
peoples against whom it was directed, and for the fact that this was the longest passage from 
home hitherto attempted, and the most ambitious in its objectives considering the resources of 
those who undertook it” (tr. Crawley). 
327 Hornblower 3 391-393 summarizes the arguments for and against taking this sentence as a 
negative description pointing to the later disaster, concluding that this section is meant to 
describe the actual power of Athens rather than a sensory illusion.  In any case, a reader who 
knows Thucydides well can read this passage ʻbackwardsʼ against 7.71 and 7.75, giving 
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power in this moment, and the τόλμα of sending such a great expedition so 
far rightly causes amazement (θάμβος).  One of the most beneficial effects of 
τόλμα in war is the shock it produces in oneʼs enemies.328  The amazement 
caused by the expedition is analogous, but here it reinforces the Greeksʼ belief 
in Athenian power rather than breaking soldiersʼ morale. And yet the ἔρως 
that motivated the expedition is much like the ἔρως that drove Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton to an act of τόλμα that Thucydides unambiguously condemns.329  
Much like the pursuit of pleasure (ἡδονή) causes τόλμα during the Plague 
and in stasis to be unrestrained and immoderate, Thucydidesʼ explicit 
connection of ἔρως with Athenian τόλμα in books six and seven signals the 
reader that τόλμα is now detrimental to the Athenians.  Although the watchers 
did not know that the departing ships were the concrete manifestation of the 
height of Athenian power, Thucydides had the benefit of hindsight and so 
chose this decisive moment for a powerful description of the sensory and 
emotional impact of Athensʼ military might.330   
When the Athenians begin to fare badly in Sicily and are subject to 
renewed Peloponnesian invasions, Thucydides reiterates their unexpected 
τόλμα.  In a sentence whose “syntactical audacity” reflects the τόλμα the 
Athenians are said to show,331 Thucydides sums up the Atheniansʼ difficulties 
in fighting a two front war: 
                                            
added force to what Hornblower calls the “tragedy” of Athenian power being destroyed in book 
seven. 
328 Luginbill (1999) 90.  
329 Meyer (2008) 25, who also notes a linguistic parallel between λαμπρότητι in this passage 
and λαμπροῦ describing Harmodius in 6.54.2; see also Wohl (1999), who analyzes the theme 
of eros in book six in light of recent scholarship on Athenian sexual mores. 
330 See section 5.3 for a discussion of the expedition of as concrete manifestation of Athenian 
power (rhome). 
331 Gomme et al. (1970) 404. 
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μάλιστα δʼ αὐτοὺς ἐπίεζεν ὅτι δύο πολέμους ἅμα εἶχον, καὶ ἐς 
φιλονικίαν καθέστασαν τοιαύτην ἣν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἠπίστησεν ἄν 
τις ἀκούσας. τὸ γὰρ αὐτοὺς πολιορκουμένους ἐπιτειχισμῷ ὑπὸ 
Πελοποννησίων μηδʼ ὣς ἀποστῆναι ἐκ Σικελίας, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖ 
Συρακούσας τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ἀντιπολιορκεῖν, πόλιν οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω 
αὐτήν γε καθʼ αὑτὴν τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τὸν παράλογον 
τοσοῦτον ποιῆσαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τόλμης, ὅσον 
κατʼ ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου οἱ μὲν ἐνιαυτόν, οἱ δὲ δύο, οἱ δὲ τριῶν γε 
ἐτῶν οὐδεὶς πλείω χρόνον ἐνόμιζον περιοίσειν αὐτούς, εἰ οἱ 
Πελοποννήσιοι ἐσβάλοιεν ἐς τὴν χώραν, ὥστε ἔτει ἑπτακαιδεκάτῳ 
μετὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐσβολὴν ἦλθον ἐς Σικελίαν ἤδη τῷ πολέμῳ κατὰ 
πάντα τετρυχωμένοι, καὶ πόλεμον οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω προσανείλοντο 
τοῦ πρότερον ὑπάρχοντος ἐκ Πελοποννήσου.332 
The phrase παράλογον … τόλμης recalls the effects of an unexpected 
assault on a body of troops, and the priamel concluding with “in the 
seventeenth year” focuses the readerʼs attention on the recurrent theme of 
Athenian power and resilience beyond what the other Greeks calculated at the 
warʼs beginning.333  Thus, the Atheniansʼ defining quality, τόλμα, enables 
them continually to confound their enemies.  And yet Lisa Kallet convincingly 
argues that this passageʼs cluster of medical vocabulary suggests that the 
Athenian polis is afflicted with passions like a human body afflicted with 
disease.334  Again, τόλμα motivated by passion and pleasure rather than 
controlled by reason is a decidedly negative quality.  On this reading, Athens 
                                            
332 T 7.28.3: “But what most oppressed them was that they had two wars at once, and had 
thus reached a pitch of frenzy which no one would have believed possible if he had heard of it 
before it had come to pass.  For could anyone have imagined that even when besieged by the 
Peloponnesians entrenched in Attica, they would still, instead of withdrawing from Sicily, stay 
on besieging in like manner Syracuse, a city (taken as a city) in no way inferior to Athens, or 
would so thoroughly upset the Hellenic estimate of their strength and audacity, as to give a 
spectacle of a people which, at the beginning of the war, some thought might hold out one 
year, some two, none more than three, if the Peloponnesians invaded their country, now 
seventeen years after the first invasion, after having already suffered from all the evils of war, 
going to Sicily and undertaking a new war nothing inferior to that which they already had with 
the Peloponnesians?” (tr. Crawley). 
333 Hornblower 3 594, Kallet (2001) 127. 
334 Kallet (2001) 128-132; note especially how she links the philonikia in this passage with “the 
Atheniansʼ lust and desire for the expedition in 415 (6.24).” 
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shows excessive τόλμα in fighting two wars simultaneously.  Much like 
individuals during the plague valued pleasure and profit above their bodies and 
possessions, the city squanders its citizens and resources in an overbold 
attempt at greater imperial power.335 
Another passage where τόλμα seems to be an advantage for the 
Athenians only to harm them in the event is Demosthenesʼ attack on Epipolae.  
The Athenian attack is initially successful, since the Atheniansʼ τόλμα causes 
ἔκπληξις in their opponents:336 
οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος καὶ οἱ μετʼ αὐτοῦ 
ἐβοήθουν ἐκ τῶν προτειχισμάτων, καὶ ἀδοκήτου τοῦ τολμήματος 
σφίσιν ἐν νυκτὶ γενομένου προσέβαλόν τε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις 
ἐκπεπληγμένοι καὶ βιασθέντες ὑπʼ αὐτῶν τὸ πρῶτον 
ὑπεχώρησαν.337 
This operation is the first known full-scale night battle in Greek history,338 
although Demosthenes had experience commanding night marches followed 
by dawn or predawn attacks.339  Despite Demosthenesʼ experience with 
similar operations, a hoplite armyʼs underdeveloped means of communication 
and identification made fighting in the dark extremely risky.340  Lazenby calls 
Thucydidesʼ account “a classic illustration of the difficulties and dangers of 
                                            
335 Kallet (2001) 136-137, linking T 2.53.2 with the present passage. 
336 The concrete noun τόλμημα only occurs two other times in Thucydides: at 2.25.2 to 
describe why Brasidas was the first commended at Sparta, and at 6.54.1 to introduce the 
tyrannicide digression (on which see below).  Therefore, this form cannot be said only to refer 
to positive or negative τόλμα , although the nearer and more emphatic use at 6.54 is more 
likely to color the readerʼs impression of Demosthenesʼ plan. 
337 T 7.43.6: “The Syracusans and their allies, and Gylippus with the troops under his 
command, advanced to the rescue from the outworks, but engaged with some consternation 
(a night attack being a piece of audacity which they had never expected), and were at first 
compelled to retreat” (tr. Crawley). 
338 Roisman (1993) 59; Hornblower 3 627 discusses the rare word nuktomachia, which occurs 
once in Herodotus to describe a daytime battle during an eclipse, and he notes that the 
Greeks found night fighting to be especially horrible. 
339 Roisman (1993) 59, noting the attacks on an Ambraciot camp (T 3.112.1-3), the Spartan 
position on Sphacteria (T 4.31.1), and the long walls of Megara (T 4.67.68). 
340 Roisman (1993) 59, Lazenby (2001) 158. 
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fighting in the dark.”341  In the end, Demosthenesʼ overbold plan led to a 
decisive Athenian defeat.342  Although the Athenian reinforcements briefly 
shook Syracusan morale and encouraged the Athenians, Demosthenesʼ arrival 
had no lasting effect on the basic trajectory of the two sidesʼ morale.343 
The tyrannicide digression shows more clearly the negative aspects of 
τόλμα within the Athenian polis.  Thucydides begins the digression by 
explaining that he wishes to relate the τόλμημα of Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton to show how the Athenians lack ἀκριβές concerning their tyrants 
and history,344 and in a classic ring composition he ends the episode with a 
reference to the ἀλόγιστος τόλμα of the two men,345 only then completely 
revealing that the assassination plot was not a blow for freedom but a murder 
motivated by passion.346  Furthermore, the substitution of ἐρωτικὴν λύπην at 
the end for ἐρωτικὴν ξυντυχίαν at the beginning, in addition to the contrast 
between the reasoned response of Hippias and the irrational passion of 
Aristogeiton, shows that this act of daring was extremely harmful.347  The 
erotic and emotional impetus for their actions clearly marks the τόλμα of 
Harmodius and Aristogeiton as immoderate and negative.  Just as the pursuit 
of pleasure motivates excessive τόλμα during the Plague and in stasis, the 
perceived threat to their sexual relationship causes the irrational daring of the 
tyrannicides.  Although the conspirators thought their act of daring would 
                                            
341 Lazenby (2001) 158. 
342 Lazenby (2001) 159. 
343 Romilly (1956) 154-155.  See section 5.4 for more analysis of the rise and fall of morale on 
both sides, which Thucydides expresses with words from the ῥώμη family. 
344 T 6.54.1. 
345 T 6.59.1. 
346 Allison (1997a) 183. 
347 Meyer (2008) 19. 
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inspire others to join in to “free themselves,”348 the actual result was greater 
oppression.  Elizabeth Meyer argues that the purpose of this digression is to 
pinpoint the moment when the Athenians became truly tyrannical; just as the 
murder of Hipparchus caused the Peisistratid tyranny to become harsh and 
unjust, the mutilation of the herms and the profanation of the Mysteries caused 
the Athenian demos, because of its misunderstanding of history, to become 
harsh and unjust.349   
June Allisonʼs analysis of 6.59 in relation to 3.82 points to an even more 
profound conclusion about Thucydidesʼ view of the political situation at Athens 
in 415, although she never states it explicitly.350  She rightly points out that the 
phrase ἀλόγιστος τόλμα at 6.59.1 reminds the alert reader of τόλμα μὲν γὰρ 
ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη at 3.82.4, and this reader notes 
the absence of the phrase ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος, especially since the two chief 
conspirators were ἑταῖροι and lovers.351  She concludes that Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton have misjudged reckless daring as loyal courage, just as men do 
in stasis, and just as the Athenians do in evaluating the tyrannicides as heroes 
and Alcibiades as an enemy of the demos.352  The Athenians, therefore, would 
judge the recall of Alcibiades an act of loyal courage, necessary to protect the 
city.  In Thucydidesʼ view, however, it is an act of irrational daring, since they 
are not only depriving the troops in Sicily of their most able general, but also 
                                            
348 T 6.56.3: ἤλπιζον γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ προειδότας, εἰ καὶ ὁποσοιοῦν τολμήσειαν, ἐκ τοῦ 
παραχρῆμα ἔχοντάς γε ὅπλα ἐθελήσειν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ξυνελευθεροῦν. “They expected 
that those without foreknowledge, even if so few of them dared, would join them in fighting for 
freedom with the weapons at hand.” 
349 Meyer (2008) 19-24. 
350 Allison (1997a) 182-186. 
351 Allison (1997a) 184, translating ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος as “loyal courage, i.e., courage in 
defense of oneʼs companion.” 
352 Ibid. 
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driving him over to the Peloponnesians, who make great use of his advice and 
insights to further their own war efforts.  Thus, the recall of Alcibiades, as 
Thucydides shows with the insertion of the tyrannicide digression, marks the 
beginning of stasis at Athens.  The Athenians are not yet fighting in the 
streets, but they are incorrectly evaluating actions just as Thucydides 
describes in 3.82. 
The speech of Euphemus in the Camarina debate also shows the 
change in Athenian character since the beginning of the Archidamian war.  He 
deploys the vocabulary of τόλμα twice: once referring to Athenian actions 
against Persia, and once rhetorically attacking his opponents for being 
misleading much like the Syracusan Athenagoras does.353  Although the 
reference to Athensʼ τόλμα against Persia is superficially like the theme of 
Athenian τόλμα developed in books one and two, Euphemusʼ invocation of the 
Persian Wars is strikingly different from that of the Athenian ambassadors at 
1.74.  In book one, the ambassadors point to Athensʼ three contributions 
against Persia: the greatest number of ships, the most intelligent general, and 
the most unflinching or daring patriotism (προθυμίαν ἀοκνοτάτην, 
προθυμίαν δὲ καὶ πολὺ τολμηροτάτην).354  Euphemus, on the other hand, 
replaces the most intelligent general with the new argument that Athens was 
justified in reducing the Ionians to servitude because some of them joined 
Persia.355  In contrast to the Athenian ambassadorsʼ genuine plea for 
negotiation at Sparta in book one, Euphemusʼ speech purports to be realistic 
and frank but is actually quite disingenuous.356  Euphemusʼ later attack on his 
                                            
353 T 6.82.4, 6.86.4; see below on Athenagoras. 
354 T 1.74.1-2. 
355 T 6.82.4-83.1; Connor (1984) 183-184. 
356 Rawlings (1981) 121-122. 
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opponent for daring to mislead his listeners recalls the rhetoric of Athenagoras 
in the initial Syracusan debate.357  The suggestive parallels and discontinuity 
with the ambassadorsʼ speech in book one shows that “Athens has crossed 
the boundaries of restraint and embarked upon a venture that is already 
profoundly changing her.”358   
Indeed, lack of restraint characterizes Athenian τόλμα throughout the 
campaign in Sicily.  Despite the role of τόλμα in the Atheniansʼ continued 
resistance in the face of wars against the Peloponnesians and the 
Syracusans, this characteristically Athenian quality becomes a great hindrance 
to Athens at this stage in the war.  The Athenians are no longer showing 
τόλμα only in a way that confounds their enemies; instead, their daring nature 
has run amok and is causing them to take excessive risks in dealing with their 
enemies and their fellow citizens.  Thucydides shows that the key to utilizing 
τόλμα is moderation, but without a leader like Pericles to control the people 
with his γνώμη,359 the Atheniansʼ daring character was bound to lead to 
excessive pleasure and profit seeking.   
 
3.5 Hermocrates and Syracusan τόλμα  
Thucydides takes up the idea of moderate and excessive τόλμα in the 
first set of paired Syracusan speeches in order to show that, unlike the 
Athenians, the Syracusans will be able to control τόλμα and deploy it in an 
effective and helpful way.  Thucydides himself explicitly says that τόλμα was 
crucial to the Syracusans,360 and the way the Syracusan leadership deploys 
                                            
357 T 6.86.4; cf. 6.36.1 and 6.39.2, discussed below. 
358 Connor (1984) 184. 
359 T 2.65.8-9. 
360 T 6.69.1, 8.96.5. 
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the vocabulary of τόλμα rhetorically shows why they outmatched the 
Athenians in this important psychological quality.  In addition to Thucydidesʼ 
own statements concerning Syracusan τόλμα, this quality is a recurrent motif 
in the speeches and thoughts of the Syracusan leadership.  Its meaning is 
implicitly disputed in the debate of Hermocrates and Athenagoras when news 
of the Athenian fleet reaches Syracuse, it dominates Hermocratesʼ 
considerations about manning a Syracusan fleet, and it appears in Gylippusʼ 
and the generalsʼ speech before the final battle in the Great Harbor.   
Although Athenagoras rails against those who would show τόλμα 
against their fellow citizens, Hermocratesʼ conception of military τόλμα 
tempered by prudent precautions more aptly fits the meaning of τόλμα as it 
appears in the later passages.  The debate ends with a short speech by a 
general, who, unlike Sthenelaidas at Sparta, diffuses the tension and 
advocates cautious preparation for the war.361  Thus, the outcome of the 
conference is a more moderate plan than Hermocratesʼ daring idea, and 
demagogic attacks among the Syracusans disappear from the narrative.  The 
Athenians and Syracusans are not only two peoples characterized by τόλμα, 
but representatives of the two different aspects of τόλμα. 
In his first speech, Hermocrates advises the Syracusans not to be 
terrified by the Atheniansʼ τόλμα, but rather to shock the Athenians by 
showing τόλμα themselves.362  He begins by exhorting his countrymen not to 
feel ἔκπληξις at the Atheniansʼ τόλμα and δύναμις,363 recalling Thucydidesʼ 
                                            
361 Rawlings (1981) 85. 
362 See also section 2.5 above on this passage. 
363 T 6.33.4: εἰ δέ τῳ καὶ πιστά, τὴν τόλμαν αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν μὴ ἐκπλαγῇ. “If these 
things are believable to someone, let him not be shocked at their daring and power.” 
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description of the departure of the expedition at 6.31.6.364  Whether or not this 
echo is meant to imply that Athensʼ power is illusory,365 Hermocratesʼ 
statement shows a clear understanding of the psychological effects of τόλμα 
in a military context.366  In fact, Hermocrates argues that by showing their own 
τόλμα, the Syracusans will be able to inspire the stronger κατάπλεξις in the 
Athenians.367  Hermocrates concludes with an exhortation to show τόλμα and 
meet the Athenians at Tarentum, but concedes that the Syracusans must at 
least prepare for war and make τὰς μετὰ φόβου παρασκευὰς 
ἀσφαλεστάτας.368  This invocation of the safest preparations based on fear 
recalls the speech of Archidamus before the first invasion of Attica.369  
Although his actual plan to meet the Athenian expedition in force before it 
reached Sicily may or may not be strategically sound,370 Hermocratesʼ implicit 
analysis of the psychology of the two sides is accurate.371  In fact, his final 
piece of advice, to take rational precautions against the invasion, is confirmed 
by the unnamed general whose speech ends the debate.372  Hermocrates 
loses the debate in the sense that the Syracusans do not adopt his strategic 
proposal, but his conception of τόλμα and its relationship to Syracusan 
                                            
364 Hornblower 3 392, 400. 
365 Kallet (2001) 66-67, noting that Hermocrates argues the ekplexis caused by the Athenians 
could actually be beneficial to Syracuse by scaring the rest of Sicily into an alliance. 
366 For more on τόλμα and ekplexis, see section 2.5 above. 
367 6.34.8: εἰ δʼ ἴδοιεν παρὰ γνώμην τολμήσαντας, τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ μᾶλλον ἂν καταπλαγεῖεν 
ἢ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς δυνάμει. “If they saw us daring contrary to reason, they would be 
more struck by the unexpectedness than by our actual power.”  Note also the echo of the 
Corinthiansʼ description of the Athenians at 1.70.3. 
368 T 6.34.9: “the safest preparations with fear.” 
369 Desmond (2006) 376-378. 
370 Hornblower 3 398-400 summarizes the not inconsiderable debate on whether Hermocratesʼ 
plan was sound. 
371 Luginbill (1999) 178-179 argues that this speech begins the transformation of Syracusan 
character from slower and Spartan-like to more daring and Athenian-like.  In any case, 
Syracusan τόλμα is an important motif as the expedition unfolds. 
372 Hornblower 3 416-417. 
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psychology reflects the later occurrences of this motif in Thucydidesʼ account.  
Unlike the Athenians, whose τόλμα is truly παρὰ γνώμην and unchecked in 
books six and seven, the Syracusans temper their τόλμα with rational 
preparations. 
In response to Hermocrates, Athenagoras makes a speech rebuking 
those who would dare to spread false rumors about an Athenian attack.373  
This type of τόλμα, deployed politically against oneʼs fellow citizens, 
represents a clear difference from the controlled military τόλμα advocated by 
Hermocrates.  Athenagoras, who functions as a paradigm for the Syracusan 
demagogue much like Cleon functions for the Athenian demagogue,374 is 
clearly wrong that the Athenians are not sailing to Sicily.  In fact, his assertions 
that Syracuse is especially prone to stasis do not reflect Thucydidesʼ text as it 
exists.375  This type of dangerous, internal τόλμα does not recur at Syracuse 
in books six or seven, despite Niciasʼ persistent hope that stasis will enable 
the Athenians to defeat Syracuse.  Thus, excessive τόλμα and stasis appear 
in Athenagorasʼ speech only to be implicitly discarded as Thucydides shapes 
the themes that dominate his account of the war in Sicily.376  As the motif of 
Syracusan τόλμα recurs, it becomes clear that Hermocratesʼ formulation of 
moderate τόλμα better reflects Syracusan psychology and actions against the 
                                            
373 T 6.36.1: τόλμης, 6.39.2: τολμᾶτε. 
374 Hornblower 3 396, 405-407. 
375 T 6.38.3; Hornblower 3 411, however, adduces Thucydidesʼ statement at 5.1 that stasis 
was prevalent at Syracuse; 406-407 notes that Athenagoras does make some valid claims 
about democracy, so his speech may have originally been meant to prefigure the outbreak of 
stasis at Syracuse and Hermocratesʼ attempted tyranny in a hypothetical book nine or ten of 
Thucydides. 
376 Rawlings (1981) 83 argues that this speech, like that of Archidamus in book one, is meant 
to modify and expand the portrait of Athensʼ adversary, and “is recorded only for the light it 
sheds upon Syracusan political and social conditions.”  Athenagoras shows the dark side of 
Syracusan democracy, but this theme does not resurface in what was finished of Thucydidesʼ 
Histories. 
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Athenians.  The ascendancy of Hermocrates means that Syracuse has chosen 
the new Pericles over the new Cleon, and this choice has profound effects on 
Syracuse itself and even Athens.377  
Hermocrates is also linked with τόλμα at the pivotal moment when the 
Syracusans first decide to man a fleet.  At the same time the Lacedaemonians 
fortify Deceleia, Gylippus returns to Syracuse with fresh allies and urges the 
Syracusans to oppose the Athenians by sea.378  Thucydides records in oratio 
obliqua the supporting speech of Hermocrates:  
ξυνανέπειθε δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης οὐχ ἥκιστα, τοῦ ταῖς ναυσὶ μὴ 
ἀθυμεῖν ἐπιχειρῆσαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, λέγων οὐδʼ ἐκείνους 
πάτριον τὴν ἐμπειρίαν οὐδʼ ἀίδιον τῆς θαλάσσης ἔχειν, ἀλλʼ 
ἠπειρώτας μᾶλλον τῶν Συρακοσίων ὄντας καὶ ἀναγκασθέντας ὑπὸ 
Μήδων ναυτικοὺς γενέσθαι. καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας τολμηρούς, οἵους 
καὶ Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς ἀντιτολμῶντας χαλεπωτάτους ἂν [αὐτοῖς] 
φαίνεσθαι· ᾧ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς πέλας, οὐ δυνάμει ἔστιν ὅτε 
προύχοντες, τῷ δὲ θράσει ἐπιχειροῦντες καταφοβοῦσι, καὶ σφᾶς 
ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὑποσχεῖν. καὶ Συρακοσίους εὖ 
εἰδέναι ἔφη τῷ τολμῆσαι ἀπροσδοκήτως πρὸς τὸ Ἀθηναίων 
ναυτικὸν ἀντιστῆναι πλέον τι διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκπλαγέντων αὐτῶν 
περιγενησομένους ἢ Ἀθηναίους τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ τὴν Συρακοσίων 
ἀπειρίαν βλάψοντας. ἰέναι οὖν ἐκέλευεν ἐς τὴν πεῖραν τοῦ 
ναυτικοῦ καὶ μὴ ἀποκνεῖν.379 
                                            
377 Rawlings (1981) 84.  See also Luginbill (1999) 174 on Hermocrates as a Periclean leader. 
378 T 7.20-21.2. 
379 T 7.21.3-4: “With him Hermocrates actively joined in trying to persuade his countrymen not 
to lack the enthusiasm to attack the Athenians at sea, saying that the latter had not inherited 
their naval prowess nor would they retain it for ever; they had been landsmen even to a 
greater degree than the Syracusans, and had only become a maritime power when obliged by 
the Mede. Besides, to daring spirits like the Athenians, reciprocal daring would seem the most 
formidable; and the Athenian plan of paralyzing by the boldness of their attack a neighbor 
often not their inferior in strength, could now be used against them with as good effect by the 
Syracusans. He was convinced also that the unlooked-for spectacle of Syracusans daring to 
face the Athenian navy would cause a terror to the enemy, the advantages of which would far 
outweigh any loss that Athenian science might inflict upon their inexperience. He accordingly 
urged them to throw aside their fears and to try their fortune at sea” (adapted from Crawleyʼs 
translation). 
 102 
Hermocrates returns to the theme of his earlier speech that the Syracusans 
must match τόλμα with τόλμα, using three τολμ- words including the rare 
verb ἀντιτολμάω.380  Showing he has an accurate understanding of the 
terrifying power of unexpected daring in a military setting, Hermocrates argues 
that it can make up for inferiorities in material strength.  In addition, his advice 
on fighting by sea is almost identical to his judgment of fighting on land at 6.72 
that “the Syracusansʼ bravery and daring will overcome their inexperience and 
defeat the Atheniansʼ greater experience (empeiria) and knowledge 
(episteme).”381  Although the Syracusans lose the subsequent sea battle much 
like they lost their first land battle, because of disorder and confusion, the 
capture of the Athenian forts at Plemmyrium cements the Syracusansʼ 
superiority on land.382  Thus, Hermocratesʼ arguments about Syracusan 
character do not explain the outcome of the battles with which they are paired; 
instead, his conception of τόλμα and its military uses reflect broader themes 
in the narrative of the Sicilian expedition.  Ultimately, the truth of Hermocratesʼ 
assessment of Syracusan character as daring and innovative sets up the 
decisive moment at 7.36.3, when they decide to equip their ships for prow-to-
prow ramming, allowing Syracuse to defeat Athens even in naval warfare.383   
The theme of Syracusan τόλμα recurs in the speech of Gylippus and 
the generals that forms part of the “ensemble” introducing the final battle and 
presenting Thucydidesʼ implicit analysis of the two sidesʼ morale.384  Gylippus 
                                            
380 Hornblower 3 580-581 notes that the verb also occurs at 2.89.6 in the speech of Phormio 
and the related adjective ἀντίτολμος occurs at Aechylus Eumenides 553. 
381 Rawlings (1981) 170. 
382 Ibid. 
383 Romilly (1956) 151-153 argues that this moment sets up the final Athenian defeat in the 
great harbor, since it allows the Syracusans to take advantage of the topography and 
neutralize their inferiority in naval skill and tactics. 
384 Romilly (1956) 160-161. 
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picks up Hermocratesʼ antitheses between τόλμα and ἐπιστήμη but suggests 
that the Syracusans now possess both:  
ἡμῶν δὲ τό τε ὑπάρχον πρότερον, ᾧπερ καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονες ἔτι 
ὄντες ἀπετολμήσαμεν, βεβαιότερον νῦν, καὶ τῆς δοκήσεως 
προσγεγενημένης αὐτῷ, τὸ κρατίστους εἶναι εἰ τοὺς κρατίστους 
ἐνικήσαμεν, διπλασία ἑκάστου ἡ ἐλπίς· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ πρὸς τὰς 
ἐπιχειρήσεις ἡ μεγίστη ἐλπὶς μεγίστην καὶ τὴν προθυμίαν 
παρέχεται.385  
This passage cements the motif of Syracusan τόλμα that Thucydides has 
been developing in Hermocratesʼ speeches and his own authorial comments 
throughout books six and seven.386  Furthermore, this passage is rich with 
verbal similarities to other passages where Thucydides analyzes Syracusan 
morale.387  The combination of recently acquired ἐπιστήμη with the τόλμα 
they always possessed sets up the final Syracusan victory.  The deficiency 
that Thucydides identified in his first explicit analysis of Syracusan morale at 
6.69.1 is no longer a problem for the Syracusans. 
Thucydides even hints at the failure of Athenian τόλμα.  In his speech 
before the first land battle against the Syracusans, Nicias argues that the 
Syracusans have τόλμα but lack ἐπιστήμη: οἳ ὑπερφρονοῦσι μὲν ἡμᾶς, 
ὑπομενοῦσι δʼ οὔ, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῆς τόλμης ἥσσω ἔχειν.388  This 
is essentially the converse of Hermocratesʼ repeated claim that Syracusan 
                                            
385 T 7.67.1: “With us it is different. The original estimate of ourselves which gave us daring 
when we still lacked skill has been strengthened, while the conviction added to it that we must 
be the best seamen of the time, if we have conquered the best, has given a double measure 
of hope to every man among us; and, for the most part, where there is the greatest hope, 
there is also the greatest enthusiasm for action” (modified from Crawleyʼs translation). 
386 Luginbill (1999) 179 argues that this speech sums up the transformation of Syracusan 
character into the daring and hopeful kind he associates with the Athenians. 
387 ἐπιχειρήσεις is echoed by ἐπιχειρηταί (of the Athenians in contrast to the ἄτολμοι 
Spartans) at 8.96.5; the collocation of τόλμα, προθυμία, and ἐπιστήμη also recalls 
Thucydidesʼ description of the Syracusans (οὐ γὰρ δὴ προθυμίᾳ ἐλλιπεῖς ἦσαν οὐδὲ 
τόλμῃ…) at 6.69.1; see section 4.4 for more on προθυμία in this passage. 
388 T 6.68.2: “They look down on us, but they will not stand up to us, because of having less 
knowledge than daring.” 
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τόλμα will make up for superior Athenian ἐπιστήμη.  Although Thucydidesʼ 
comment on the following battle confirms Niciasʼ argument that the 
Syracusans lose because of a lack of ἐπιστήμη,389 ceding the advantage in 
τόλμα to the Syracusans becomes problematic when they gain experience 
and skill.  Once the Syracusans have triumphed at sea by reinforcing their 
prows, they decide to try annihilating the entire Athenian force and take 
measures in case the Athenians still show daring: 
ἔκλῃον οὖν τόν τε λιμένα εὐθὺς τὸν μέγαν, ἔχοντα τὸ στόμα 
ὀκτὼ σταδίων μάλιστα, τριήρεσι πλαγίαις καὶ πλοίοις καὶ ἀκάτοις 
ἐπʼ ἀγκυρῶν ὁρμίζοντες, καὶ τἆλλα, ἢν ἔτι ναυμαχεῖν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι 
τολμήσωσι, παρεσκευάζοντο, καὶ ὀλίγον οὐδὲν ἐς οὐδὲν 
ἐπενόουν.390 
As Romilly argues, this completes the reversal of Naupactus, as the Athenians 
vainly try to shrug off a dispiriting defeat with irrational hopes.391  Since Nicias 
ceded the rhetorical advantage in τόλμα to the Syracusans long before, it is 
not surprising that he is unable to inspire the true daring that could have 
shocked the Syracusans and reversed the general trend in the two sidesʼ 
morale.  Ultimately, the second defeat so badly damages Athenian morale that 
the sailors will not even show enough τόλμα to attempt a third sea battle, 
despite their continued numerical superiority.392 
Thucydides carefully deploys terms from the τολμ- root in his account 
of the Sicilian expedition.  Although both sides are characterized by τόλμα, 
Thucydides depicts the Athenians as irrationally daring and the Syracusans as 
                                            
389 T 6.69.1. 
390 T 7.59.3: “They began at once to close up the Great Harbor by means of boats, merchant 
vessels, and galleys moored broadside across its mouth, which is nearly a mile wide, and 
made all their other arrangements for the event of the Athenians again daring to fight at sea. 
There was, in fact, nothing little either in their plans or their ideas” (adapted from Crawleyʼs 
translation). 
391 Romilly (1956) 156-157. 
392 T 7.72. 
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bold in adversity.  When applied to the Athenians, τόλμα represents their 
decision to send the expedition and continue despite the renewal of war in 
Hellas.393  It refers to the actions of the tyrannicides and the risky military plan 
that compromised Demosthenesʼ reinforcements.394  It also characterizes the 
disingenuous rhetoric that dominated Athenian diplomacy.395  When 
Thucydides applies τόλμα to the Syracusans in his own voice,396 it reflects the 
same theme that Hermocrates repeats time and again: Syracusan daring will 
defeat Athenian military science.397  Ultimately, the speech of Gylippus before 
the climactic battle in the Great Harbor claims that the Syracusans have added 
knowledge to their daring, prefiguring their decisive victory.398  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Thucydides skillfully deploys the two different connotations of τόλμα, 
boldness and excessive daring, to highlight a fundamental difference between 
Athens and Syracuse during the Sicilian Expedition.  The contrasts between 
the irrational and excessive Athenian τόλμα and the controlled and unbending 
Syracusan τόλμα represent a purposeful motif in the previously identified 
parallelism between Athens and Syracuse.399  Although τόλμα is extremely 
effective in the short-term, it ultimately undermines state morale.  Sparta shuns 
Brasidas because his τόλμα makes him a threat.  Diodorus tells that 
Hermocrates was later killed for attempting to establish a tyranny.400  
                                            
393 T 6.31.6, 7.28.3. 
394 T 6.54.1, 6.59.1, 7.43.6. 
395 T 6.82.4, 6.86.4. 
396 T 6.69.1. 
397 T 6.34.8, 6.34.9, 7.21.3 (x2) 7.21.4. 
398 T 7.67.1. 
399 See Hornblower 3 21-22 for a recent sketch of the Athens/Syracuse parallel. 
400 Diodorus Siculus 13.75.5-8. 
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Thucydidesʼ narrative shows that τόλμα frequently motivates transgressive 
actions.  The long-term durability of Spartan morale is related to their lack of 
τόλμα.  Although Athensʼ τόλμα brings success on many occasions, and her 
most effective adversaries show τόλμα, this quality ultimately leads to Athens 
imploding into internal dissension.  The strong association of Hermocrates with 
τόλμα and the speech of Athenagoras suggest that the completed Histories 
would have shown Syracuse imploding in a similar manner.401 
  The usefulness of martial τόλμα and the destructiveness of τόλμα in 
the civic sphere shows that it is an ambivalent quality in Thucydidesʼ eyes.402  
Yet this may be too neat a distinction, since too much boldness can also be a 
hindrance in military affairs.  It is, therefore, better to conclude that moderate 
τόλμα is beneficial, but unrestrained τόλμα is detrimental.  Furthermore, 
Thucydides often signals the reader that τόλμα is positive by linking it with 
γνώμη or rational preparations and negative by linking it with ἔρως, ἡδονή, or 
quick and impulsive actions.  Unfortunately, Thucydidesʼ work is unfinished, so 
it is impossible to know whether the Spartans ultimately win because they gain 
τόλμα or because they find a way to triumph without it.  The characterization 
of exceptional Spartan leaders like Brasidas implies that they may have found 
a way to reconcile τόλμα with their ἄτολμοι nature, but the Spartansʼ fear of 
Athenian τόλμα and jealousy of Brasidas makes it more likely that Sparta 
triumphed without significantly relying on this quality.403  Thucydides blamed 
Athensʼ defeat on internal strife that I have shown stemmed from increasingly 
excessive τόλμα as the war progressed, so it is simply too dangerous to rely 
                                            
401 Hornblower 3 396, who notes that Athenagorasʼ remarkably sustained defense of Athenian-
style democracy may allude to Hermocratesʼ later career. 
402 Bassi (2003) 31 n 19. 
403 Spartan fear of Athenian τόλμα: T 1.90.1, 1.102.3; jealousy of Brasidas: 4.108.7. 
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on τόλμα when fighting a long term conflict.  As the description of the Plague 
and the spread of stasis show, uncontrolled τόλμα causes increasingly 
transgressive and radicalized behavior.  A daring act leads to a more daring 
response, and because of the pressure of war the cycle repeats until the city 
destroys itself. 
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CHAPTER 4  
 
SPIRIT AND MORALE: PROTHUMIA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The semantic field I typically refer to by the abstract noun προθυμία 
also includes a verbal form, an adjectival form, and an adverbial form.404  The 
noun προθυμία occurs twenty-one times, typically meaning ʻspirit,ʼ 
ʻenthusiasm,ʼ or ʻzeal.ʼ405  The verb προθυμέομαι occurs fifteen times and can 
mean ʻbe enthusiastic forʼ with an accusative object or ʻbe enthusiastic toʼ with 
a complementary infinitive; the latter meaning can act as an emphatic 
equivalent of βούλομαι.406  The adjective πρόθυμος occurs thirty-two times 
and typically refers to enthusiasm in a general sense, although four of its 
occurrences are as a neuter substantive.407  The adverb προθύμως, meaning 
ʻenthusiasticallyʼ or ʻzealously,ʼ appears thirty times.408  Huart defines 
προθυμία in Thucydides generally as “ardeur,” though he notes that the verbal 
form especially can also mean “désirer” and “zèle.”409  As the antonym of 
                                            
404 The root of προθυμία, -θυμος, occurs in a variety of other words used in Thucydides; see 
Huart (1968) 411 n 2 for more on the other -θυμος compounds in Thucydides, none of which 
come especially close in meaning to English morale like προθυμία or ἀθυμία.   
405 T 1.74.1, 1.74.2, 1.75.1, 1.92.1, 1.118.2, 2.71.3, 3.56.5, 4.11.3, 4.14.3, 5.65.3, 6.47.1, 
6.69.1, 6.83.1, 6.88.8, 6.92.3, 7.67.1, 7.70.3, 7.76.1, 8.12.1, 8.15.2, 8.22.1; see also Huart 
(1968) 412-413. 
406 T 4.9.1, 4.12.2, 4.81.1, 5.16.1, 5.17.1, 5.39.3, 5.50.1, 5.71.1, 6.31.3, 6.39.2, 7.70.8, 7.86.3, 
8.6.1, 8.9.1, 8.90.1; see also Huart (1968) 411-412. 
407 T 1.71.6, 2.20.4, 2.53.3, 2.86.6, 3.38.6, 3.57.4, 3.67.6, 4.124.4, 6.88.10, 6.89.2, 7.7.2, 
7.18.3, 8.40.3, 8.74.1, 8.99.1; as comparative: 4.83.4, 5.37.4, 6.6.2, 6.77.1, 6.80.1, 6.92.1, 
7.1.4, 8.90.3; as superlative: 3.59.4, 6.15.2, 7.33.6, 8.68.1, 8.68.3; as neuter substantive: 
2.64.6, 3.82.8, 4.85.5, 6.69.3; see also Huart (1968) 414-415. 
408 T 2.18.3, 2.36.4, 3.10.4, 3.13.7, 3.15.2, 3.45.7, 3.55.3, 3.62.5, 3.95.1, 4.61.4, 4.80.5, 
4.121.1, 5.23.1, 5.23.2, 5.32.4, 6.18.2, 6.68.4, 6.75.3, 7.1.4, 7.43.5, 7.66.1, 7.70.7, 8.36.1, 
8.46.5, 8.52.1, 8.63.4, 8.75.2, 8.92.1, 8.92.8, 8.106.5; see also Huart (1968) 415. 
409 Huart (1968) 411-415. 
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προθυμία,410 Thucydides uses the abstract noun ἀθυμία, ʻlack of spirit,ʼ six 
times and the verb ἀθυμέω, ʻbe unenthusiastic,ʼ twelve times.411  Since 
προθυμία is more common than the other terms studied in this thesis, 
discussing the variety of its uses will take somewhat longer.  Thucydides does 
not, however, use the word group with meanings that are significantly different 
from earlier authors. 
 The word προθυμία occurs once in the Illiad, where it describes 
Menelaus: ἐν δ᾽ αὐτὸς κίεν ᾗσι προθυμίῃσι πεποιθὼς.412  The tragedians 
Aeschylus and Sophocles also use the word προθυμία, and their usages are 
more clearly similar to those of Thucydides.  In the Prometheus Bound, 
Prometheus tries to persuade Oceanus not to ask Zeus to relax the 
punishment: τὰ μέν σʼ ἐπαινῶ κοὐδαμῆι λήξω ποτέ, / προθυμίας γὰρ 
οὐδὲν ἐλλείπεις· ἀτὰρ / μηδὲν πόνει.413  Here Prometheus is actually trying 
to prevent Oceanus from taking action, but he implies that prothumia is a 
motivator of action.  Thucydides even uses a similar phrase: οὐ γὰρ δὴ 
προθυμίᾳ ἐλλιπεῖς ἦσαν.414   
 In the Trachiniae, Sophocles gives one of the characters a line relating 
προθυμία to action.  Deianeira, upset over her ill-fated gift to Herakles, tells 
the chorus that she would never recommend eagerness for untried action: 
                                            
410 LSJ, s.v. προθυμία, citing Xenophon Education of Cyrus 1.6.13 for ἀθυμία as the opposite 
of προθυμία; Thucydides himself contrasts προθυμία and ἀθυμία at 6.80.1, discussed below.  
Lendon (1999) 290-292 likens the polarity of προθυμία and ἀθυμία in Xenophon to the more 
general dichotomy of confidence, boldness, enthusiasm and fear, panic. 
411 ἀθυμία: T 1.71.4, 2.51.4, 4.26.4, 6.46.2, 7.24.3, 7.55.1; ἀθυμέω: 2.88.3, 5.91.1, 6.34.6, 
6.80.1, 7.21.3, 7.60.5, 7.61.2, 7.76.1, 7.79.3, 8.11.3, 8.76.3, 8.96.3. 
412 Homer Iliad 2.588: “He himself moved among them, confident in his zeal.” 
413 Aeschylus Prometheus Bound 340-342: “I will praise you for these things and never stop, 
for you do not at all lack enthusiasm, but do not trouble yourself.” 
414 T 6.69.1: “They were not lacking in enthusiasm.” 
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ὥστε μήποτʼ ἂν προθυμίαν / ἄδηλον ἔργου τῳ παραινέσαι λαβεῖν.415  
Although Thucydides never uses the phrase προθυμία ἔργου, this conception 
of προθυμία as a motivator of action appears in Thucydidesʼ Histories.  
Sophoclesʼ Electra also begins with a reference to Orestes yearning for the 
homeland he is reaching: νῦν ἐκεῖνʼ ἔξεστί σοι / παρόντι λεύσσειν, ὧν 
πρόθυμος ἦσθʼ ἀεί.416 
 The vocabulary of προθυμία is much more common in Herodotus, who 
uses the verb προθυμέομαι as well as the abstract noun and adjective.  Like 
Thucydides, Herodotus commonly uses προθυμέομαι with an infinitive to 
mean “eager or enthusiastic to do” something or in an absolute sense of “be 
enthusiastic” in both military and non-military contexts.417  Herodotus also uses 
προθυμίη ἔχειν and πρόθυμός εἰμι with the same contructions as 
προθυμέομαι.418  Furthermore, Herodotus uses these words with about the 
same relative frequency as Thucydides, with προθυμέομαι occurring seven 
times, προθυμίη fifteen, πρόθυμος eighteen, and προθύμως twenty.419  The 
only major difference between Thucydides and these other authors is that 
Thucydides does not use προθυμία and related words to refer to goodwill or 
kindness.420 
 Thucydidesʼ description of the Lacedaemoniansʼ decision to go to war 
contains one of the most common meanings of προθυμία, ʻenthusiasm for 
                                            
415 Sophocles Trachiniae 669-670: “And so I would never recommend to anybody that he be 
eager for untried action.” See Jebb (1902) loc. cit. for ἄδηλον as untried, here in reference to 
using the ʻlove potionʼ for the first time on a gift for Herakles. 
416 Sophocles Electra 2-3: “Now it is possible for you in person to look on those things that you 
were always desiring.” 
417 LSJ, s.v. προθυμέομαι. 
418 Ibid., s.v. προθυμία, πρόθυμος. 
419 The most notable difference is Herodotus using the abstract noun twice as much as the 
verb, while Thucydides uses the noun just a couple of times more than the verb. 
420 Contra LSJ s.v. προθυμία II, citing T 1.74. 
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war.ʼ  Because προθυμία often refers to a willingness to fight, it overlaps 
significantly with the English concept of battlefield morale.  In this case, the 
Lacedaemonians decide to undertake the war in a spirit of great enthusiasm: 
τότε δὲ οὐκέτι ἀνασχετὸν ἐποιοῦντο, ἀλλʼ ἐπιχειρητέα ἐδόκει 
εἶναι πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ καὶ καθαιρετέα ἡ ἰσχύς, ἢν δύνωνται, 
ἀραμένοις τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον.421 
The Lacedaemoniansʼ great enthusiasm for war at the outset corresponds to 
their high morale, although the ineffectiveness of their military strategy later 
undermines their morale. 
 A military alliance also depends on the προθυμία of its members.  
Thucydides records a thought of Demosthenes about the Phocians that 
implies allies join either enthusiastically or under compulsion: οἳ προθύμως 
ἐδόκουν κατὰ τὴν Ἀθηναίων αἰεί ποτε φιλίαν ξυστρατεύσειν ἢ κἂν βίᾳ 
προσαχθῆναι.422  Furthermore, increasing the προθυμία of their countrymen 
and allies is a frequent goal of generals and other leaders whose speeches 
Thucydides reports.  Hermocrates, for instance, urges Sicilian unity in order to 
gain προθυμία against Athens.  In addition to showing a leaderʼs concern for 
προθυμία, this passage balances ἀθυμία against προθυμία, although 
Hermocrates alternates between a verbal and an adverbial form:  
ὥστε οὐχ ἁθρόους γε ὄντας εἰκὸς ἀθυμεῖν, ἰέναι δὲ ἐς τὴν 
ξυμμαχίαν προθυμότερον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου 
παρεσομένης ὠφελίας, οἳ τῶνδε κρείσσους εἰσὶ τὸ παράπαν τὰ 
πολέμια.423 
                                            
421 T 1.118.2: “Then the Lacedaemonians could no longer bear it, but rather they decided 
Athenian power must be attacked with all enthusiasm and, if they were able, destroyed by 
starting this war.” 
422 T 3.95.1: “[The Phocians], whom he expected because of their continual friendly ties with 
Athens to join the campaign enthusiastically, or perhaps under forceful compulsion.” 
423 T 6.80.1: “And so, at least together we will not likely lack enthusiasm, but fight together 
more enthusiastically, especially since help will come from the Peloponnesians, who are in all 
respects mightier than our enemies here in matters of war.” 
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The contrast between ἀθυμία separately or προθυμία together indicates that 
Hermocrates sees the two words as antonyms.  Since Hermocrates is trying to 
convince the Camarineans to fight beside the Syracusans in the present and 
future with more enthusiasm,424 this passage also illustrates the importance of 
προθυμία to an alliance.  This type of appeal to allies to fight with more 
enthusiasm is quite common, even appearing in the text of the treaty between 
Athens and Sparta that ended the Archidamian War.425   
 And yet προθυμία appears in more than just military contexts.  One of 
the most telling uses of a form of προθυμία occurs in the speech of Diodotus.  
Although he uses the adverb rather than the abstract noun, his argument 
about the efficacy of legal deterrence shows how powerfully προθυμία can 
effect human actions.  Diodotus claims that no law or other punishment can 
turn a man away from a course of action he is pursuing with enthusiasm:  
ἁπλῶς τε ἀδύνατον καὶ πολλῆς εὐηθείας, ὅστις οἴεται τῆς 
ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως ὁρμωμένης προθύμως τι πρᾶξαι ἀποτροπήν 
τινα ἔχειν ἢ νόμων ἰσχύι ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ δεινῷ.426 
Hornblower notes that the argument here is actually flawed, since legal 
deterrence is effective on the vast majority of people even if an occasional 
person breaks the law.427  Whether or not Diodotusʼ political theory is sound, 
the important point for my argument is that a man acting with προθυμία 
cannot be deterred.  Thus, προθυμία can be more powerful than the English 
translations ʻenthusiasmʼ or even ʻzealʼ suggest and is a kind of unstoppable 
                                            
424 Hornblower 3 500, follows Dover in taking ξυμμαχία to refer loosely to people fighting on 
the same side, since the Syracusans and Camarineans are already technically allies; 
Hornblower 3 499 compares 6.75.3, where the Syracusans are said to suspect the 
Camarineans of sending support not προθύμως. 
425 T 5.23.1, 5.23.2. 
426 T 3.45.7: “It is absolutely impossible and is a mark of great foolishness, if anyone believes 
he has any deterrence by force of law or anything else terrible once human nature has started 
to do something with enthusiasm.” 
427 Hornblower 1 435-437; he also briefly surveys some scholarship on legal deterrence. 
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perseverance, since Diodotus claims that nothing terrifying can turn aside a 
man who acts with προθυμία. 
A similar meaning of προθυμία occurs in Thucydidesʼ description of the 
Great Plague at Athens, although this example shows how an extreme lack of 
προθυμία prevents men from persevering in anything.  Because death was so 
common, the normal motivators of honor and shame became ineffective: καὶ 
τὸ μὲν προσταλαιπωρεῖν τῷ δόξαντι καλῷ οὐδεὶς πρόθυμος ἦν, ἄδηλον 
νομίζων εἰ πρὶν ἐπʼ αὐτὸ ἐλθεῖν διαφθαρήσεται.428  Although the 
disintegration of normal values marks this episode as similar to stasis,429 the 
role of προθυμία is much different.  The calamity of the plague undermines 
each individualʼs enthusiasm to adhere to the cityʼs values and so ruins 
Athenian morale.  Stasis, on the other hand, causes προθυμία to run wild in 
self-perpetuating cycles of violence.  Just as with τόλμα, a complete lack or 
an overabundance of προθυμία can be problematic.430 
Although Diodotus argues that nothing terrifying can stand against 
προθυμία, fear and desperation can stimulate προθυμία in some cases.   
One example is Thucydidesʼ explanation of why hoplite armies tend to drift to 
the right.  Here, prothumia describes a soldierʼs great desire to keep himself 
protected.  The man who first causes the drifting is on the right wing, since he 
is always enthusiastic to get his exposed side away from the enemy: 
                                            
428 T 2.53.3: “No one was enthusiastic to persevere in what was reputed to be noble, since 
considered it uncertain if he would die before he reached his goal.” 
429 Hornblower 1 326 compares the mood of the stasis passage. See near the end of this 
section for more on προθυμία in stasis. 
430 See section 3.3 above. 
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καὶ ἡγεῖται μὲν τῆς αἰτίας ταύτης ὁ πρωτοστάτης τοῦ δεξιοῦ 
κέρως, προθυμούμενος ἐξαλλάσσειν αἰεὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν 
ἑαυτοῦ γύμνωσιν, ἕπονται δὲ διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν φόβον καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.431 
Interestingly, Thucydides here restates the desire of the man on the right to 
keep his unarmored side away from the enemy as “the same fear.”  This 
contrasts with the usages discussed above of Diodotus and the Plataeans, 
who equate προθυμία with a kind of fearlessness.   
Despite its importance for success in war, προθυμία in the wrong 
circumstances can be a clear hindrance.  In the lead up to this same battle at 
Mantinea, untimely προθυμία nearly leads the Lacedaemonian forces into 
disaster:  
καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι εὐθὺς αὐτοῖς ἐπῇσαν· καὶ μέχρι μὲν λίθου καὶ 
ἀκοντίου βολῆς ἐχώρησαν, ἔπειτα τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τις Ἄγιδι 
ἐπεβόησεν, ὁρῶν πρὸς χωρίον καρτερὸν ἰόντας σφᾶς, ὅτι 
διανοεῖται κακὸν κακῷ ἰᾶσθαι, δηλῶν τῆς ἐξ Ἄργους ἐπαιτίου 
ἀναχωρήσεως τὴν παροῦσαν ἄκαιρον προθυμίαν ἀνάληψιν 
βουλόμενον εἶναι.432 
The negative adjective ἄκαιρος, just like the adjective ἀλόγιστος in the stasis 
description,433 clearly marks the usage of a typically positive term as 
negative.434  Enthusiasm is necessary for both soldiers and generals, 
particularly in the phalanx, since the general fights among the soldiers and is 
expected to act as a model for them to follow,435 but it is not an absolute good.  
Neither Thucydides nor his speakers mention inappropriate or excessive 
                                            
431 T 5.71.1: “The man in the front rank of the right wing begins the fault, being zealous to 
withdraw his exposed side from the enemy, and the rest also follow because of the same 
fear.” 
432 T 5.65.2: “The Lacedaemonians immediately went against them. And they were within a 
stoneʼs throw or javelinʼs cast, then one of the older men, seeing that they were going against 
a strong position, shouted to Agis that he was intending to cure bad with bad; meaning that he 
wished the present untimely enthusiasm to make amends for the reviled retreat from Argos.”  
433 See section 3.4 above. 
434 Hornblower 3 171 translates “inopportune” rather than “untimely,” showing even more 
clearly that the adjective is negative. 
435 Compare the contrasting descriptions of Brasidas and Cleon before Amphipolis (T 5.7.2). 
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ἀνδρεία, but προθυμία like τόλμα can be a negative quality in the wrong 
circumstances.  In addition, this passage may provide a counter-example to 
Diodotusʼ argument, since the words of the soldier turn aside what Thucydides 
calls his generalʼs untimely προθυμία. 
 Other instances of προθυμία could also be termed negative, like the 
one in Thucydidesʼ description of the cycle of stasis, even though no adjective 
marks it unambiguously as negative.  After cataloguing the inversion of values 
in stasis, Thucydides explains how the cycle begins: πάντων δʼ αὐτῶν αἴτιον 
ἀρχὴ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν· ἐκ δʼ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν 
καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον.436  Huart notes that this particular usage of 
πρόθυμον refers to the violence of the desires.437  Lowell Edmunds argues 
that this passage outlines a genetic relationship from ἀρχὴ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν 
καὶ φιλοτιμίαν, to τὸ φιλονικεῖν and, finally, to τὸ πρόθυμον.438  He further 
identifies τὸ πρόθυμον with Hesiodʼs use of ζῆλος, “zealous emulation,” in 
the Theogonyʼs account of the Iron Age.439  Hornblower builds on Edmundsʼ 
interpretation, translating πρόθυμον in this passage as “passions.”440  As the 
third element in the cycle, προθυμία is not the initial cause of civil strife, but 
rather allows stasis to perpetuate itself.  Since προθυμία causes stasis to 
continue here, it is a negative quality in this passage. 
 Thucydides also associates προθυμία with adherence to a particular 
faction or regime type.  When Athens is embroiled in civil strife in book eight, 
Thucydides identifies multiple individuals who were particularly enthusiastic for 
                                            
436 T 3.82.8: “The cause of all this was rule through lust for power and ambition, and 
proceeding from that also was the enthusiasm for strife once men were engaged in it.” 
437 Huart (1968) 414. 
438 Edmunds (1975b) 87-88. 
439 Ibid., Hesiod Theogony 195-201. 
440 Hornblower 1 485. 
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the oligarchy.  He calls Pisander most zealous to dissolve democracy: ἦν δὲ ὁ 
μὲν τὴν γνώμην ταύτην εἰπὼν Πείσανδρος, καὶ τἆλλα ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς 
προθυμότατα ξυγκαταλύσας τὸν δῆμον.441  A little later, Thucydides also 
claims that Phrynichus showed superlative zeal for the oligarchy: 
παρέσχε δὲ καὶ ὁ Φρύνιχος ἑαυτὸν πάντων διαφερόντως 
προθυμότατον ἐς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, δεδιὼς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ 
ἐπιστάμενος εἰδότα αὐτὸν ὅσα ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ πρὸς τὸν Ἀστύοχον 
ἔπραξε, νομίζων οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ὑπʼ ὀλιγαρχίας 
κατελθεῖν·442 
Again, Thucydides links προθυμία with fear, showing that fear can stimulate 
enthusiasm in various types of situations.  Earlier, the Syracusan 
Athenagoras, who is introduced in a manner similar to Cleon but does not 
otherwise appear in the narrative,443 accuses the young and powerful of being 
zealous for the fruits of oligarchy:  
ὀλιγαρχία δὲ τῶν μὲν κινδύνων τοῖς πολλοῖς μεταδίδωσι, τῶν δʼ 
ὠφελίμων οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαντʼ ἀφελομένη 
ἔχει· ἃ ὑμῶν οἵ τε δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ νέοι προθυμοῦνται, ἀδύνατα 
ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει κατασχεῖν.444 
This rhetorical formulation, with προθυμέομαι taking as its objects the 
benefits that oligarchy keeps to itself, is essentially an expansion of 
Thucydidesʼ typical phrase with the adjectival form followed by ἐς τὴν 
ὀλιγαρχίαν.  Thucydides also links προθυμία with the actions of at least one 
adherent of the democratic party.  The faction at Samos sends Chaereas to 
                                            
441 T 8.68.1: “Pisander was pronouncing this opinion and in other respects working openly to 
dissolve the with the greatest enthusiasm.” 
442 T 8.68.3: “Phrynichus was making himself most zealous for the oligarchy differently than 
everyone, since he feared Alcibiades and knew that man had knowledge of all the things he 
did in Samos with Astyochus, and he did not consider it likely that Alcibiades would return 
under oligarchy.” 
443 Compare T 4.21.2 of Cleon; Hornblower 3 407-408 collects some epigraphical evidence 
that may relate to the historical Athenagoras. 
444 T 6.39.2: “Oligarchy gives a share of the risks to many, and it not only grasps after the 
benefits but also takes and keeps them all, which are what the powerful and young among you 
are zealous for, though these things are impossible to achieve in a great city.” 
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Athens, a man zealous for the democrats: τὴν δὲ Πάραλον ναῦν καὶ 
Χαιρέαν ἐπʼ αὐτῆς τὸν Ἀρχεστράτου, ἄνδρα Ἀθηναῖον, γενόμενον ἐς 
τὴν μετάστασιν πρόθυμον.445  Here, μετάστασις means the “counter-
revolution” that the soldiers at Samos are staging against the oligarchs in 
Athens,446 so phrase is parallel to the more common ʻenthusiastic for the 
oligarchy.ʼ 
 Thucydides uses προθυμία and derivatives most commonly in military 
contexts, but προθυμία also refers to enthusiasm or zeal in a number of 
important passages that do not directly relate to fighting.  Like τόλμα, 
προθυμία also has a political dimension and can lead to destructive behavior.  
At the same time, military alliances and society itself cannot function properly 
without προθυμία.  Although Thucydides uses προθυμία in a great variety of 
contexts, there are three major themes that merit further study.  One is the 
relationship between leadership and προθυμία.  One of the most obvious links 
are the pre-battle exhortations, some of which Thucydides explicitly says were 
motivated by a desire to promote προθυμία among the men.  And yet 
generals affect the προθυμία of allies and enemies passively as well as 
actively.  Leaders can also help to change the object of προθυμία.  Early in 
the narrative all sides direct their προθυμία toward the war, but Nicias and 
Pleistoanax redirect their προθυμία toward peace after the setbacks at in 
Ionia and at Pylos (5.16).  A second major theme is the relationship between 
alliance and προθυμία in the speeches.  The examples above show that 
προθυμία is an integral part of a functional alliance, so it is no surprise that 
                                            
445 T 8.74.1: [They sent] the ship Paralus and Chaereas on it, an Athenian man who had been 
enthusiastic in the movement.” 
446 Hornblower 3 974.  
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speakers commonly refer to the προθυμία shown by or for allies.  In fact, 
speakers often try to curry favor by mentioning past προθυμία or try to 
convince their listeners that they will show προθυμία in the future.  The third 
notable way Thucydides uses the vocabulary of προθυμία is in his account of 
the war in Sicily.  Thucydidesʼ use of προθυμία and related words in the 
narrative allows the reader to trace the rising and falling of the two sidesʼ 
morale.  Furthermore, the appearances of προθυμία in the speeches enable 
Thucydides to comment on and expand the analysis of προθυμία that he 
presents in the narrative.  Finally, this chapter focuses on morale in the 
episode at Pylos.  The affair at Pylos begins with a contest of προθυμία, 
which the Lacedaemonians are winning, but the arrival of Demosthenes 
changes everything.  Thucydides, however, shifts from describing Athenian 
morale in terms of προθυμία to using ῥώμη and related words.  Thus, 
προθυμία is an important part of Thucydidesʼ understanding of morale, but it 
cannot tell the whole story. 
 
4.2 Leadership and προθυμία 
Most commonly, Thucydides relates προθυμία to war, and the word 
means something like ʻenthusiasmʼ for fighting.  Unsurprisingly, managing and 
manipulating the προθυμία of oneʼs own citizens or soldiers is a frequent 
concern of leaders.  A common manifestation of this concern is a generalʼs 
pre-battle exhortation aimed at increasing his menʼs wavering προθυμία.447  
And yet Thucydides also uses προθυμία and related words to track the overall 
                                            
447 See Hanson (1998), Clark (1995) 375-376, Pritchett (1994) 27-109, and Hanson (1993) 
161-180 for a debate on what form historical speeches by generals before battle might have 
taken.  Whatever their historicity, these speeches form an important and recurring part of 
Thucydidesʼ narrative. 
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morale of different cities or confederacies in the war.  Table 4.1 also shows 
that by the end of the Archidamian War both the Athenian and the 
Lacedaemonian leaders have directed their enthusiasm away from war and 
towards peace.  Unlike Thucydidesʼ account of the Sicilian Expedition, in which 
Athenian προθυμία falls while Syracusan προθυμία rises, both Athenian and 
Lacedaemonian προθυμία in the Archidamian War follow similar trajectories 
as misfortune causes the two sides to change the object of their enthusiasm.  
Although early Athenian speeches about their προθυμία in the Persian Wars 
and Archidamusʼ noted lack of προθυμία initially imply that it is an Athenian 
quality, Thucydides himself identifies both Lacedaemonian and Corinthian 
προθυμία.  After the disaster at Pylos, the Lacedaemonians channel their 
remaining προθυμία into the expedition of Brasidas, who makes great use of it 
among the Athenian allies.  After the deaths of Brasidas and Cleon, the 
leaders of both Athens and Sparta are enthusiastic for peace rather than war 
(5.16).   
 Archidamus is the first leader whose relationship to προθυμία 
Thucydides explores.  Archidamus misses some early opportunities and 
comes under suspicion for not being enthusiastic enough in the lead-up to the 
war:  
αἰτίαν τε οὐκ ἐλαχίστην Ἀρχίδαμος ἔλαβεν ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ, δοκῶν καὶ 
ἐν τῇ ξυναγωγῇ τοῦ πολέμου μαλακὸς εἶναι καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις 
ἐπιτήδειος, οὐ παραινῶν προθύμως πολεμεῖν·448 
This passage, presenting events from the perspective of the Peloponnesian 
soldiers,449 shows that Archidamus was insufficiently zealous in this eyes of  
                                            
448 T 2.18.3: “Archidamus received not the least blame from this, since he seemed soft and 
friendly toward the Athenians in the lead-up to the war when he did not enthusiastically advise 
going to war.” 











Table 4.1 – Leadership and προθυμία 
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Athenian and Allied Leaders Lacedaemonian and Allied Leaders 
 2.18.3 – Archidamus was very much blamed 
because of the delay, since even in the lead 
up to the war he seemed weak and friendly to 
the Athenians when he did not 
enthusiastically advocate going to war 
(προθύμως) 
 2.20.4 – Archidamus thought that the 
Acharnians would not be similarly 
enthusiastic to risk themselves for the land of 
others once they were bereft of their own, and 
then there would be division in the Atheniansʼ 
opinions (προθύμους) 
2.36.4 – [Periclesʼ Funeral Oration] Not 
wishing to speak at length on well known 
matters, I will omit the martial deeds through 
which we acquired each possession, whether 
we ourselves or our fathers were 
enthusiastically repaying a barbarian or 
Greek aggressor (προθύμως) 
 
2.64.6 – [speech of Pericles] Looking for 
honor in the future and no shame in the 
present, acquire them both with enthusiasm 
right now; and do not send heralds to the 
Lacedaemonians or show your suffering 
openly (προθύμῳ) 
 
 2.86.6 – Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other 
commanders called together the troops and, 
seeing that they were afraid because of the 
former defeat and not enthusiastic, 
encouraged them with a speech 
(προθύμους) 
 4.80.5 – The Spartans enthusiastically sent 
seven hundred helots with Brasidas as 
hoplites [to Chalcidice], and he recruited the 
rest of the force from the Peloponnese with 
money (προθύμως) 
 4.81.1 – The Lacedaemonians sent out 
Brasidas mainly at his own desire, and the 
Chalcidians also were enthusiastic for him, a 
man both accounted effective in all respects 
at Sparta and after he went out proving to be 
of the most use to the Lacedaemonians 
(προυθυμήθησαν) 
 4.83.3 – The Chalcidian envoys 
accompanying Brasidas instructed him not 
remove sources of anxiety from Perdiccas, so 
that he would be more enthusiastic when they 
employed him for their own devices 
(προθυμοτέρῳ) 
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Table 4.1 (Continued) 
 4.121.1 – The Scionaeans were elated at his 
words and all encouraged in a similar 
manner, even those who before were not 
pleased with the things being done; and they 
decided to carry on the war enthusiastically 
and honor Brasidas in a variety of ways 
(προθύμως) 
 4.124.4 – Perdiccas wanted to advance and 
attack the villages of Arrhabaeus, but 
Brasidas was not enthusiastic and wanted 
instead to withdraw, since he was concerned 
over Mende if the Athenians should attack 
and the absence of the Illyrians (πρόθυμος) 
5.16.1 – After the deaths of Brasidas and 
Cleon, who both strongly opposed peace; 
those most taking care of governance for 
each state, Pleistoanax, king of Sparta, and 
Nicias, at that time the most successful 
general, were much more enthusiastic for 
peace (προυθυμοῦντο) 
5.16.1 – After the deaths of Brasidas and 
Cleon, who both strongly opposed peace; 
those most taking care of governance for 
each state, Pleistoanax, king of Sparta, and 
Nicias, at that time the most successful 
general, were much more enthusiastic for 
peace (προυθυμοῦντο) 
 5.17.1 – Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias 
and king of Sparta, was enthusiastic for a 
treaty because he was hurt by this particular 
slander and thought that, in peacetime, 
nothing would trip him up and with the 
prisoners recovered he would be unassailable 
by his enemies, but in wartime, those in 
power are compelled to suffer slander 
because of events (προυθυμήθη) 
 6.88.10 – The ephors and those in office 
intended to send ambassadors to Syracuse to 
prevent them from going over to Athens, but 
they were not enthusiastic to send 
assistance, so Alcibiades came forward to 
inflame and incite the Lacedaemonians 
(προθύμων) 
 6.89.2 – [speech of Alcibiades] Although I 
was enthusiastic throughout, you provided 
power to my enemies and dishonor to me by 
negotiating peace with Athens through them 
(προθύμου) 
 6.92.1 – [speech of Alcibiades] Bringing about 
any of these things quickly and with 
enthusiasm is on you, Lacedaemonians, 
since I am confident that it is quite possible 
and I do not believe my judgment is wrong 
(προθυμότερον) 
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 6.92.2 – [speech of Alcibiades] I think I have 
a right not to seem inferior to any of you nor 
for my words to be suspected as the 
enthusiasm of an exile, if once seeming to be 
a patriot I now forcefully attack my own city 
together with its greatest enemies 
(προθυμίαν) 
7.86.3 – The other, Nicias, was the most 
friendly to the Lacedaemonians since he was 
enthusiastic to let the men from the island 
free, and persuaded the Athenians to make a 
treaty (προυθυμήθη) 
 
 8.6.1 – Pharnabazus sent some exiles taking 
refuge with him to Lacedaemon to procure a 
fleet for the Hellespont in the hope that he 
himself could cause the cities in his fief to 
revolt from Athens and obtain alliance with 
the Lacedaemonians for the king, just like 
Tissaphernes was enthusiastic to do 
(προυθυμεῖτο) 
 8.12.1 – Alcibiades persuaded the ephors not 
to shrink from the expedition, saying that they 
could sail there before the Chians heard 
about the disaster of the fleet and that he 
would go to Ionia himself and persuade the 
cities to revolt by talking about the weakness 
of Athens and the enthusiasm of the 
Lacedaemonians (προθυμίαν) 
 8.40.3 – When Astyochus saw that the allies 
were also enthusiastic [to aid Chios], he 
departed with the fleet to help, although he 
did not intend it because of the threat 
(προθύμους) 
 8.46.5 – By claiming that the Phoenician fleet 
would come and they would fight with an 
advantage, Tissaphernes ruined the 
Peloponnesian cause and blunted the navyʼs 
edge, although it had been in peak shape; 
and in other ways he joined in the war effort 
without enthusiasm more openly than could 
go unnoticed (προθύμως) 
 8.52.1 – Alcibiades, since he was contending 
over serious issues, was devoted to 
Tissaphernes and flattered him 
enthusiastically (προθύμως) 
 8.99.1 – Meanwhile, Pharnabazus was 
inviting the Peloponnesian fleet and was 
zealous to bring them over and cause the rest 
of the cities in his own sphere of influence to 
revolt from Athens, just like Tissaphernes 
(πρόθυμος) 
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his men.  This lack of spirit on the part of their general undermines the troopsʼ 
morale, although this expedition is not tested by significant Athenian 
resistance. 
 And yet, Archidamus himself is following a plan calculated to decrease 
the προθυμία of a major component of the Athenian citizenry.  Just as 
Thucydides pauses to relate the thoughts and feelings of the Peloponnesian 
troops in 2.18, he here delves into the mind of their general.450  Rather than 
analyzing his own προθυμία or that of his troops, Archidamus calculates that 
he can undermine Athenian προθυμία and sow dissension inside the city:  
τοὺς γὰρ Ἀχαρνέας ἐστερημένους τῶν σφετέρων οὐχ ὁμοίως 
προθύμους ἔσεσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων κινδυνεύειν, στάσιν δʼ 
ἐνέσεσθαι τῇ γνώμῃ.451  
This sophisticated analysis of Athenian προθυμία results in a plan that the 
troops seem not to have understood, but Archidamus has a particularly keen 
appreciation for the role of hearts and minds in warfare.  Rather than 
devastating all of Attica, Archidamus tries to undermine Athenian morale by 
creating divisions between the citizens.  He meets with only limited success,452 
but his appreciation for the mental dimension of war is clear.  Most of the 
predictions and analyses of Archidamus are so well confirmed by later events 
that Hunter accuses Thucydides of “deriving purposes from results” in this 
episode to highlight aspects of Athenian and Peloponnesian mass 
psychology.453 
                                            
450 Hornblower 1 273. 
451 T 2.20.4: “[He thought] that the Acharnians, bereft of their own property, would not be 
similarly enthusiastic to face danger on behalf of the property of others, and that dissension 
would be introduced into their minds.” 
452 Lazenby (2004) 34-35 discusses the failure of Archidamusʼ attempt to cause disagreement 
inside Athens and possible motivations besides those given by Thucydidesʼ for the route he 
chooses during the invasion. 
453 Hunter (1973) 20-21, especially n 10. 
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 Pericles also shows concern for προθυμία in the early part of the war, 
although he talks exclusively about Athenian προθυμία.  In the Funeral 
Oration, Pericles mentions how past and present Athenians acquired the 
empire by enthusiastically defending themselves: 
ὧν ἐγὼ τὰ μὲν κατὰ πολέμους ἔργα, οἷς ἕκαστα ἐκτήθη, ἢ εἴ τι 
αὐτοὶ ἢ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν βάρβαρον ἢ Ἕλληνα πολέμιον ἐπιόντα 
προθύμως ἠμυνάμεθα, μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν οὐ βουλόμενος 
ἐάσω·454 
Pericles dispenses quickly with the praise of Athensʼ victories over the 
Persians and others that is typical of this kind of speech,455 but he 
encapsulates it in the phrase ʻfought for themselves enthusiasticallyʼ 
(προθύμως ἠμυνάμεθα).  Pericles even doubly emphasizes the defensive 
nature of the wars with the words ʻattacking enemyʼ (πολέμιον ἐπιόντα).  The 
unnamed Athenian, the Plataeans, and Euphemus also talk in similar terms 
about προθυμία shown in the Persian Wars.456 
 After the plague ruins Athenian προθυμία, Pericles attempts to reverse 
the decline in morale with his final speech in the Histories.  The climax of the 
speech asks Athenians to show προθυμία and not to reveal their difficulties to 
the Lacedaemonians: 
ὑμεῖς δὲ ἔς τε τὸ μέλλον καλὸν προγνόντες ἔς τε τὸ αὐτίκα μὴ 
αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἤδη προθύμῳ ἀμφότερα κτήσασθε, καὶ 
Λακεδαιμονίοις μήτε ἐπικηρυκεύεσθε μήτε ἔνδηλοι ἔστε τοῖς 
παροῦσι πόνοις βαρυνόμενοι, ὡς οἵτινες πρὸς τὰς ξυμφορὰς 
γνώμῃ μὲν ἥκιστα λυποῦνται, ἔργῳ δὲ μάλιστα ἀντέχουσιν, οὗτοι 
καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν κράτιστοί εἰσιν.457 
                                            
454 T 2.36.4: “Not wishing to speak at length among those who know, I will pass by those 
menʼs martial deeds, by which they acquired each [part of the empire], whether we ourselves 
or our fathers were defending ourselves enthusiastically against a barbarian or Greek 
aggressor.” 
455 Rusten (1990) 141-142. 
456 T 1.74.1, 1.74.2, 1.75.1; 3.55.3, 3.56.5; 6.83.1. 
457 T 2.64.6: “Recognizing beforehand what is noble for the future and not shameful in the 
present, acquire them both with enthusiasm right now, and do not send heralds to the 
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Although the Athenian public is still somewhat hostile to Pericles, this speech 
becomes the prime example of Pericles influencing public opinion as 
Thucydides describes at 2.65.9.  Pericles is much more successful at raising 
Athenian morale than at mitigating the Atheniansʼ anger against him, and 
Westlake argues that Pericles showed considerable bravery by supporting the 
war so vehemently when public opinion was against it.458  This type of speech 
by a leader who notices low morale and attempts to increase προθυμία also 
recalls the very common appearance of προθυμία words in generalsʼ pre-
battle exhortations. 
 Thucydides also repeatedly links the Spartan Brasidas with προθυμία. 
Brasidas not only manages προθυμία actively, his reputation enables his 
mere presence to instill it in allies.  Nevertheless, he has trouble controlling 
Perdiccas and the other northerners.  Thucydides first mentions Brasidas 
worrying about his menʼs προθυμία before the second battle of Naupactus, 
and this is a typical example of soldiersʼ lack of enthusiasm motivating a 
generalʼs exhortation: ὁρῶντες αὐτῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς διὰ τὴν προτέραν 
ἧσσαν φοβουμένους καὶ οὐ προθύμους ὄντας παρεκελεύσαντο καὶ 
ἔλεξαν τοιάδε.459  Here, Thucydides likens being fearful to lacking προθυμία, 
so φόβος can sometimes undermine προθυμία but stimulate it at other times.  
This exhortation is less than successful, since the Peloponnesian sailors have 
low morale in the subsequent battle.   
                                            
Lacedaemonians or show yourselves weighed down by the present troubles; for whichever 
men are least hurt mentally in the face of misfortunes and most actually endure are the 
mightiest both as cities and as individuals.” 
458 Westlake (1968) 37. 
459 T 2.86.6: “Seeing many of them afraid because of the former defeat and not enthusiastic, 
they encouraged them and said something like the following.” 
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 Later, Brasidas has more success, even managing to instill προθυμία 
in the Lacedaemonians after the disaster at Pylos.  By advancing a plan that 
involved the removal of Helot warriors from the homeland, Brasidas received 
an enthusiastic response to at least some of his actions: καὶ τότε προθύμως 
τῷ Βρασίδᾳ αὐτῶν ξυνέπεμψαν ἑπτακοσίους ὁπλίτας, τοὺς δʼ ἄλλους ἐκ 
τῆς Πελοποννήσου μισθῷ πείσας ἐξήγαγεν.460  Thucydides has just 
finished explaining the anxieties that the restive Helot population caused the 
Lacedaemonians, making it clear that Brasidas has based his planning on a 
rational appraisal of Lacedaemonian wishes and fears.  Furthermore, 
Thucydides adds that Brasidas is also instilling enthusiasm in the Chalcidians: 
αὐτόν τε Βρασίδαν βουλόμενον μάλιστα Λακεδαιμόνιοι 
ἀπέστειλαν (προυθυμήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδῆς), ἄνδρα ἔν τε τῇ 
Σπάρτῃ δοκοῦντα δραστήριον εἶναι ἐς τὰ πάντα καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐξῆλθε 
πλείστου ἄξιον Λακεδαιμονίοις γενόμενον.461 
Hornblower notes the repitition of προθυμία here as way way to prepare the 
reader for Brasidas to be “dynamic and positive.”462  Indeed, this chapter 
powerfully communicates to the reader that Brasidas is an important leader at 
this time and that the reactions he inspires from the cities in the north will be of 
great significance.463  Furthermore, the rest of 4.81 shows that Brasidas has 
long lasting positive effects on the morale of those sympathetic to the 
Peloponnesian cause. 
                                            
460 T 4.80.5: “They enthusiastically sent out seven hundred of [the Helots] as hoplites with 
Brasidas, and he lead out others from the Peloponnese persuading them with pay.” 
461 T 4.81.1: “The Lacedaemonians sent out Brasidas mostly at his own wish (but the 
Chalcidians were also enthusiastic for him), a man reputed at Sparta to be effective in all 
respects and, after he went out, a man of the most worth to the Lacedaemonians, too.” 
462 Hornblower 2 267. 
463 Connor (1984) 131. 
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 The prime example of Brasidas eliciting προθυμία occurs at Scione.  
Brasidas convinces the Scionaeans to fight more enthusiastically, and they 
also honor him personally: 
καὶ οἱ μὲν Σκιωναῖοι ἐπήρθησάν τε τοῖς λόγοις καὶ θαρσήσαντες 
πάντες ὁμοίως, καὶ οἷς πρότερον μὴ ἤρεσκε τὰ πρασσόμενα, τόν 
τε πόλεμον διενοοῦντο προθύμως οἴσειν καὶ τὸν Βρασίδαν τά τʼ 
ἄλλα καλῶς ἐδέξαντο καὶ δημοσίᾳ μὲν χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἀνέδησαν 
ὡς ἐλευθεροῦντα τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἐταινίουν τε καὶ 
προσήρχοντο ὥσπερ ἀθλητῇ.464 
Brasidas clearly has the ability to raise his listenersʼ morale, as Thucydides 
triply emphasizes with ἐπήρθησάν, θαρσήσαντες, and προθύμως.  The verb 
θαρσέω partially overlaps in meaning with προθυμία, but Thucydides links 
προθυμία more closely with the Scionaeansʼ commitment to the war while 
θαρσέω seems to describe their confidence more generally.  In addition, 
Connor argues that the third word, ἐπήρθησάν, expresses not just confidence 
but the kind of overconfidence that leads to disaster, which does in fact 
happen to Scione when the Athenians respond to the revolt.465  Brasidas is 
more effective at rallying support for the ʻfreeing Greeceʼ than actually 
defending his new allies. 
 Although Brasidas has great success manipulating the προθυμία  of 
Greek cities, he is less able to control the enthusiasm of his Macedonian ally, 
Perdiccas.  Before he departs, some Chalcidean ambassadors warn Brasidas 
not to please Perdiccas too much so he stays enthusiastic: καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδέων 
πρέσβεις ξυμπαρόντες ἐδίδασκον αὐτὸν μὴ ὑπεξελεῖν τῷ Περδίκκᾳ τὰ 
                                            
464 T 4.121.1: “The Scionaeans were inflamed by his words and, gaining confidence all alike, 
even those who were formerly not pleased with what was being done, they decided that they 
would carry on the war enthusiastically.  They also entertained Brasidas nobly in other ways 
and presented him publicly with a gold crown as the liberator of Hellas, and privately they were 
decking him with garlands and going up to him like an athlete.”  See Hornblower 2 380-385 for 
the translation of προσήρχοντο as “go to, approach.” 
465 Connor (1984) 135-136. 
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δεινά, ἵνα προθυμοτέρῳ ἔχοιεν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἑαυτῶν χρῆσθαι.466  Here fear, 
expressed by τὰ δεινά rather than φόβος, is thought to increase προθυμία.  
Thus, a little apprehension can increase enthusiasm for fighting.  And yet 
Brasidas later fails to show προθυμία for Perdiccas because of his own 
worries over Mende.  Perdiccas wants to attack another leaderʼs villages, but 
Brasidas in unenthusiastic because he thinks the Athenians might attack 
Mende: 
ἔπειτα ὁ Περδίκκας ἐβούλετο προϊέναι ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ Ἀρραβαίου 
κώμας καὶ μὴ καθῆσθαι, Βρασίδας δὲ τῆς τε Μένδης 
περιορώμενος, μὴ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρότερον ἐπιπλευσάντων τι 
πάθῃ, καὶ ἅμα τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν οὐ παρόντων, οὐ πρόθυμος ἦν, ἀλλὰ 
ἀναχωρεῖν μᾶλλον.467 
Thus, the anxiety (περιορώμενος) of Brasidas undermines his προθυμία.  
Brasidas may also hold back because of the earlier advice about not acceding 
to Perdiccas.  In that case, Thucydides describes a strange situation in which 
Brasidas shows less προθυμία in order to get Perdiccas to show more.  
Furthermore, Brasidas alienates Perdiccas and lets Mende get taken by the 
Athenians during the expedition against Arrhabaeus.  This conspicuous failure 
allows causes the reader to react differently the Greeksʼ reactions to Brasidas, 
as recorded by Thucydides.  As the Greeks in the north respond more 
enthusiastically and lavishly to Brasidas, the reader gains “a greater 
awareness of the ambiguity of Brasidasʼ actions and of the danger of his 
appeals.”468 
                                            
466 T 4.83.3: “The Chalcidean ambassadors present instructed him not drive away Perdiccasʼ 
sources of anxiety, so that he would be able to employ a man with more enthusiasm for his 
own devices.” 
467 T 4.124.4: “Then Perdiccas wanted to advance against the villages of Arrabaeus and not 
encamp, but Brasidas, watching over Mende so it would not suffer anything if the Athenians 
sailed against it first, and also since the Illyrians were not present, was not enthusiastic but 
wanted instead to withdraw.” 
468 Connor (1984) 139. 
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 And yet leaders do not have προθυμία exclusively for war.  After the 
deaths of Brasidas and Cleon, Pleistoanax and Nicias gain preeminence. 
These two men, each for his own reasons, help turn their citiesʼ προθυμία 
toward peace and conclude a treaty:  
τότε δὴ ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ πόλει σπεύδοντες τὰ μάλιστα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν 
Πλειστοάναξ τε ὁ Παυσανίου βασιλεὺς Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Νικίας 
ὁ Νικηράτου, πλεῖστα τῶν τότε εὖ φερόμενος ἐν στρατηγίαις, 
πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον προυθυμοῦντο, Νικίας μὲν βουλόμενος, ἐν ᾧ 
ἀπαθὴς ἦν καὶ ἠξιοῦτο, διασώσασθαι τὴν εὐτυχίαν, καὶ ἔς τε τὸ 
αὐτίκα πόνων πεπαῦσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ τοὺς πολίτας παῦσαι καὶ τῷ 
μέλλοντι χρόνῳ καταλιπεῖν ὄνομα ὡς οὐδὲν σφήλας τὴν πόλιν 
διεγένετο, νομίζων ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου τοῦτο ξυμβαίνειν καὶ ὅστις 
ἐλάχιστα τύχῃ αὑτὸν παραδίδωσι, τὸ δὲ ἀκίνδυνον τὴν εἰρήνην 
παρέχειν, Πλειστοάναξ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν διαβαλλόμενος περὶ 
τῆς καθόδου, καὶ ἐς ἐνθυμίαν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις αἰεὶ 
προβαλλόμενος ὑπʼ αὐτῶν, ὁπότε τι πταίσειαν, ὡς διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου 
κάθοδον παρανομηθεῖσαν ταῦτα ξυμβαίνοι.469 
Although the phrase πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον προυθυμοῦντο is difficult, since this 
is the first explicit mention of Nicias and Pleistoanax having προθυμία to make 
peace, it must elliptically mean something like “they were [keen before and] 
even keener now.”470  Thus, this phase of the war ends with both sides 
desiring a cessation of hostilities on similar terms.  This contrasts with the end 
of the Sicilian Expedition, since the morale of the two sides in the Archidamian 
War follows a similar trajectory.   
                                            
469 5.16.1: “The foremost candidates for power in either city, Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, 
king of Lacedaemon, and Nicias, son of Niceratus, the most fortunate general of his time, each 
desired peace more enthusiastically than ever. Nicias, while still happy and honored, wished 
to secure his good fortune, to obtain a present release from trouble for himself and his 
countrymen, and hand down to posterity a name as an ever-successful statesman, and 
thought the way to do this was to keep out of danger and commit himself as little as possible 
to fortune, and that peace alone made this keeping out of danger possible. Pleistoanax, again, 
was assailed by his enemies for his restoration, and regularly held up by them to the prejudice 
of his countrymen, upon every reverse that befell them, as though his unjust restoration were 
the cause” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
470 Hornblower 2 463. 
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 In a highly artful chapter relating the execution of Nicias,471 Thucydides 
explains the generalʼs προθυμία at the end of the Archidamian War in slightly 
different terms than at 5.16.  Because the first part of the passage has a 
Lacedaemonian focalization, with the thoughts and wishes of Gylippus in the 
foreground,472 Thucydides says that Nicias had προθυμία for releasing the 
men from the island rather than concluding the treaty: τοὺς γὰρ ἐκ τῆς 
νήσου ἄνδρας τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὁ Νικίας προυθυμήθη, σπονδὰς 
πείσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ποιήσασθαι, ὥστε ἀφεθῆναι.473  For this reason, 
Thucydides calls Nicias the ʻmost friendlyʼ (ἐπιτηδειότατον) of the Athenians 
to the Lacedaemonians.474  
 After his arrival in the Peloponnese, Alcibiades joins the Corinthians 
and Syracusans in urging the Lacedaemonians to intervene in Sicily.475  He 
gives a speech dealing extenstively with both his own and Peloponnesian 
προθυμία to conteract the lack of προθυμία among the Lacedaemonian 
leaders: 
καὶ διανοουμένων τῶν τε ἐφόρων καὶ τῶν ἐν τέλει ὄντων 
πρέσβεις πέμπειν ἐς Συρακούσας κωλύοντας μὴ ξυμβαίνειν 
Ἀθηναίοις, βοηθεῖν δὲ οὐ προθύμων ὄντων, παρελθὼν ὁ 
Ἀλκιβιάδης παρώξυνέ τε τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ ἐξώρμησε 
λέγων τοιάδε.476 
                                            
471 Hornblower 3 738, who also collects some bibliography on why Demosthenes is mentioned 
only briefly while Nicias gets a proper assessment. 
472 Hornblower 3 739. 
473 T 7.86.3: “Nicias had been enthusiastic to get the Lacedaemonian men from the island 
freed, since he persuaded the Athenians to make peace.” 
474 Ibid. 
475 Westlake (1968) 228 argues that Alcibiades was probably alone in urging a 
Lacedaemonian commander be sent, while the Syracusans and Corinthians probably 
requested more general military aid.  In the event, the effectiveness of Gylippus, who seems to 
have been sent especially at Alcibiadesʼ urging, benefitted the Syracusans greatly (see 
below). 
476 T 6.88.10: “When the ephors and those in power were planning to send ambassadors to 
Syracuse to hinder them from going over to the Athenians but were not enthusiastic to send 
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This fits the common pattern, identified above, of a leader noticing a lack of 
προθυμία and giving a speech, although it happens more commonly with a 
general and his troops.  Right after his initial defection, Alcibiades vigorously 
acts to promote the morale and enthusiasm of his new allies.  First, Alcibiades 
attempts to prove that he had προθυμία for Lacedaemonian interests during 
the negotiations to end the Archidamian War: 
καὶ διατελοῦντός μου προθύμου ὑμεῖς πρὸς Ἀθηναίους 
καταλλασσόμενοι τοῖς μὲν ἐμοῖς ἐχθροῖς δύναμιν διʼ ἐκείνων 
πράξαντες, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀτιμίαν περιέθετε.477 
Although Thucydides does not record what role Alcibiades played, Alcibiades 
himself claims to have shown enthusiasm but been scorned.  This forms the 
first part of a λῦσις διαβολῆς, dealing with the past, in which Alcibiades 
attempts to put to rest any grievances the Lacedaemonians have against 
him.478 
 Alcibiades later shifts his focus to the Lacedaemoniansʼ προθυμία.  He 
reassures them that his strategic advice is sound, and claims that everything 
depends on quick and enthusiastic action: 
γίγνεσθαι δέ τι αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν τάχει καὶ προθυμότερον ἐν ὑμῖν 
ἐστίν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπεὶ ὥς γε δυνατά (καὶ οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεσθαι 
οἶμαι γνώμης) πάνυ θαρσῶ.479 
Just as at Athens, Alcibiades is able to capitalize on his own προθυμία and 
elicit it from his audience.480  Here, however, Alcibiades advocates action that 
                                            
help, Alcibiades came up and both goaded and incited the Lacedaemonians by saying 
something like the following.” 
477 T 6.89.2: “Although I was continuously enthusiastic, you gave power to my greatest 
enemies and dishonor to me by doing things through those men when you were negotiating 
with the Athenians.” 
478 Hornblower 3 511. 
479 T 6.92.1: “That any of these things come about quickly and with enthusiasm is on you, 
Lacedaemonians, since I am quite confident that they are possible (and I am not often 
mistaken in my opinion).” 
480 See section 4.4 for more Alcibiadesʼ role in increasing Athenian προθυμία for the 
expedition to Sicily. 
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turns out to be as rational and effective as he claims, and Thucydides gives 
Alcibiades a major role in motivating the Lacedaemonians at this point in the 
war. 
 After giving advice on how to fight Athens, Alcibiades returns to his 
λῦσις διαβολῆς, this time talking about the present.481  Here, he tries to justify 
his actions and defend himself against the charge of showing an exileʼs 
προθυμία, a unique phrase in Thucydides:  
Καὶ χείρων οὐδενὶ ἀξιῶ δοκεῖν ὑμῶν εἶναι, εἰ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ μετὰ τῶν 
πολεμιωτάτων φιλόπολίς ποτε δοκῶν εἶναι νῦν ἐγκρατῶς 
ἐπέρχομαι, οὐδὲ ὑποπτεύεσθαί μου ἐς τὴν φυγαδικὴν προθυμίαν 
τὸν λόγον φυγάς τε γάρ εἰμι τῆς τῶν ἐξελασάντων πονηρίας, καὶ 
οὐ τῆς ὑμετέρας, ἢν πείθησθέ μοι, ὠφελίας· καὶ πολεμιώτεροι οὐχ 
οἱ τοὺς πολεμίους που βλάψαντες ὑμεῖς ἢ οἱ τοὺς φίλους 
ἀναγκάσαντες πολεμίους γενέσθαι.482 
This argument results in some rather sophistic verbal gymnastics as he 
justifies providing significant help to his homelandʼs greatest enemy as 
ʻpatriotismʼ because of its wicked leaders.483  Furthermore, Alcibiades seems 
like a narcissist throughout this speech, since he concentrates so much on 
himself and his own προθυμία while ostensibly talking about the 
Lacedaemoniansʼ war effort.484  Nevertheless, Alcibiades presents a 
convincing analysis of the military situation, Thucydides makes it clear that he 
fundamentally changed the attitude of the Lacedaemonians.485  That is, 
Alcibiades was successful at manipulating the Lacedaemoniansʼ προθυμία 
                                            
481 See Hornblower 3 511 for a more lengthy discussion of ring composition in this speech. 
482 T 6.92.2-3: “Meanwhile I hope that none of you will think any the worse of me if after having 
hitherto passed as a lover of my country, I now actively join its worst enemies in attacking it, or 
will suspect what I say as the fruit of an exileʼs enthusiasm. I am an outlaw from the iniquity of 
those who drove me forth, not, if you will be guided by me, from your service; my worst 
enemies are not you who only harmed your foes, but they who forced their friends to become 
enemies” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
483 Hornblower 3 516 calls it a “forced and arrogant conceit.” 
484 Compare his arguments that his personal glory brings glory to Athens (T 6.16.2-3). 
485 Westlake (1968) 230. 
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because of the clever and persuasive way he presented himself and his 
military recommendations. 
 Alcibades continues to incite the Lacedaemonians after the end of the 
Sicilian Expedition, starting with his leading role in the first revolts of Athenian 
allies in Ionia.  Alcibiades convinces Endius and the Lacedaemonian ephors 
that he can make the Athenian allies in Ionia revolt despite the Athenian 
blockade of the Peloponnesian fleet:  
λέγων ὅτι φθήσονταί τε πλεύσαντες πρὶν τὴν τῶν νεῶν ξυμφορὰν 
Χίους αἰσθέσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ὅταν προσβάλῃ Ἰωνίᾳ, ῥᾳδίως πείσειν 
τὰς πόλεις ἀφίστασθαι τήν τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων λέγων ἀσθένειαν καὶ 
τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων προθυμίαν.486 
Thucydides does not explicitly vouch for the effect Alcibiadesʼ words have on 
Lacedaemonian προθυμία, but Alcibiades convinces the Lacedaemonian 
leaders that his words about their enthusiasm can cause the Ionians to revolt 
from Athens.  Indeed, Alcibiadesʼ success in causing the revolt of Chios and 
other places confirms his rhetorical prowess, especially since he brings 
insignificant military power with him.487 
 Alcibiades greatly diminishes in power among the Persians, although 
he still tries to manipulate προθυμία.  When the Athenian oligarchs are trying 
to come to an agreement with the Persians, Alcibiades devotes himself to 
flattering Tissaphernes: καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδης, ἅτε περὶ μεγάλων 
ἀγωνιζόμενος, προθύμως τὸν Τισσαφέρνην θεραπεύων προσέκειτο.488  
                                            
486 T 8.12.1: “Saying that they could sail and arrive before the Chians heard about the 
misfortune of the ships and that he himself would easily persuade the cities, whenever he 
landed in Ionia, to revolt by speaking of the weakness of the Athenians and the enthusiasm of 
the Lacedaemonians.” 
487 Westlake (1968) 233-5, also arguing that rivalry between Agis and Alcibiades greatly 
complicates the Peloponnesian attempts to campaign in Ionia. 
488 T 8.52.1: “Alcibiades, since he was contending of serious matters, enthusiastically applied 
himself to flattering Tissaphernes.” 
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Weslake argues that Alcibiades had only marginal influence over 
Tissaphernes, and the extent to which Alcibiades had any chance of 
convincing Tissaphernes to ally with Athens is exaggerated.489  In any case, 
Alcibiades no longer seems to have the ability to influence προθυμία through 
his rhetorical prowess and personal charm.  Instead, Thucydides recounts how 
the Persian leaders were active in analyzing and showing προθυμία 
themselves. 
 Early in book eight, Thucydides makes it clear that the enthusiasm of 
different powerful Persians will increasingly influence the course of the war.  
Pharnabazus sends some Greek exiles to Lacedaemon to secure a fleet for 
the Hellespont, but Thucydides elaborates further on his aims:  
καὶ αὐτός, εἰ δύναιτο, ἅπερ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης προυθυμεῖτο, τάς τε 
ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῇ πόλεις ἀποστήσειε τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τοὺς 
φόρους καὶ ἀφʼ ἑαυτοῦ βασιλεῖ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων 
ποιήσειεν.490  
Although Thucydides does not mention it here, the implied προθυμία of 
Pharnabazus consists of substantial amounts of money sent with his 
envoys.491  And yet the Lacedaemonians choose to aid the Chian revolt 
instead but scale back the expedition and change the commander after an 
earthquake.492 
 Later, Tissaphernes has enticed the Peloponnesians into alliance with 
the promise of a Phoenician fleet.  He shows, however, a distinct lack of 
                                            
489 Westlake (1968) 247-248, who also argues that the whole episode of Alcibiades contesting 
with Phrynichus to give advice receives attention greater than its historical significance. 
490 T 8.6.1: “And himself, if he were able, cause the cities in his sphere of influence to revolt 
from the Athenians because of the tribute and make an alliance with the Lacedaemonians for 
the king by himself, just like Tissaphernes was enthusiastic to do.” 
491 Hornblower 3 775-776. 
492 T 8.6.4-6. 
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προθυμία and hinders the Peloponnesian war effort at the advice of 
Alcibiades: 
τῷ γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς εὖ περὶ τούτων παραινοῦντι 
προσθεὶς ἑαυτὸν ἐς πίστιν τήν τε τροφὴν κακῶς ἐπόριζε τοῖς 
Πελοποννησίοις καὶ ναυμαχεῖν οὐκ εἴα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας 
φάσκων ναῦς ἥξειν καὶ ἐκ περιόντος ἀγωνιεῖσθαι ἔφθειρε τὰ 
πράγματα καὶ τὴν ἀκμὴν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν ἀφείλετο γενομένην 
καὶ πάνυ ἰσχυράν, τά τε ἄλλα καταφανέστερον ἢ ὥστε λανθάνειν 
οὐ προθύμως ξυνεπολέμει.493 
This is a clear example of how an allyʼs lack of προθυμία can hinder an entire 
confederacy.  The exact chronology is vague, but this interference on the part 
of Tissaphernes is clearly a long and ongoing process, as the repeated 
imperfect verbs show.494  Finally, Tissaphernesʼ deficient enthusiasm causes 
the Peloponnesians to look to Pharnabazus, since he is more enthusiastic: 
Φαρνάβαζός τε ἐπεκαλεῖτο αὐτοὺς καὶ ἦν πρόθυμος κομίσας τὰς 
ναῦς καὶ αὐτὸς τὰς λοιπὰς ἔτι πόλεις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς 
ἀποστῆσαι τῶν Ἀθηναίων.495 
As προθυμία rises and falls and alliances shift, Thucydides shows that the 
various Persian leaders have major effects on Peloponnesian morale in the 
naval campaign.  Alcibiades also continues to play a role, although he acts on 
individual Persians rather than the Lacedaemonians as a whole. 
 Although the general normally attempts to instill enthusiasm, but the 
process can happen in reverse.  The Spartan Astyochus rushes to help Chios 
despite threatening not to do so because of the enthusiasm of his allies: ὁ δὲ 
                                            
493 T 8.46.5: “He now gave his confidence to Alcibiades in recognition of his good advice, and 
kept the Peloponnesians short of money, and would not let them fight at sea, but ruined their 
cause by pretending that the Phoenician fleet would arrive, and that they would thus be 
enabled to contend with the odds in their favour, and so made their navy lose its efficiency, 
which had been very remarkable, and generally betrayed a lack of enthusiasm in the war that 
was too plain to be mistaken” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
494 Hornblower 3 891. 
495 T 8.99.1: “Pharnabazus both called on them and was enthusiastic himself to cause the rest 
of the cities in his sphere of influence to revolt from the Athenians.” 
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Ἀστύοχος καίπερ οὐ διανοούμενος διὰ τὴν τότε ἀπειλήν, ὡς ἑώρα καὶ 
τοὺς ξυμμάχους προθύμους ὄντας, ὥρμητο ἐς τὸ βοηθεῖν.496   Yet again, 
Thucydides links προθυμία to the verb ὁρμάω.  In addition, Westlake uses 
this episode, and especially his failure actually to sail to Chios, as evidence 
that Astyochus lacked the strength of character to command effectively and 
even wanted to hand over his authority.497  Hornblower, however, raises the 
possibility that Thucydides may have wanted to give Astyochus some credit 
here for taking account of his allies state of mind.  Indeed, disregarding the 
προθυμία of his allies would likely have been problematic for Astyochus, 
either because they would lose their enthusiasm or turn elsewhere for help. 
 
4.3 Alliance and προθυμία 
As Table 4.2 shows, speakers throughout the Histories refer to 
προθυμία shown toward allies in the past to engender goodwill among 
members of another city or exhort current and potential allies to show 
προθυμία in the future.  A good alliance is characterized by προθυμία,498 so 
past and future προθυμία are of great concern to speakers dealing with 
intercity relations.  Early in Thucydidesʼ narrative, the actions of the Greek 
confederates against Persia are the prototypical case of προθυμία in support 
of allies.  As mentioned above, προθυμία can sometimes be translated as 
ʻpatriotism,ʼ especially when it is used to describe action in the Persian  
 
                                            
496 T 8.40.3: “Astyochus, although he did not intend to because of the threat at that time, when 
he saw even the allies were enthusiastic, he rushed to help.” 
497 Westlake (1968) 297-298. 
498 See, for instance, the clauses stipulating that προθυμία must be shown in the treaties that 
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References to future prothumia for allies Claims of prothumia already shown for allies 
1.71.6 – [speech of the Corinthians] If you are 
willing to show enthusiasm, we will stand by 
you, since we would not do the pious thing by 
changing our allegiance and would not likely 
find others more congenial (προθύμων) 
 
 1.74.1 – [speech of an Athenian] Since this 
was the result and it is abundantly clear that 
the Hellenic cause depended on the fleet, we 
provided the three most useful things to it: the 
greatest number of ships, the most intelligent 
general, and a most unshrinking enthusiasm 
(προθυμίαν) 
 1.74.2 – [speech of an Athenian] And we also 
showed by far the most daring enthusiasm, 
we who, although no one was helping us and 
men up to our borders were already enslaved, 
leaving our city and destroying our homes, 
decided not to betray the common cause of 
our remaining allies (προθυμίαν) 
 1.75.1 – [speech of an Athenian] Surely, 
Lacedaemonians, on account of our 
enthusiasm and the intelligence of our 
judgment at that time we deserve for the 
Greeks not to begrudge the empire that we 
have (προθυμίας) 
 1.92.1 – At this time, the Lacedaemonians for 
the most part had friendly feelings toward the 
Athenians because of the enthusiasm they 
showed against the Mede (προθυμίαν) 
 2.71.3 – [speech of the Plataeans] Your 
fathers gave us these privileges because of 
our virtue and enthusiasm during those 
dangers, but you do the opposite, since you 
come with our greatest enemies to enslave us 
(προθυμίας) 
 3.10.4 – [speech of Mytilenian envoys] As 
long as the Athenians led the alliance fairly, 
we followed with enthusiasm; but when we 
saw them giving up hostilities with the Mede 
and pursuing the enslavement of their allies, 
we began to be fearful (προθύμως) 
3.13.7 – [speech of Mytilenian envoys] If you 
help us enthusiastically, you will add to your 
side a city with a large navy, which you 
especially lack; and you will more easily 
overthrow Athens by depriving her of allies, 




Table 4.2 (Continued) 
 3.55.3 – [speech of the Plataeans] The 
Athenians helped us against Thebes when 
you held back, and it is no longer honorable 
to betray them, especially since being well 
treated and asking ourselves we became their 
allies and received a share of citizenship; 
instead, it is seemly to come to their call 
enthusiastically (προθύμως) 
 3.56.5 – [speech of the Plataeans] It is just to 
weigh our enthusiasm against Xerxes then 
against our transgression now, if indeed we 
did transgress (προθυμίαν) 
 3.57.4 – [speech of the Plataeans] We 
Plataeans, enthusiastic beyond our power for 
the Greeks, are pushed away by all, alone 
and dishonored; and none of our allies from 
before is any use, and we fear you, 
Lacedaemonians, our only hope, will not be 
dependable (πρόθυμοι) 
 3.59.4 – [speech of the Plataeans] We 
beseech you, Lacedaemonians, not to give up 
to Thebans, their most hated enemies, the 
Plataeans, the most zealous for the Greeks, 
suppliants from your hands and trust; but be 
our saviors and do not destroy us while 
freeing the other Greeks (προθυμότατοι) 
 3.62.5 – [speech of the Thebans] Fighting 
and beating the Athenians at Coroneia we 
freed Boeotia, and now we are 
enthusiastically helping to free the rest of 
Greece, providing horses and a force as big 
as no other ally (προθύμως) 
 3.67.6 – [speech of the Thebans] So, 
Lacedaemonians, defend the law of the 
Greeks transgressed by these men, and to us 
who were wronged grant just rewards for the 
enthusiasm which we have shown 
(πρόθυμοι) 
 4.61.4 – [speech of Hermocrates] The 
Athenians showed their ambition recently in 
the appeal of the Chalcidians, since the 
Chalcidians never helped them as allies, but 
the Athenians enthusiastically provided more 
than the treaty called for (προθύμως) 
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Table 4.2 (Continued) 
5.23.1 – [Treaty of Athens and Sparta] If 
some enemy attacks the land of the 
Lacedaemonians and does them harm, the 
Athenians will help the Lacedaemonians in 
whatever way they can as effectively as 
possible; and if anyone ravages the land and 
leaves, that city is the enemy of the 
Lacedaemonians and the Athenians and will 
suffer at the hands of both until both cities call 
off hostilities together.  These things are to be 
done justly, with enthusiasm, and without 
guile (προθύμως) 
 
5.23.2 – [Treaty of Athens and Sparta] If 
some enemy attacks the land of the 
Athenians and does them harm, the 
Lacedaemonians will help the Athenians in 
whatever way they can as effectively as 
possible; and if anyone ravages the land and 
leaves, that city is the enemy of the 
Lacedaemonians and the Athenians and will 
suffer at the hands of both until both cities call 
off hostilities together.  These things are to be 
done justly, with enthusiasm, and without 
guile (προθύμως) 
 
 6.83.1 – [speech of Euphemus] For these 
reasons, we deserve to rule: because we 
provided the biggest fleet and enthusiasm for 
the Greeks without pretext, and because 
those doing so even for the Mede harmed us; 
and we are also aiming at strength against 
the Peloponnesians (προθυμίαν) 
Wars.499  Because of the Atheniansʼ early descriptions of their own προθυμία 
against the Persians, it seems initially to be an exclusively Athenian trait.  The 
Athenians at Sparta during the first congress of the Peloponnesians claim 
προθυμία as the third of their great contributions to the Greek war effort, and 
the tricolon crescendo in their explanations of these contributions shows that 
they regard προθυμία as the most important: 
τοιούτου μέντοι τούτου ξυμβάντος, καὶ σαφῶς δηλωθέντος ὅτι ἐν 
ταῖς ναυσὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰ πράγματα ἐγένετο, τρία τὰ 
ὠφελιμώτατα ἐς αὐτὸ παρεσχόμεθα, ἀριθμόν τε νεῶν πλεῖστον 
καὶ ἄνδρα στρατηγὸν ξυνετώτατον καὶ προθυμίαν ἀοκνοτάτην· 
                                            
499 Crawley translates προθυμία at 1.74.1-2, 1.92.1, and other places this way. 
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ναῦς μέν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν, 
Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ ἄρχοντα, ὃς αἰτιώτατος ἐν τῷ στενῷ ναυμαχῆσαι 
ἐγένετο, ὅπερ σαφέστατα ἔσωσε τὰ πράγματα, καὶ αὐτὸν διὰ 
τοῦτο ὑμεῖς ἐτιμήσατε μάλιστα δὴ ἄνδρα ξένον τῶν ὡς ὑμᾶς 
ἐλθόντων· προθυμίαν δὲ καὶ πολὺ τολμηροτάτην ἐδείξαμεν, οἵ γε, 
ἐπειδὴ ἡμῖν κατὰ γῆν οὐδεὶς ἐβοήθει, τῶν ἄλλων ἤδη μέχρι ἡμῶν 
δουλευόντων ἠξιώσαμεν ἐκλιπόντες τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα 
διαφθείραντες μηδʼ ὣς τὸ τῶν περιλοίπων ξυμμάχων κοινὸν 
προλιπεῖν μηδὲ σκεδασθέντες ἀχρεῖοι αὐτοῖς γενέσθαι, ἀλλʼ 
ἐσβάντες ἐς τὰς ναῦς κινδυνεῦσαι καὶ μὴ ὀργισθῆναι ὅτι ἡμῖν οὐ 
προυτιμωρήσατε.500 
The contribution of ships receives little explanation, the intelligent generalship 
of Themistocles is treated at more length, but the weight is clearly on the 
προθυμία that the Athenians showed by abandoning their city and resisting 
the invasion even though their own homes had been occupied.  In addition, the 
Atheniansʼ προθυμία is qualified by two different superlative adjectives: 
ἀοκνοτάτην, most unshrinking, and τολμηροτάτην, most daring.  Both 
adjectives emphasize the Atheniansʼ willingness to face the seemingly 
insurmountable Persian forces, and the description of those who submitted to 
the Persians as ʻalready serving as slavesʼ as well as the lack of military 
support from anyone else gives this speech a moralistic tone.501  The 
Athenians do not, however, claim to have shown andreia against the Persians, 
                                            
500 T 1.74.1-2: “Such, then, was the result of the matter, and it was clearly proved that it was 
on the fleet of Hellas that her cause depended. Well, to this result we contributed three very 
useful elements: the largest number of ships, the ablest commander, and the most 
unhesitating enthusiasm. Our contingent of ships was little less than two-thirds of the whole 
four hundred; the commander was Themistocles, through whom chiefly it was that the battle 
took place in the straits, the acknowledged salvation of our cause. Indeed, this was the reason 
of your receiving him with honors such as had never been accorded to any foreign visitor. 
While for daring enthusiasm we had no competitors. Receiving no reinforcements from behind, 
seeing everything in front of us already subjugated, we had the spirit, after abandoning our 
city, after sacrificing our property (instead of deserting the remainder of the league or depriving 
them of our services by dispersing), to throw ourselves into our ships and meet the danger, 
without a thought of resenting your neglect to assist us” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
501 There are numerous examples in Herodotus of subjection to a foreign power being referred 
to as “enslavement,” e.g. Herodotus 1.94.7, 1.169.2, 6.32.1, 7.108.1, 7.235.3, among many 
others. 
 143 
both because it might have offended the mostly hostile audience and because 
abandoning oneʼs city runs counter to the traditional view of andreia outlined 
above, i.e. standing oneʼs ground. 
We should not accept the claims of Thucydidean speakers as 
representative of the author himself, but Thucydides confirms in his own voice 
that the Atheniansʼ actions against Persia showed προθυμία in a statement 
with Spartan focalization.  Here, he explains the Lacedaemonian reaction to 
the secret building of the Themistoclean walls: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ κωλύμῃ, ἀλλὰ 
γνώμης παραινέσει δῆθεν τῷ κοινῷ ἐπρεσβεύσαντο, ἅμα δὲ καὶ 
προσφιλεῖς ὄντες ἐν τῷ τότε διὰ τὴν ἐς τὸν Μῆδον προθυμίαν τὰ μάλιστʼ 
αὐτοῖς ἐτύγχανον.502  Although the Atheniansʼ appeal to προθυμία against 
Persia falls flat as the Peloponnesian War is about to begin, Thucydides 
confirms that the Spartans did respect the Atheniansʼ προθυμία in the 
immediate aftermath of the Persian War.  Even though the Lacedaemonians 
are displeased with their loss of preeminence,503 they excuse the Atheniansʼ 
actions when the Persian Wars are still a fresh memory. 
Athenian speakers repeatedly invoke their cityʼs προθυμία in the 
Persian Wars in the early part of the narrative, making προθυμία initially seem 
to be an aspect of Athenian self-presentation, but the Plataeans also refer to 
their own προθυμία against Persia. In this context, προθυμία can sometimes 
be translated as ʻpatriotism.ʼ  In their first speech to the Lacedemonians, the 
                                            
502 T 1.92.1: “The embassy, it seems, was prompted not by a desire to obstruct, but to guide 
the counsels of their government: besides, Spartan feeling was at that time very friendly 
towards Athens on account of the enthusiasm which she had displayed in the struggle with the 
Mede” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
503 Hornblower 1 137. 
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Plataeans contrast the favor they received after showing enthusiasm in the 
Persian Wars with the present situation: 
τάδε μὲν ἡμῖν πατέρες οἱ ὑμέτεροι ἔδοσαν ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ 
προθυμίας τῆς ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς κινδύνοις γενομένης, ὑμεῖς δὲ 
τἀναντία δρᾶτε· μετὰ γὰρ Θηβαίων τῶν ἡμῖν ἐχθίστων ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ 
τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἥκετε.504 
Thus, it is more correct to say that Thucydides and speakers from various city-
states associate προθυμία with the defense of Greece during the Persian 
Wars than to call προθυμία an Athenian trait.  It may initially seem to be an 
Athenian quality, but as Thucydides refines the paradigms introduced in book 
one, especially in the account of the fighting at Pylos, the reader learns that 
both sides show προθυμία at various times.   
 The Plataeans try a similar argument after the siege succeeds, and 
their past προθυμία becomes a more prominent rhetorical theme. In order to 
convince the Lacedaemonians to show clemency, the Plataeans cite their 
προθυμία against Persia again:  
καὶ δίκαιον ἡμῶν τῆς νῦν ἁμαρτίας, εἰ ἄρα ἡμάρτηταί τι, 
ἀντιθεῖναι τὴν τότε προθυμίαν· καὶ μείζω τε πρὸς ἐλάσσω 
εὑρήσετε καὶ ἐν καιροῖς οἷς σπάνιον ἦν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τινὰ ἀρετὴν 
τῇ Ξέρξου δυνάμει ἀντιτάξασθαι, ἐπῃνοῦντό τε μᾶλλον οἱ μὴ τὰ 
ξύμφορα πρὸς τὴν ἔφοδον αὑτοῖς ἀσφαλείᾳ πράσσοντες, 
ἐθέλοντες δὲ τολμᾶν μετὰ κινδύνων τὰ βέλτιστα.505 
They also relate enthusiastic fighting against the Persians with ἀρετή for a 
second time, although this probably has more to do with the nature of that 
conflict than with any idea of goodness implicit in προθυμία.  In addition, the 
                                            
504 T 2.71.3: “Your fathers granted us these honors because of our virtue and enthusiasm in 
those troubles, but you do the opposite, since you come with our most hated enemies, the 
Thebans, to enslave us.” 
505 T 3.56.5: “It is just, therefore, to put our patriotism then against our error now, if error there 
has been; and you will find the merit outweighing the fault, and displayed at a juncture when 
there were few Hellenes who would set their valor against the strength of Xerxes, and when 
greater praise was theirs who preferred the dangerous path of honor to the safe source of 
consulting their own interest with respect to the invasion” (tr. Crawley). 
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Plataeans conclude their appeal to the Lacedaemonians after the capture of 
Plataea by claiming they showed the most προθυμία in the earlier war:  
ἐπισκήπτομέν τε ἅμα μὴ Πλαταιῆς ὄντες οἱ προθυμότατοι περὶ 
τοὺς Ἕλληνας γενόμενοι Θηβαίοις τοῖς ἡμῖν ἐχθίστοις ἐκ τῶν 
ὑμετέρων χειρῶν καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας πίστεως ἱκέται ὄντες, ὦ 
Λακεδαιμόνιοι, παραδοθῆναι, γενέσθαι δὲ σωτῆρας ἡμῶν καὶ μὴ 
τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας ἐλευθεροῦντας ἡμᾶς διολέσαι.506 
The superlative shows that the Plataeans are ratcheting up their rhetoric as 
the speech concludes, and the contrast with the ʻmost hostileʼ Thebans recalls 
their first speech.  C. F. Smithʼs commentary on this passage notes that 
προθυμότατοι here, like πρόθυμοι at 3.57.4, describes “a disposition ready 
for any sacrifice.”507  Thus, προθυμία is one of the most important collective 
virtues because it can reflect the depth of someoneʼs commitment to a larger 
cause or group.  Smithʼs description of προθυμία also overlaps with the 
Baynesʼ definition of military morale quoted in chapter one.508  In fact, tracing 
the rising and falling of προθυμία in Thucydidesʼ narrative is a good way to 
follow morale, especially in the account of the Sicilian Expedition. 
 Plataea cites its προθυμία in the Persian Wars to curry favor with the 
Lacedaemonians, but Thebes finds more success by referring to its current 
προθυμία.  The Theban counter-speech rebuts claims of προθυμία against 
Persia by citing their own προθυμία in the current campaign: 
ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ὅ τε Μῆδος ἀπῆλθε καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔλαβε, 
σκέψασθαι χρή, Ἀθηναίων ὕστερον ἐπιόντων τήν τε ἄλλην 
Ἑλλάδα καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν χώραν πειρωμένων ὑφʼ αὑτοῖς ποιεῖσθαι 
καὶ κατὰ στάσιν ἤδη ἐχόντων αὐτῆς τὰ πολλά, εἰ μαχόμενοι ἐν 
                                            
506 T 3.59.4: “We call upon you not to give over us Plataeans from your hands and your pledge 
of faith to the Thebans, our most hated enemies, since we are the most enthusiastic 
concerning the Greeks and suppliants; but become our saviors and do not destroy us while 
freeing the other Greeks.” 
507 Smith (1894) ad loc.  He also compares uses of προθυμία by the Plataeans at 3.56.5 and 
2.71.3. 
508 See above, section 1.1. 
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Κορωνείᾳ καὶ νικήσαντες αὐτοὺς ἠλευθερώσαμεν τὴν Βοιωτίαν 
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους νῦν προθύμως ξυνελευθεροῦμεν, ἵππους τε 
παρέχοντες καὶ παρασκευὴν ὅσην οὐκ ἄλλοι τῶν ξυμμάχων.509 
The repeated root in ἠλευθερώσαμεν and ξυνελευθεροῦμεν recalls the 
Plataeans ironical ἐλευθεροῦντας at 3.59.4, but the Thebans pointedly put 
the adverb νῦν next to προθύμως, highlighting the benefits the 
Lacedaemonians are currently receiving.  Furthermore, the Thebans are even 
specific about the military contributions to the alliance that show their 
προθυμία. 
 The Thebans make the same point even more emphatically as they 
conclude their argument.  They somewhat euphemistically ask for restitution 
for the wrongs the Plataeans have done, since they themselves have shown 
προθυμία.  The Thebans also imply that the Plataeansʼ past προθυμία is 
mere empty λόγος compared to the ἔργα they are currently accomplishing 
with their προθυμία: 
ἀμύνατε οὖν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ τῷ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νόμῳ ὑπὸ 
τῶνδε παραβαθέντι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἄνομα παθοῦσιν ἀνταπόδοτε χάριν 
δικαίαν ὧν πρόθυμοι γεγενήμεθα, καὶ μὴ τοῖς τῶνδε λόγοις 
περιωσθῶμεν ἐν ὑμῖν, ποιήσατε δὲ τοῖς Ἕλλησι παράδειγμα οὐ 
λόγων τοὺς ἀγῶνας προθήσοντες ἀλλʼ ἔργων, ὧν ἀγαθῶν μὲν 
ὄντων βραχεῖα ἡ ἀπαγγελία ἀρκεῖ, ἁμαρτανομένων δὲ λόγοι ἔπεσι 
κοσμηθέντες προκαλύμματα γίγνονται.510 
                                            
509 T 3.62.5: “Examine only how we acted after the departure of the Mede and the recovery of 
the constitution; when the Athenians attacked the rest of Hellas and endeavored to subjugate 
our country, of the greater part of which faction had already made them masters. Did not we 
fight and conquer at Coronea and liberate Boeotia, and do we not now enthusiastically 
contribute to the liberation of the rest, providing horses to the cause and a force unequalled by 
that of any other state in the confederacy?” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
510 T 3.67.6: “Vindicate, therefore, Lacedaemonians, the Hellenic law which they have broken; 
and to us, the victims of its violation, grant the reward merited by our enthusiasm. Nor let us 
be supplanted in your favour by their harangues, but offer an example to the Hellenes, that the 
contests to which you invite them are of deeds, not words: good deeds can be shortly stated, 
but where wrong is done a wealth of language is needed to veil its deformity” (adapted from 
Crawleyʼs translation). 
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As Adam Parry argues, this sentence reduces Plataeansʼ claims of past deeds 
to “pure λόγος,” since their statements about traditional nobility and actions 
against Persia are only words compared to the Thebansʼ concrete benefits to 
the Peloponnesian war effort.511  The Plataeansʼ arguments about προθυμία 
against Persia are ineffectual compared to the Thebansʼ προθυμία against 
Athens. 
 In a different way, the Mytilenians try to excuse their past προθυμία for 
Athens and persuade the Lacedaemonians to show προθυμία for Mytilene 
and help it revolt.  The Mytilenians first try to convince the Lacedaemonians 
that they only enthusiastically followed the Athenians as long as they carried 
on hostilities with Persia: 
καὶ μέχρι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἡγοῦντο, προθύμως εἱπόμεθα· ἐπειδὴ 
δὲ ἑωρῶμεν αὐτοὺς τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μήδου ἔχθραν ἀνιέντας, τὴν δὲ 
τῶν ξυμμάχων δούλωσιν ἐπαγομένους, οὐκ ἀδεεῖς ἔτι ἦμεν.512  
This implies that participating in an alliance without προθυμία is almost like 
not participating; the Mytilenians almost seem to be describing a kind of 
passive resistance.  Later, the Mytilenians try to convince the 
Lacedaemonians to show προθυμία by enumerating the benefits of alliance: 
βοηθησάντων δὲ ὑμῶν προθύμως πόλιν τε προσλήψεσθε ναυτικὸν 
ἔχουσαν μέγα, οὗπερ ὑμῖν μάλιστα προσδεῖ, καὶ Ἀθηναίους ῥᾷον 
καθαιρήσετε ὑφαιροῦντες αὐτῶν τοὺς ξυμμάχους (θρασύτερον 
γὰρ πᾶς τις προσχωρήσεται), τήν τε αἰτίαν ἀποφεύξεσθε ἣν εἴχετε 
μὴ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις.513 
                                            
511 Parry (1981) 190. 
512 T 3.10.4: “As long as they led fairly, we followed enthusiastically; but when we saw them 
relaxing their hostility toward the Mede and devising the enslavement of their allies, we were 
not longer free from anxiety.” 
513 T 3.13.7: “If you send help enthusiastically, you will gain a city with a great fleet, which you 
need most of all, and you will more easily wipe out the Athenians by causing the allies to revolt 
(since everyone will come over more boldly) and escape the responsibility which you have for 
not helping those who revolt.” 
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This is a compelling analysis of the tactical and propaganda value of 
defending Mytilene from the Athenians, and the Lacedaemonians decide to aid 
them.  Thus, the Mytilenians nominally succeed with their speech, but in fact 
are not much more successful than the Plataeans in persuading the 
Lacedaemonians.  That is to say, they cannot convince the Lacedaemonians 
actually to show much προθυμία for them, since the fleet dallies and does not 
arrive before the city surrenders.514  
 The Syracusan Hermocrates also talks about how showing προθυμία 
affects the nature of an alliance.  Hermocratesʼ speech mentions the 
προθυμία the Athenians show for their allies in order to scare his countrymen 
into banding together:  
ἐδήλωσαν δὲ νῦν ἐν τῇ τοῦ Χαλκιδικοῦ γένους παρακλήσει· τοῖς 
γὰρ οὐδεπώποτε σφίσι κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν προσβοηθήσασιν αὐτοὶ 
τὸ δίκαιον μᾶλλον τῆς ξυνθήκης προθύμως παρέσχοντο.515 
Hermocrates argues that the Athenians will menace Sicily, since they recently 
sent military aid to Chalcidice without receiving any prior benefits.  Hornblower 
notes that Hermocrates plays with both formal and informal senses of alliance 
in this sentence, since the ξυμμαχικὸν that might the Chalcidians might have 
followed refers to a general tie of Ionian ethnicity, but the ξυνθήκη that the 
Athenians followed was an actual treaty.516  This is an early indication both of 
Hermocratesʼ speeches implying rational calculations about προθυμία and his 
attempts to unify the Sicilians in books six and seven, which are discussed at 
length in the next section. 
 
                                            
514 T 3.29, although 3.26 explains that Cleomenesʼ invasion of Attica was very destructive. 
515 T 4.61.4: “They showed it recently in the request of the Chalcidian tribe: although the 
Chalcidians had never helped them according to the alliance, the Athenians enthusiastically 
provided more than was required in the treaty.” 
516 Hornblower 2 225. 
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4.4 Προθυμία in Sicily 
As Table 4.3 shows, Thucydides repeatedly mentions their προθυμία 
when the Athenians are contemplating and sending the expedition to Sicily, 
but he emphasizes Syracusan προθυμία more and more as the campaign 
wears on.  When the Athenians get to Sicily and find out the promised financial 
support does not exist, their προθυμία wavers.  The loss of Alcibiades harms 
them even more, since he, like Gylippus and Hermocrates on the Syracusan 
side, deploys λόγοι of προθυμία in a way that is consonant with Thucydidesʼ 
descriptions of προθυμία in the narrative (ἔργα).  Despite the Atheniansʼ 
deficient leadership, both sides show tremendous προθυμία during the battle 
in the Great Harbor. Afterwards, however, Athenian προθυμία only motivates 
flight and appears in unsuccessful exhortations of Nicias.  A study of 
προθυμία in Thucydidesʼ narrative of the Sicilian Expedition reveals an almost 
exclusively upward trajectory for Syracusan and allied προθυμία and an early 
plateau followed by a precipitous drop at the end for Athenian and allied 
προθυμία.  Thus, the rhetorical claims of the Syracusan Hermocrates and the 
Lacedaemonian Gylippus are implicitly validated by Thucydides.  The 
Athenians initially have in Alcibiades a leader who both shows and elicits 
προθυμία, but his defection leaves Athenian morale in the less than capable 
hands of Nicias.  Nicias typically speaks of Athenian προθυμία as it is falling 
or tries in vain to increase his soldiersʼ προθυμία, showing that his λόγοι of 
προθυμία are ineffectual.  By developing the theme of προθυμία in the 
speeches and the narrative, Thucydides implicitly highlights the successes 















Table 4.3 – Προθυμία during the Sicilian Expedition 
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Athenians and Allies Syracusans and Allies 
6.6.2 – Ambassadors from Egesta incited the 
Athenians especially and called on them more 
enthusiastically (προθυμότερον) 
 
6.15.2 – Alcibiades most zealously supported 
the expedition (προθυμότατα) 
 
6.31.3 – Each trierarch in the Sicilian 
expedition was enthusiastic to the highest 
degree that his ship excel in beauty and fast 
sailing (προθυμηθέντος) 
 
 6.34.5 – Hermocrates argues that the 
Athenians will be discouraged if the 
Syracusans follow his plan to defend 
Tarentum, since they will not know for sure 
whether the nearby cities will receive them 
favorably (ἀθυμοῖεν) 
 6.39.2 – [speech of Athenagoras] Oligarchy 
gives a share of danger to the many and not 
only claims an undue share of the benefits 
but takes and keeps it all, which is what the 
powerful and young among you are 
enthusiastic for (προθυμοῦνται) 
6.46.2 – The Athenian generals lost 
enthusiasm, both because the first thing had 
gone against them and because the 
Rhegians, who were the first to be 
approached and most likely, refused to join 
them despite being kinsmen of the Leontines 
and friendly with them (ἀθυμίᾳ) 
 
6.47.1 – Nicias was of the opinion that they 
should settle matters between Egesta and 
Selinus, and after coasting past the other 
cities to show the power of the Athenians and 
their enthusiasm for their friends and allies 
sail home, unless some unexpected 
opportunity arose (προθυμίαν) 
 
6.68.4 – [speech of Nicias] So, remembering 
your reputation, go against your opponents 
enthusiastically and with the belief that the 
present necessity and difficulty are more 
fearsome than the enemy (προθύμως) 
 
 6.69.1 – The Syracusans did not fall short in 
enthusiasm or daring in either this or the 
other battles, and they were no worse in 
courage as long as their knowledge held out, 
but they unwillingly gave up their resolution 
when it ran out (προθυμίᾳ) 
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Table 4.3 (Continued) 
6.69.3 – The subject allies had the most 
enthusiasm because of the incalculable 
chance of salvation if they did not win, and 
getting easier terms from the Athenians was 
only a secondary concern (πρόθυμον) 
 
 6.75.3 – The Syracusans suspected that the 
Camarinaeans did not send what they sent to 
them for the first battle enthusiastically and 
would no longer be willing to help in the 
future, but that they would switch sides when 
they saw the Atheniansʼ success in battle 
(προθύμως) 
 6.80.1 – [speech of Hermocrates] And so, at 
least together we will not likely lack 
enthusiasm (ἀθυμεῖν), but go into an alliance 
with more enthusiasm, especially since help 
will come from the Peloponnesians, who are 
in all respects mightier than our enemies here 
in matters of war (προθυμότερον) 
 6.88.8 – The Corinthians voted immediately 
to be the first to send assistance with all 
enthusiasm and sent along ambassadors 
with them to Lacedaemon, in order to 
persuade them also to make the war here 
against the Athenians more open and send 
some aid to Sicily (προθυμίᾳ) 
 7.1.4 – Some of the Sicels promised to send 
a few troops, since they were ready to join in 
much more enthusiastically because one of 
their kings who was friendly to Athens had 
recently died and Gylippus had seemed to 
come from Lacedaemon with enthusiasm 
(προθυμότερον, προθύμως) 
 7.7.2 – Gylippus had gone to the rest of Sicily 
for troops, collecting both a navy and an 
army, and also to bring over any cities that 
were not enthusiastic or were completely 
staying out of the conflict (πρόθυμος) 
 7.21.3 – Hermocrates urged them most of all 
not to lack the spirit to try their hand with 
ships against the Athenians, saying that not 
even those men had a perpetual experience 
with the sea handed down to them but were 
mainlanders more than the Syracusans, who 
had been compelled by the Medes to become 
seafarers (ἀθυμεῖν) 
7.24.3 – the Athenians lose the fort at 
Plemmyrium and can no longer bring in 
supplies, which causes shock and lack of 
spirit in the army, and this lack of supplies is 
extremely detrimental to them (ἀθυμίαν) 
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Table 4.3 (Continued) 
7.33.6 – The Athenians collected the whole 
force and waited at Thurii, wishing to round 
up anyone who was missing and convince the 
Thurians to join the campaign with as much 
zeal as possible and, since they were in the 
present circumstance, make an offensive and 
defensive alliance with Athens 
(προθυμότατα) 
 
 7.43.5 – The Syracusan garrison on Epipolae 
immediately went to help the captured fort, 
and Demosthenes and the Athenians fell 
upon and routed them, although the 
Syracusans resisted enthusiastically 
(προθύμως) 
7.55.1 – the decisive Athenian loss at sea 
causes undermines their spirit (ἀθυμίας) 
 
7.60.5 – After everything was ready, Nicias, 
seeing that the soldiers were dispirited 
because of the very much unexpected defeat 
on the ships and wanting to go through the 
danger as quickly as possible because of the 
dearth of friendly faces, first called them 
together and said the following (ἀθυμοῦντας)  
 
7.61.2 – Nicias exhorts the Athenians and 
allies not to lack spirit or suffer what the least 
experienced of men feel, who after suffering 
defeats in their first contests then have an 
expectation of fear like their misfortunes 
throughout (ἀθυμεῖν) 
 
 7.66.1 – [speech of Gylippus and the 
generals] That our past deeds are glorious 
and this contest will be for future glories, 
Syracusans and allies, we think you know, for 
otherwise you would not have taken these 
things in hand so enthusiastically 
(προθύμως) 
 7.67.1 – [speech of Gylippus] Our spirit and 
recent victory have given us a double hope; 
and, for the most part, the greatest hope also 
provides the greatest enthusiasm for action 
(προθυμίαν) 
7.70.3 – From the sailors on both sides, there 
was much enthusiasm to bring the boats to 
wherever was ordered, and the helmsmenʼs 
rivalry in technique and competition with one 
another was great (προθυμία) 
7.70.3 – From the sailors on both sides, there 
was much enthusiasm to bring the boats to 
wherever was ordered, and the helmsmenʼs 
rivalry in technique and competition with one 
another was great (προθυμία) 
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Table 4.3 (Continued) 
7.70.7 – There were many orders and shouts 
about technical matters and because of the 
rivalry of the moment from both naviesʼ 
boatswains, calling on the Athenians to force 
a passage and enthusiastically take part now, 
if ever again; and calling to the Syracusans 
and their allies that it was noble to prevent the 
enemiesʼ escape and for each to glorify his 
homeland by winning (προθύμως) 
 
7.70.8 – In the critical battle, the Syracusan 
generals asked any they saw hesitating if 
they knew the Athenians were enthusiastic in 
every way for escape and they themselves 
were fleeing from men who were fleeing 
(προθυμουμένους) 
 
7.76.1 – When Nicias saw the army was 
dispirited (ἀθυμοῦν) and greatly altered, he 
went along the lines to encourage and 
comfort them as much as possible in the 
circumstances, shouting louder at each group 
he was with because of his enthusiasm and 
desire to do some benefit by being heard as 
far as possible (προθυμίας) 
 
7.79.3 – The Athenians lose heart at a normal 
thunder storm, thinking it portends their 
destruction (ἠθύμουν) 
 
In addition, the chart below shows rising and falling προθυμία in 
Thucydidesʼ narrative of the Sicilian Expedition.  Only Thucydidesʼ own uses of 
προθυμία and related words are included, so occurrences in direct and 
indirect speeches are not graphed.  In addition, the enthusiasm of each sideʼs 
allies is counted.  Instances of προθυμία are represented by an increase of 
one, and the lack of προθυμία and ἀθυμία are represented by a decrease of 
one. The chart indicates that Syracusan morale starts relatively low but 
steadily increases, while Athenian morale plateaus after the expeditions arrival 
before dropping off at the end.  The lines cross near the beginning of book 
seven and the arrival of Gylippus.  Furthermore, allies play a much different 
role for the two sides.  The only loss of Syracusan προθυμία charted 
describes their wavering Camarinaean allies (6.75.3).  Athenian προθυμία, on 
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the other hand, receives a bump from descriptions of allies in two of the three 
times it rises after the departure of the expedition (6.69.3, 7.33.6).  Thus, the 
Athenians are more dependent on their allies for fighting spirit than the 
Syracusans, who are fighting in defense of their own land. 
 Although a visual representation of προθυμία in Thucydidesʼ narrative 
is instructive, it gives only a simplified view of a complex theme.  This section 
will discuss προθυμία in direct and indirect speeches alongside προθυμία in 
the narrative, since the λόγοι enrich the ἔργα in notable ways.  Thucydides 
relates προθυμία to the genesis of the expedition, but he attributes it originally 
to the Egestaeans.  After relating that the Athenians really wanted to rule all of 
Sicily, Thucydides says that ambassadors from Egesta incited them 
enthusiastically: μάλιστα δʼ αὐτοὺς ἐξώρμησαν Ἐγεσταίων [τε] πρέσβεις 
παρόντες καὶ προθυμότερον ἐπικαλούμενοι.517  Note that although the 
Egestaeans express their προθυμία in λόγος, Thucydides uses the verb 
ἐξορμᾶν to describe the inciting, echoing ὁρμᾶσθαι of the Atheniansʼ desire 
                                            
517 T 6.6.2: “Ambassadors of the Egestaeans who were present and calling on them rather 
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to campaign against Sicily in the previous sentence, and showing that the 
Egestaean λόγος causes actual Athenian action.  The ambassadorsʼ verbal 
προθυμία persuades the Athenians, but the lack of funds at Egesta when the 
Athenians arrive constitutes a deficiency in actual προθυμία.  Despite 
inspiring Athenian action, Egesta has προθυμία only in λόγος. 
Just as he motivates προθυμία among Athensʼ enemies after his 
defection, Alcibiades is a major motivator of Athenian enthusiasm for the 
expedition.  Thucydides counts Alcibiades as the most enthusiastic Athenian 
supporter of the expedition, because of enmity with Nicias and personal 
ambition: 
ἐνῆγε δὲ προθυμότατα τὴν στρατείαν Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου, 
βουλόμενος τῷ τε Νικίᾳ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὢν καὶ ἐς τἆλλα διάφορος 
τὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῦ διαβόλως ἐμνήσθη, καὶ μάλιστα 
στρατηγῆσαί τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε διʼ αὐτοῦ καὶ 
Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ 
δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν.518 
Again, Thucydides depicts a process in which a someone advances a λόγος 
in a spirit of προθυμία and then engenders προθυμία in his listeners.  Indeed, 
Alcibiadesʼ speech reflects the mood of the Athenian people quite well at this 
point, as shown by the trierarchsʼ preparations.  Like his speech to the 
Lacedaemonians discussed above, this speech is a λύσις διαβολῆς that also 
increases its listeners προθυμία.519  And yet Alcibiadesʼ emphasis on desire 
(ἐπιθυμία), profit, and expense also ties his speech into a larger negative 
                                            
518 T 6.15.2: “By far the most enthusiastic advocate of the expedition was, however, 
Alcibiades, son of Clinias, who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent and also 
because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and who was, besides, 
exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and 
personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes” (adapted from 
Crawleyʼs translation). 
519 Hornblower 3 338-339. 
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motifs relating to both the downfall of Alcibiades and the expedition itself.520  
All this verbal inciting culminates in the individual Athenian trierarchs showing 
actual προθυμία as they fit out their ships: καὶ ἐς τὰ μακρότατα 
προθυμηθέντος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου ὅπως αὐτῷ τινὶ εὐπρεπείᾳ τε ἡ ναῦς 
μάλιστα προέξει καὶ τῷ ταχυναυτεῖν.521  In this sentence, the τε…καὶ 
construction shows that the trierarchsʼ προθυμία causes them to strive for 
beauty and utility equally, although the next sentence suggests that the 
Athenian armament may be more imposing in appearance than actual military 
power.522   
After Thucydides shifts to Sicily, he relates a debate between the 
Syracusans Hermocrates and Athenagoras.523  In his speech, Hermocrates 
advances a plan calculated to undercut Athenian morale.  This is the first 
speech of Hermocrates since he warned against enthusiastic Athenian 
interventionism in book four.524  Hermocrates argues that defending Tarentum 
will leave the Athenians in a difficult position that will cause ἀθυμία: 
οἱ δὲ μετʼ ὀλίγων ἐφοδίων ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίᾳ περαιωθέντες 
ἀποροῖεν ἂν κατὰ χωρία ἐρῆμα, καὶ ἢ μένοντες πολιορκοῖντο ἂν ἢ 
πειρώμενοι παραπλεῖν τήν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἀπολείποιεν ἂν 
καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων οὐκ ἂν βέβαια ἔχοντες, εἰ ὑποδέξοιντο, 
ἀθυμοῖεν.525 
                                            
520 Kallet (2001) 36-37; see also 3.4, relating the Atheniansʼ unchecked desires to too much 
reliance on τόλμα. 
521 T 6.31.3: “And each one [of the trierarchs] was zealous to the highest degree that his ship 
stand out with some adornment and in fast sailing.” 
522 Kallet (2001) 48-66 argues by analogy with T 1.10 that the expedition was much more 
powerfully visually than militarily, but Hornblower 3 338-340 counters that a polished and 
formidable appearance suggests efficacy in action rather than contrasting with it. 
523 See sections 4.1 and 3.5 for more on the speech of Athenagoras. 
524 See the previous section for a discussion of that speech. 
525 T 6.34.5: “They, having crossed with few provisions just to give battle, would be hard put in 
desolate places, and would either have to remain and be blockaded, or to try to sail along the 
coast, abandoning the rest of their armament, and losing enthusiasm even more since they 
would not know for certain whether the cities would receive them” (adapted from Crawleyʼs 
translation). 
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Although the Syracusans do not adopt this plan, this speech prepares the 
reader for Hermocratesʼ role in managing Syracusan προθυμία and suggests 
the ability to plan rationally that he later shows.  H. P. Stahl argues that 
Hermocratesʼ plan shows a nuanced understanding of how to challenge the 
Athenians psychologically with the unexpected, and that Thucydides includes 
this kind of literary detail “to draw the readerʼs attention to an unforeseen 
situation, in which the train of events may switch tracks.”526 
Although a bold and decisive Sicilian show of resistance does not 
materialize, events in Sicily still do not play out as the Athenians initially 
expected.  Soon after arriving in Sicily, the Athenian generals lose enthusiasm 
because of the lack of money at Egesta and the intractability of the Rhegians: 
καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ εὐθὺς ἐν ἀθυμίᾳ ἦσαν, ὅτι αὐτοῖς τοῦτό τε 
πρῶτον ἀντεκεκρούκει καὶ οἱ Ῥηγῖνοι οὐκ ἐθελήσαντες 
ξυστρατεύειν, οὓς πρῶτον ἤρξαντο πείθειν καὶ εἰκὸς ἦν μάλιστα, 
Λεοντίνων τε ξυγγενεῖς ὄντας καὶ σφίσιν αἰεὶ ἐπιτηδείους.527 
Since the Egestaeans showed such infectious προθυμία when they were 
inciting the Athenians to come to Sicily, the failure of the promised support to 
materialize undermines the Athenian generalsʼ enthusiasm to a similar degree.  
Furthermore, Thucydides couples his reference to Athenian disappointment 
with an explanation of the device the Egestaeans used to deceive them, and 
this is an example of Thucydidesʼ “technique of using facts to characterize 
human moods and attitudes.”528  When the generals debate how to respond to 
these developments, Nicias advocates making a quick show of Athensʼ 
                                            
526 Stahl (2003) 194-199. 
527 T 6.46.2: “The generals immediately lost enthusiasm at being thus disappointed at the 
outset, and by the refusal to join in the expedition of the Rhegians, the people they had first 
tried to gain and had had most reason to count upon, from their relationship to the Leontines 
and constant friendship for Athens” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
528 Stahl (2003) 184-185. 
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προθυμία for her allies and sailing home: ἐπιδείξαντας μὲν τὴν δύναμιν τῆς 
Ἀθηναίων πόλεως, δηλώσαντας δὲ τὴν ἐς τοὺς φίλους καὶ ξυμμάχους 
προθυμίαν, ἀποπλεῖν οἴκαδε.529  Hornblower notes that Niciasʼ emphasis on 
display so soon after the Egestaeansʼ fraud, also described by ἐπιδείκνυμι, 
has a negative connotation, although the fleetʼs power is more real than the 
Egestaeans money.530  This speech, like that of Hermocrates before the 
Athenians arrive, also leads the reader to consider another purely hypothetical 
end to the expedition, in which it sails back to Athens intact and nominally 
successful but without satifying the Atheniansʼ desire for conquest. 
 The account of the first land battle between the Athenian expedition and 
the Syracusans contains a complex investigation of the προθυμία on both 
sides.  In addition to the important authorial comment at 6.69, Nicias gives a 
speech to encourage προθυμία before the battle, and Thucydides comments 
on the προθυμία of the Athenian subject allies in the battle.  Nicias ends his 
pre-battle exhortation with an appeal to his troops to fight enthusiastically: τῆς 
τε οὖν ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν ἀξίας μνησθέντες ἐπέλθετε τοῖς ἐναντίοις 
προθύμως, καὶ τὴν παροῦσαν ἀνάγκην καὶ ἀπορίαν φοβερωτέραν 
ἡγησάμενοι τῶν πολεμίων.531  Nicias, like other leaders, attempts to 
motivate προθυμία through fear (φόβος), and the Athenian victory shows that 
he is at least partially successful.  The speech, however, is rather grim and 
uninspiring, and Thucydides makes up for its deficiencies by relating the 
different factionsʼ motivations at 6.69.3, so the soldiers themselves counteract 
                                            
529 T 6.47.1: “Demonstrating the power of the city of the Athenians and her enthusiasm for her 
friends and allies to sail away home.” 
530 Hornblower 3 424. 
531 T 6.68.4: “Remembering your own reputation, go against your opponents enthusiastically, 
considering the present necessity and difficulty more terrifying than the enemy.” 
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their commanderʼs “defeatism.”532  After explaining that the Syracusans were 
fighting for safety and freedom, Thucydides relates what the Athenians, the 
Argives, and the other autonous allies were fighting for.  He then switches 
constructions and tells what elicited προθυμία from the Atheniansʼ subject 
allies: 
τὸ δʼ ὑπήκοον τῶν ξυμμάχων μέγιστον μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτίκα 
ἀνελπίστου σωτηρίας, ἢν μὴ κρατῶσι, τὸ πρόθυμον εἶχον, ἔπειτα 
δὲ ἐν παρέργῳ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ξυγκαταστρεψαμένοις ῥᾷον αὐτοῖς 
ὑπακούσεται.533 
Thucydides seems to suggest that the subject allies were mostly more 
enthusiastic because they were more desperate than the other factions in the 
Athenian force.  Although I have shown above that fear or apprehension can 
increase προθυμία, Thucydides is remarkably ambivalent about the victorious 
Atheniansʼ morale.   
 Furthermore, these two descriptions of Athenian προθυμία frame a 
much more positive authorial statement about the Syracusans.  At 6.69.1,534 
Thucydides explains that the Syracusans were not deficient in προθυμία in 
this or any other battles.  Thus, the two instances in the narrative implicitly 
undermine the speech of Nicias.  Although the Athenians win the battle, 
Thucydides emphasizes the enthusiasm of their enemies.  He explains the 
enthusiasm of their allies for reasons that agree with Niciasʼ speech, but the 
omission of προθυμία from the description of the Atheniansʼ and autonomous 
alliesʼ motivations implies that they did not have the same enthusiasm for 
fighting that drove the Syracusans and the subject allies. 
                                            
532 Hornblower 3 472. 
533 T 6.69.3: “The greatest part of the subject allies had enthusiasm first on account of not 
expecting salvation if they were not victorious and only second in the hope that their terms 
would be easier if they joined in the conquering.” 
534 See sections 1.2 and 6.1 for more lengthy discussions of this passage. 
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The Syracusan reaction to the defeat focuses on the role of the 
Camarinaeans, who sent some troops to fight alongside the Syracusans.  The 
Syracusan focus on the deficient enthusiasm of their allies dovetails with 
Thucydidesʼ own claim that the Syracusans themselves did not fall short in 
προθυμία.  Thucydides explains that the Syracusans suspected the 
Camarinaeans of not helping enthusiastically: 
ἦσαν γὰρ ὕποπτοι αὐτοῖς οἱ Καμαριναῖοι μὴ προθύμως σφίσι μήτʼ 
ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην μάχην πέμψαι ἃ ἔπεμψαν, ἔς τε τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ 
οὐκέτι βούλωνται ἀμύνειν, ὁρῶντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῇ μάχῃ 
εὖ πράξαντας, προσχωρῶσι δʼ αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν προτέραν φιλίαν 
πεισθέντες.535 
The Camarinaeans have “symmachial obligations” to both sides, but the 
following debate between Hermocrates and Euphemus does not settle 
anything, and the Camarinaeans do not fully commit to the Syracusan side 
until after the Athenian defeat at Plemmyrium (7.33).536  In his speech at 
Camarina, Hermocrates advocates Sicilian unity against the Athenian threat:  
ὥστε οὐχ ἁθρόους γε ὄντας εἰκὸς ἀθυμεῖν, ἰέναι δὲ ἐς τὴν 
ξυμμαχίαν προθυμότερον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου 
παρεσομένης ὠφελίας, οἳ τῶνδε κρείσσους εἰσὶ τὸ παράπαν τὰ 
πολέμια·537 
Just as argued above, one of the central elements of a functioning alliance is 
προθυμία.  The phrase ἰέναι δὲ ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν προθυμότερον must 
refer to fighting alongside the Syracusans more enthusiastically, not joining an 
alliance with them, since a treaty already exists between Syracuse and 
                                            
535 T 6.75.3: “The Camarinaeans were suspected by them of not enthusiastically sending for 
the first battle what they sent, of no longer wanting to defend them in the future, seeing that 
the Athenians did well in the battle, and of going over to the Athenians in obedience to their 
earlier ties of friendship.” 
536 Hornblower 3 492-493. 
537 6.80.1: “And so it is not likely that we would lack enthusiasm when together, but fight 
alongside us more enthusiastically, especially since aid will come from the Peloponnesians, 
who are in all respects mightier than these men in matters of war.” 
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Camarina.538  Hermocrates is unable to sway the Camarinaeans, but his 
emphasis on help from the Peloponnese is not incorrect.  Thucydides relates 
immediately after the debate that envoys from Syracuse convinced the 
Corinthians to prepare a relief force enthusiastically: καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι εὐθὺς 
ψηφισάμενοι αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι ὥστε πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ ἀμύνειν.539  Thucydides 
also contrasts the active Corinthians and the more deliberate Spartans, who 
do not yet send forces to Sicily.540   
 The Spartans also eventually send help, once Alcibades has convinced 
them and increased their προθυμία.541  Thucydides shows that Alcibiades was 
important in overcoming the Lacedaemoniansʼ deficient προθυμία and in the 
decision to send a Spartan commander.  Furthermore, this commander is able 
to rally general Sicilian προθυμία.  Thucydides explains that the arrival of 
Gylippus and death of one of their kings made the Sicels more enthusiastic for 
Syracuse:  
πέμψειν δέ τινα αὐτοῖς ὑπέσχοντο στρατιὰν οὐ πολλὴν καὶ οἱ 
Γελῷοι καὶ τῶν Σικελῶν τινές, οἳ πολὺ προθυμότερον προσχωρεῖν 
ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν τοῦ τε Ἀρχωνίδου νεωστὶ τεθνηκότος, ὃς τῶν ταύτῃ 
Σικελῶν βασιλεύων τινῶν καὶ ὢν οὐκ ἀδύνατος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις 
φίλος ἦν, καὶ τοῦ Γυλίππου ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος προθύμως 
δοκοῦντος ἥκειν.542 
Thus, the Syracusan allies gain enthusiasm for two reasons: the death of 
Archonidas and their impression of Gylippus as enthusiastic.  This Archonidas 
                                            
538 Hornblower 3 500. 
539 T 6.88.8: “The Corinthians were straightaway the first to vote to send help [to Syracuse] 
with total enthusiasm.” 
540 Hornblower 3 509, comparing the contrast at 2.80 of the Spartans and Corinthians, who are 
described by ξυμπροθυμούμενοι there.  
541 See section 4.2 above. 
542 T 7.1.4: “A few troops were also promised by the Geloans and some of the Sicels, who 
were now ready to join them with much greater enthusiasm, owing to the recent death of 
Archonidas, a powerful Sicel king in that neighborhood and friendly to Athens, and owing also 
to the enthusiasm shown by Gylippus in coming from Lacedaemon” (adapted from Crawleyʼs 
translation). 
 163 
was actually an Athenian proxenos, and Thucydidesʼ vague and belated 
referrence to this previously existing diplomatic tie has the effect of making the 
Athenian invasion look less well planned than it was.543  In addition, Gylippus 
shows and elicits προθυμία, similar to Alcibades and Brasidas, but 
Thucydidesʼ qualification δοκοῦντος is more a matter of emphasizing the 
Siciliansʼ impressions of him than contrasting his apparent προθυμία with an 
actual lack of it.   
 After the Corinthian ships arrive, Thucydides again relates Gylippus to 
προθυμία, as he goes around to encourage the Sicilian cities that were 
unenthusiastic: 
καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν ἐπὶ στρατιάν τε ᾤχετο, καὶ 
ναυτικὴν καὶ πεζὴν ξυλλέξων, καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἅμα προσαξόμενος 
εἴ τις ἢ μὴ πρόθυμος ἦν ἢ παντάπασιν ἔτι ἀφειστήκει τοῦ 
πολέμου.544 
Here again, Thucydides seems to view προθυμία as the quality that alliance 
depends on, since Gylippus is trying to gain the adhesion of both 
unenthusiastic allies and neutrals.  Thus, the arrival of Gylippus and his 
effective leadership are major reasons for the Syracusans and their allies 
having high morale at this point. 
Hermocrates also joins Gylippus in trying to increase Syracusan 
προθυμία.  Hermocrates urged them most of all not to lack the spirit to try their 
hand with ships against the Athenians: 
ξυνανέπειθε δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης οὐχ ἥκιστα, τοῦ ταῖς ναυσὶ μὴ 
ἀθυμεῖν ἐπιχειρῆσαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, λέγων οὐδʼ ἐκείνους 
πάτριον τὴν ἐμπειρίαν οὐδʼ ἀίδιον τῆς θαλάσσης ἔχειν, ἀλλʼ 
                                            
543 Hornblower 3 542-543. 
544 T 7.7.2: “Gylippus had gone to the rest of Sicily for an army, collecting both sea and land 
forces, and also bringing over any of the cities, if they were either not enthusiastic or still 
completely abstained from the war.” 
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ἠπειρώτας μᾶλλον τῶν Συρακοσίων ὄντας καὶ ἀναγκασθέντας ὑπὸ 
Μήδων ναυτικοὺς γενέσθαι.545 
Hornblower argues that Hermocrates gives the right recommendation for the 
wrong reasons; that is, the claim about the Athenians being landsmen is a 
rhetorical exaggeration, but this is the beginning of a process that culminates 
in the Syracusans outdoing the Athenians in sea-fighting.546  This paraphrased 
speech of Hermocrates also picks up the theme of Syracuse matching Athens 
in τόλμα, another crucial element of the Syracusansʼ ultimate triumph.547  
The result of the first sea battle is a considerable setback for the 
Athenians, even though they win the ship-to-ship fighting.  Because of the 
battle, the Athenians lose the fort at Plemmyrium and can no longer bring in 
supplies, causing ἀθυμία to the army:   
μέγιστόν τε καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον ἐκάκωσε τὸ στράτευμα τὸ τῶν 
Ἀθηναίων ἡ τοῦ Πλημμυρίου λῆψις· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι οὐδʼ οἱ ἔσπλοι 
ἀσφαλεῖς ἦσαν τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς τῶν ἐπιτηδείων (οἱ γὰρ Συρακόσιοι 
ναυσὶν αὐτόθι ἐφορμοῦντες ἐκώλυον, καὶ διὰ μάχης ἤδη 
ἐγίγνοντο αἱ ἐσκομιδαί), ἔς τε τἆλλα κατάπληξιν παρέσχε καὶ 
ἀθυμίαν τῷ στρατεύματι.548 
Thucydides pairs κατάπληξις with ἀθυμία to emphasize the serious effects of 
this development on Athenian morale.549  The word κατάπληξις, a stronger 
version of the more common ἔκπληξις, first occurs here in Thucydides and 
                                            
545 T 7.21.3: “With him Hermocrates actively joined in trying to persuade his countrymen not to 
lack the enthusiasm to attack the Athenians at sea, saying that the latter had not inherited 
their naval prowess nor would they retain it for ever; they had been landsmen even to a 
greater degree than the Syracusans, and had only become a maritime power when obliged by 
the Mede” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
546 Hornblower 3 580. 
547 See section 3.5 above. 
548 T 7.24.3: “Indeed the first and chiefest cause of the ruin of the Athenian army was the 
capture of Plemmyrium; even the entrance of the harbor being now no longer safe for carrying 
in provisions, as the Syracusan vessels were stationed there to prevent it, and nothing could 
be brought in without fighting; and generally it caused shock and low morale among the men” 
(adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
549 Contrast 4.14.3, discussed in the next section, where the Lacedaemonians combine 
προθυμία with ἔκπληξις. 
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extant Greek literature.550  Furthermore, by speaking of the capture (λῆψις) of 
Plemmyrium rather than its loss, Thucydides emphasizes increasing 
Syracusan “dynamism.”551 
At this point in the campaign, Athenian morale receives a boost from 
reinforcements.  First, the Athenians convince the Thurians to provide 
assistance, and then Demosthenes arrives from Athens with another 
considerable fleet.  Since the Athenians are struggling, they want to get the 
Thurians to fight alongside them enthusiastically and conclude a formal 
alliance: 
καὶ βουλόμενοι τὴν στρατιὰν αὐτόθι πᾶσαν ἁθροίσαντες εἴ τις 
ὑπελέλειπτο ἐξετάσαι, καὶ τοὺς Θουρίους πεῖσαι σφίσι 
ξυστρατεύειν τε ὡς προθυμότατα καί, ἐπειδήπερ ἐν τούτῳ τύχης 
εἰσί, τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις νομίζειν, 
περιέμενον ἐν τῇ Θουρίᾳ καὶ ἔπρασσον ταῦτα.552 
Here, the Athenians seem to view campaigning together with προθυμία as a 
form of alliance a step below a formal treaty.  The Athenians are at least 
partially successful at getting the enthusiastic help they want.  Although no 
formal alliance is concluded, the Thurians provide troops to Demosthenes at 
7.35.1 and are listed on the Athenian side at 7.57.11.553  Thucydides 
associates the relief force of Demosthenes with ῥώμη,554 but he mentions the 
προθυμία of the Syracusans in response to Demosthenesʼ attack on Epipolae. 
Although the reinforcements greatly encourage the Athenians and dismay the 
                                            
550 Hornblower 3 583-584. 
551 Ibid. 
552 T 7.33.6: “And accordingly they remained there to muster and review the whole army, to 
see if any had been left behind, and to prevail upon the Thurians to join them with as much 
enthusiasm as possible in their expedition, and in the circumstances in which they found 
themselves to conclude a defensive and offensive alliance with the Athenians” (adapted from 
Crawleyʼs translation). 
553 Hornblower 3 609. 
554 See section 5.2 for more on Demosthenesʼ force and ῥώμη, as well as the effects on both 
sidesʼ morale of the daring assault on Epipolae. 
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Syracusans, Thucydides uses the προθυμία motif to show that they do not 
really change the trajectory of either sideʼs morale.  The Syracusan guards on 
Epipolae respond quickly but are routed: οἱ δʼ ἐβοήθουν τʼ εὐθύς, καὶ 
αὐτοῖς ὁ Δημοσθένης καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐντυχόντες ἀμυνομένους 
προθύμως ἔτρεψαν.555  Like Thucydidesʼ statement about the first 
Syracusans defeat at 6.69, although much less emphatically, this emphasis on 
the defeated Syracusansʼ προθυμία prepares the reader to understand their 
ultimate victory.  
The subsequent Athenian defeat at sea causes ἀθυμία for them, and 
Thucydidesʼ excursus on morale here also explains that the Athenians had 
trouble fighting a city so similar to their own.556  Thucydides that their decisive 
loss at sea caused a complete loss of enthusiasm among the Athenians:  
Γεγενημένης δὲ τῆς νίκης τοῖς Συρακοσίοις λαμπρᾶς ἤδη καὶ τοῦ 
ναυτικοῦ (πρότερον μὲν γὰρ ἐφοβοῦντο τὰς μετὰ τοῦ 
Δημοσθένους ναῦς ἐπελθούσας) οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν παντὶ δὴ 
ἀθυμίας ἦσαν καὶ ὁ παράλογος αὐτοῖς μέγας ἦν, πολὺ δὲ μείζων 
ἔτι τῆς στρατείας ὁ μετάμελος.557 
Thus, the defeat at sea despite the reinforcements under Demosthenes lowers 
Athenian morale even more than before Demosthenes arrived.  Stahl argues 
that this passage describes the Athenian mood as the reverse of what is was 
when they decided to send the expedition at 6.24: ἔρως then has become 
μετάμελος now, and παράλογος here answers ignorance there.558  
                                            
555 T 7.43.5: “[The Syracusan garrison] rushed to assist, and Demosthenes and the Athenians 
fell upon and routed them, although they resisted enthusiastically.” 
556 Hornblower 3 648-650, arguing that πόλεσι must refer especially to Syracuse, but that 
Thucydides also wants to highlight the ineffectiveness of the Athenian strategy of regime 
change. 
557 T 7.55.1: “The Syracusans had now gained a decisive victory at sea, where until now they 
had feared the reinforcement brought by Demosthenes, and complete, in consequence, was 
the lack of enthusiasm of the Athenians, and great their disappointment, and greater still their 
regret for having come on the expedition” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
558 Stahl (2003) 185. 
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Furthermore, Thucydidesʼ comments on the Atheniansʼ difficulty fighting the 
Syracusans almost quote Niciasʼ speech at 6.20, so the course of events in 
book seven is now elucidating speeches from the beginning of book six.559 
The προθυμία of both sides is also a major theme of the interlaced 
speech and narrative that relate the climactic battle in the Great Harbor.  The 
complex of speeches continues an almost exclusive oratorical focus on Nicias 
in book seven, at least on the Athenian side.560  In the speeches on both 
sides, the more general advice contains arguments about experience and 
προθυμία.  Thucydides says the first direct speech was motivated by the low 
morale after the defeat at sea:  
ὁρῶν τοὺς στρατιώτας τῷ τε παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς πολὺ ταῖς ναυσὶ 
κρατηθῆναι ἀθυμοῦντας καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων σπάνιν ὡς 
τάχιστα βουλομένους διακινδυνεύειν.561  
During the actual speech, Nicias specifically addresses the menʼs ἀθυμία, 
arguing that they are acting like very inexperienced men who cannot overcome 
a single defeat: 
ἀθυμεῖν δὲ οὐ χρὴ οὐδὲ πάσχειν ὅπερ οἱ ἀπειρότατοι τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων, οἳ τοῖς πρώτοις ἀγῶσι σφαλέντες ἔπειτα διὰ παντὸς 
τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ φόβου ὁμοίαν ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἔχουσιν.562 
Nicias then tells his men that they are too experienced to react this way to a 
single defeat, however unexpected.  Thucydidesʼ comment about προθυμία at 
7.70.3 shows this was at least partially successful at increasing Athenian 
enthusiasm, but the Athenians still lose even with a numerical advantage.  
                                            
559 Stahl (2003) 185-186. 
560 Hornblower 3 673. 
561 T 7.60.5: “Seeing the soldiers unenthusiastic because of the quite unexpected defeat at 
sea and wanting to roll the dice as quickly as possible because of the scarcity of the 
provisions.” 
562 T 7.61.2: “Do not be unenthusiastic and experience what the least experienced men do, 
who stumble in their first matches and then completely have a fearful expectation like their 
misfortunes.” 
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Nicias sees that his men are dispirited and tries to talk them out of it, but 
Gylippus sees his men already enthusiastic and needs only to keep their 
momentum going.   
 As Gylippus argues, all the recent battles have given him good reason 
to believe Syracusan momentum will continue, and so it does.  Echoing the 
opening of Niciasʼ speech with a reference to the coming ἀγών, Gylippus and 
the generals say that the men listening to them are already acting with 
προθυμία: 
Ὅτι μὲν καλὰ τὰ προειργασμένα καὶ ὑπὲρ καλῶν τῶν μελλόντων ὁ 
ἀγὼν ἔσται, ὦ Συρακόσιοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, οἵ τε πολλοὶ δοκεῖτε ἡμῖν 
εἰδέναι (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως αὐτῶν προθύμως ἀντελάβεσθε), καὶ 
εἴ τις μὴ ἐπὶ ὅσον δεῖ ᾔσθηται, σημανοῦμεν.563 
Thus, the oration itself is probably not necessary, since the Syracusans are 
currently acting with προθυμία.  Not only do the speakers claim that the 
Syracusans are and have been showing προθυμία, they also argue that the 
Syracusans will have more προθυμία in the coming battle than before.  
Because the Syracusans have now added skill to their daring, their greater 
expectations will generate more enthusiasm:  
ἡμῶν δὲ τό τε ὑπάρχον πρότερον, ᾧπερ καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονες ἔτι 
ὄντες ἀπετολμήσαμεν, βεβαιότερον νῦν, καὶ τῆς δοκήσεως 
προσγεγενημένης αὐτῷ, τὸ κρατίστους εἶναι εἰ τοὺς κρατίστους 
ἐνικήσαμεν, διπλασία ἑκάστου ἡ ἐλπίς· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ πρὸς τὰς 
ἐπιχειρήσεις ἡ μεγίστη ἐλπὶς μεγίστην καὶ τὴν προθυμίαν 
παρέχεται.564 
                                            
563 T 7.66.1: “ʻSyracusans and allies, the glorious character of our past achievements and the 
no less glorious results at issue in the coming battle are, we think, understood by most of you, 
or you would never have thrown yourselves so enthusiastically into the struggle; and if there 
be any one not as fully aware of the facts as he ought to be, we will declare them to him” 
(adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
564 T 7.67.1: “With us it is different. The original estimate of ourselves which gave us daring 
when we still lacked skill has been strengthened, while the conviction added to it that we must 
be the best seamen of the time, if we have conquered the best, has given a double measure 
of hope to every man among us; and, for the most part, where there is the greatest hope, 
there is also the greatest enthusiasm for action” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
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This highly rhetorical sentence, with the word διπλασία reflected in the actual 
doubling of κρατίστους and μεγίστη,565 recalls Thucydidesʼ statement about 
Syracusan morale at 6.69.1.  The previous chapter explained how this speech 
picks up the themes of τόλμα and ἐπιστήμη from 6.69,566 and Gylippusʼ 
argument about προθυμία works in a similar way.  Not only are the 
Syracusans already showing προθυμία, but their recent victory over the 
mighty Athenians should increase their enthusiasm.  Thucydidesʼ own analysis 
of Syracusan morale in book six is echoed and answered by this speech, the 
arguments of which are confirmed by the subsequent narrative.567 
Thucydidesʼ description of the battle contains a greater concentration of 
rhetorical techniques, like the anaphora of πολλὴ, than is typical for 
Thucydides, marking this as a particularly decisive moment.568  In the climactic 
battle in the Great Harbor, Thucydides says the sailors on both sides show 
great enthusiasm:  
πολλὴ μὲν γὰρ ἑκατέροις προθυμία ἀπὸ τῶν ναυτῶν ἐς τὸ ἐπιπλεῖν 
ὁπότε κελευσθείη ἐγίγνετο, πολλὴ δὲ ἡ ἀντιτέχνησις τῶν 
κυβερνητῶν καὶ ἀγωνισμὸς πρὸς ἀλλήλους·569 
In addition to Thucydidesʼ own words, he records in indirect speech shouts of 
the boatswains and generals on both sides.  In a kind of chiastic structure, the 
Athenian boatswains, whose words are recorded first, try to elicit enthusiasm 
from their men; then, the Syracusan generals, whose words are reported 
fourth, reevaluate the Atheniansʼ προθυμία as simply desire for flight.  On the 
Athenian side, the encouragement calls for fighting enthusiastically to save the 
                                            
565 Hornblower 3 686. 
566 See section 3.5 above. 
567 Romilly (1956) 160-161. 
568 Hornblower 3 694. 
569 T 7.70.3: “Great was the enthusiasm from the rowers on each side to row where they were 
bid, and great was the rivalry in skill and contention with one another of the helmsmen.” 
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homeland: τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις βιάζεσθαί τε τὸν ἔκπλουν ἐπιβοῶντες καὶ 
περὶ τῆς ἐς τὴν πατρίδα σωτηρίας νῦν, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὖθις, προθύμως 
ἀντιλαβέσθαι.570  Although these Athenians are ultimately fighting to secure 
their city, it is actually the Syracusans who are fighting more immediately to 
protect their homes.  Furthermore, the encouragement for the Syracusans 
uses the Atheniansʼ enthusiasm to shame any wavering Syracusan: οἱ δὲ 
Συρακόσιοι εἰ οὓς σαφῶς ἴσασι προθυμουμένους Ἀθηναίους παντὶ 
τρόπῳ διαφυγεῖν, τούτους αὐτοὶ φεύγοντας φεύγουσιν.571  Thucydidesʼ 
inclusion of these statements refines his own claim about προθυμία in the 
battle, and the juxtaposition of these two competing shouts prepares the 
reader for the Atheniansʼ defeat.  Despite the enthusiasm on both sides, the 
Syracusans are fighting for their homeland, and the Athenians are desperate 
to escape. 
After this defeat, Athenian morale cannot recover, although Nicias tries 
to turn it around.  Nicias again sees the ἀθυμία of his men and 
enthusiastically tries to encourage them.  Nicias has been a feckless 
commander up to now, but Thucydides depicts him as more active in the final 
phase of the campaign.  When he sees the troopsʼ low morale, προθυμία 
drives Niciasʼ exhortation:  
Ὁρῶν δὲ ὁ Νικίας τὸ στράτευμα ἀθυμοῦν καὶ ἐν μεγάλῃ μεταβολῇ 
ὄν, ἐπιπαριὼν ὡς ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἐθάρσυνέ τε καὶ 
παρεμυθεῖτο, βοῇ τε χρώμενος ἔτι μᾶλλον ἑκάστοις καθʼ οὓς 
                                            
570 T 7.70.7: “Calling on the Athenians to force passage out and enthusiastically grab hold of 
salvation for their homeland now, if ever again.” 
571 T 7.70.8: “The Syracusan generals [asked anyone they saw wavering] if they were 
themselves fleeing these fleeing Athenians, whom they well knew were enthusiastic in every 
way to escape.” 
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γίγνοιτο ὑπὸ προθυμίας καὶ βουλόμενος ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον 
γεγωνίσκων ὠφελεῖν τι.572 
The contrast of the demoralized troops and enthusiastic shines a more 
positive light on Nicias, but his speech is unimaginative and unconvincingly 
draws on traditional ideas of piety and justice.573  Soon after, the Athenians 
lose enthusiasm yet again, this time because of a thunderstorm:  
ἔτυχον δὲ καὶ βρονταί τινες ἅμα γενόμεναι καὶ ὕδωρ, οἷα τοῦ 
ἔτους πρὸς μετόπωρον ἤδη ὄντος φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι· ἀφʼ ὧν οἱ 
Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον ἔτι ἠθύμουν καὶ ἐνόμιζον ἐπὶ τῷ σφετέρῳ 
ὀλέθρῳ καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γίγνεσθαι.574  
Since Thucydides claims that this sort of storm was typical for the time of year, 
the Atheniansʼ reaction was clearly irrational.  This contrasts with 6.70, where 
only the less experienced men are scared by the thunder; here, everyone on 
the Athenian side is affected by a kind of religious foreboding.575  The contrast 
confirms the Atheniansʼ destruction, since it shows that Niciasʼ argument at 
7.61 about experience still saving the Athenians no longer has any validity.  
Even the Atheniansʼ great experience and skill cannot steady their morale 
after such great and unexpected defeats at the hands of the Syracusans. 
 
4.5 Morale at Pylos: προθυμία and ῥώμη 
 Thucydidesʼ account of the campaign at Pylos contains a number of 
important assessments of both sidesʼ morale.  Table 4.5 shows that the  
                                            
572 T 7.76.1: “Nicias seeing the army unenthusiastic and greatly altered, passed along the 
ranks and encouraged and comforted them as far as was possible under the circumstances, 
raising his voice still higher and higher as he went from one company to another in his 
enthusiasm, and wishing that the benefit of his words might reach as many as possible” 
(adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
573 Connor (1984) 201-202. 
574 T 7.79.3: “Meanwhile occurred some claps of thunder and rain, as often happens towards 
autumn, which made the Athenians still more unenthusiastic, who thought all these things to 
be omens of their approaching ruin” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
575 Horblower 3 724-725. 
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Table 4.5 – Προθυμία and ῥώμη at Pylos 
Athenians and Allies Peloponnesians and Allies 
4.9.2 – Demosthenes calculates desperation 
will cause his picked troops to be more 
enthusiastic (προθυμήσεσθαι) 
 
 4.11.3 – The Athenians were defending 
themselves from both sides, land and sea; 
and the Lacedaemonians, divided into small 
groups of ships, since they could not 
approach with many, and relieving each other 
in turn made their attack, using all their 
enthusiasm and cheering each other on in the 
hope of breaking through and taking the wall 
(προθυμίᾳ) 
 4.12.2 – The other Lacedaemonians were 
enthusiastic, but they were unable to 
disembark owing to the difficulty of the terrain 
and because the Athenians stood their 
ground and did not give way 
(προυθυμοῦντο) 
 4.14.3 – The confusion was great, especially 
since the two sides exchanged their usual 
manner of naval fighting. The 
Lacedaemonians virtually fought a sea battle 
from the land because of their enthusiasm 
and shock, and the Athenians were fighting a 
land battle from the ships when they were 
winning and wanted to capitalize on their 
present fortune as much as possible 
(προθυμίας) 
4.26.4 – Athenian lose enthusiasm because 
an unexpectedly long amount of time passes 
without surrender from those besieged 
without supplies on the island (ἀθυμίαν) 
 
4.29.3-4 – Demosthenes gains ῥώμη after 
the fire, since the burning of the brush cover 
improves the Atheniansʼ tactical position 
(ῥώμην) 
 
4.36.2 – Successful sneak attack against the 
Spartans instills ῥώμη in the Athenian and 
allied troops (ἐπέρρωσεν) 
 
Spartans at Pylos have no shortage of προθυμία, but the Athenians still 
prevail because they have ῥώμη.  Although Thucydides identifies προθυμία 
as one of the main qualities necessary for success in war,576 it is not enough 
                                            
576 See above, chapter 1.2. 
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for the Spartans at Pylos; the desire and willingness to fight cannot alone bring 
victory.  Huart identifies προθυμία as a near synonym of ῥώμη.577 The linkage 
between the two concepts appears most clearly in their verbal forms, and the 
LSJ even gives προθυμέομαι as a synonym of ἕρρωμαι.578  Thucydides, 
however, often uses the words with a subtle distinction, with προθυμία 
meaning only willingness or eagerness to fight and ῥώμη signifying 
confidence based on actual material or circumstantial advantage.  One could 
describe ῥώμη as προθυμία based on concrete reasons for expecting victory. 
The campaign at Pylos offers an opportunity to distinguish between προθυμία 
and ῥώμη, two important psychological terms that can both overlap 
significantly with the English concept of morale. 
Here ῥώμη characterizes the Athenians in contrast to the 
Lacedaemonians, who show much προθυμία but ultimately fail.  Thucydidesʼ 
emphasizes the importance of the unexpected Athenian triumph here by 
explicitly highlighting a number of reversals, such as the Athenians on land 
fighting the Lacedaemonians on ships and the Spartans surrendering on the 
island rather than fighting to the death like at Thermopylae.579  The explicit 
comparison of the Spartansʼ glorious death at Thermopylae to their surrender 
on Sphacteria helps explain why the surrender was so shocking to the rest of 
the Greeks.580  Another element of reversal in Thucydidesʼ description is his 
repeated attribution of προθυμία to the Spartans.  As shown above, the 
Athenians are linked with προθυμία early in the Histories, but the Spartans 
show this quality more at Pylos, even though it does not enable them to win 
                                            
577 Huart (1968) 417 n 3. 
578 LSJ, s.v. ῥώννυμι II 2. 
579 Reversal of the land/sea antithesis: T 4.12.3, 4.14.3; comparison to Thermopylae: 4.36.3. 
580 Rood (1998) 37-39. 
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and even implicitly hinders them in one case.  In fact, this whole campaign, 
based on Demosthenesʼ tactic of epiteichismos, or “forward-basing,” shows 
clearly how different the Peloponnesian War was from the kind of warfare 
practiced in the Archaic and early Classical periods.581 
Initially, Thucydides describes both Athenian and Lacedaemonian 
morale in terms of προθυμία. In the early phase of the campaign, 
Demosthenes manipulates some enthusiasm out of his troops because of their 
precarious position, but the Spartans have much more enthusiasm because 
they are defending their own territory. The first mention of Athenian προθυμία 
in this episode describes troops whom Demosthenes tries to force into 
showing προθυμία.  He orders a small number of picked troops to guard a 
poorly fortified area, calculating that their vulnerability will increase their 
enthusiasm:  
αὐτὸς δὲ ἀπολεξάμενος ἐκ πάντων ἑξήκοντα ὁπλίτας καὶ τοξότας 
ὀλίγους ἐχώρει ἔξω τοῦ τείχους ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, ᾗ μάλιστα 
ἐκείνους προσεδέχετο πειράσειν ἀποβαίνειν, ἐς χωρία μὲν χαλεπὰ 
καὶ πετρώδη πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τετραμμένα, σφίσι δὲ τοῦ τείχους 
ταύτῃ ἀσθενεστάτου ὄντος ἐσβιάσασθαι αὐτοὺς ἡγεῖτο 
προθυμήσεσθαι·582 
This is the first mention of προθυμία in the Pylos episode and the only 
referring to the Athenians, who were at their weakest at this point, since the 
initial incursion under Demosthenes is not extensively planned or supplied.  
Later, once the tactical situation changes dramatically from the fire and 
reinforcements, the Athenian leadership and then the men themselves gain 
ῥώμη. 
                                            
581 Hanson (2005) 111. 
582 T 4.9.2: “He himself chose from all the men sixty hoplites and some bowmen and went 
outside the wall to the sea, where he most expected the enemy to try to disembark, a difficult 
and rocky place facing the open sea; but, since the wall was weakest there, he thought his 
men would be compelled to show enthusiasm.” 
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 The theme of Spartan προθυμία at Pylos first appears in their initial 
attack on the Athenian fortification, when they act just as Demosthenes 
expects and fail to force a landing:  
καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἔκ τε γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης 
ἠμύνοντο· οἱ δὲ κατʼ ὀλίγας ναῦς διελόμενοι, διότι οὐκ ἦν πλέοσι 
προσσχεῖν, καὶ ἀναπαύοντες ἐν τῷ μέρει τοὺς ἐπίπλους 
ἐποιοῦντο, προθυμίᾳ τε πάσῃ χρώμενοι καὶ παρακελευσμῷ, εἴ πως 
ὠσάμενοι ἕλοιεν τὸ τείχισμα.583 
Thucydides account here shows the corollary to Demosthenesʼ argument in 
4.10 that the Athenian experience (ἐμπειρία) of naval landings will give them 
an advantage over the Spartans; that is, the Spartans inexperience causes 
them to make grave tactical errors in the amphibious assault.584  Not only do 
the Spartans attack exactly where Demosthenes expects, but they also give 
up their numerical advantage by breaking into small groups.  After including a 
detailed account of the noteworthy but ultimately futile actions of Brasidas in 
the landing, Thucydides reiterates the difficulties that the Lacedaemonians 
faced despite their enthusiasm for defending their territory: οἱ δʼ ἄλλοι 
προυθυμοῦντο μέν, ἀδύνατοι δʼ ἦσαν ἀποβῆναι τῶν τε χωρίων 
χαλεπότητι καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων μενόντων καὶ οὐδὲν ὑποχωρούντων.585 
Although Thucydides does not attribute ἀνδρεία to the Athenian defenders 
here, they do show what was termed ʻpassive courageʼ above.  The Athenians 
do not have the same reputation for hoplite valor as the Spartans, but their 
                                            
583 T 4.11.3: “The Athenians had thus to defend themselves on both sides, from the land and 
from the sea; the enemy rowing up in small detachments, the one relieving the other—it being 
impossible for many to bring to at once—and showing great enthusiasm and cheering each 
other on, in the endeavor to force a passage and to take the fortification” (adapted from 
Crawleyʼs translation). 
584 Lazenby (2004) 72 notes that this is one of the rare occasions in ancient history when a 
shoreline was defended 
585 T. 4.12.2: “The others had enthusiasm but were unable to disembark owing to the difficulty 
of the terrain and because the Athenians stood their ground and did not give an inch.” 
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experience in shore fighting enables them to triumph over the utterly 
inexperienced Spartan marines. 
As the battle turns against the Spartans, προθυμία even implicitly 
hinders the Spartans, since Thucydides explains that προθυμία and ἔκπληξις 
caused the other Spartan contingent to fight a land battle from the sea:  
ἐγένετό τε ὁ θόρυβος μέγας καὶ ἀντηλλαγμένου τοῦ ἑκατέρων 
τρόπου περὶ τὰς ναῦς· οἵ τε γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπὸ προθυμίας καὶ 
ἐκπλήξεως ὡς εἰπεῖν ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ ἐκ γῆς ἐναυμάχουν, οἵ τε 
Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦντες καὶ βουλόμενοι τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ ὡς ἐπὶ 
πλεῖστον ἐπεξελθεῖν ἀπὸ νεῶν ἐπεζομάχουν.586 
By joining προθυμία with the negative quality ἔκπληξις,587 Thucydides shows 
that προθυμία actually caused the Lacedaemonian soldiers to make a grave 
mistake by running into the sea to defend their ships.  Thematically, 
Thucydidesʼ repeated reversal of the Spartan-land/Athenian-sea antithesis 
emphasizes the shocking Athenian victory in this phase of the campaign.  No 
one, including the other Athenian commanders, thought Demosthenes could 
hold this beachhead in Messenia.588  From a practical perspective, however, 
the Spartansʼ inability to dislodge the Athenians makes perfect sense; they 
simply did not have the necessary experience and knowledge to perform well 
in this type of warfare, but Demosthenes says explicitly and Thucydides shows 
implicitly that the Athenians were mentally well equipped for this kind of war. 
                                            
586 T 4.14.3: “Great was the melee, and quite in contradiction to the naval tactics usual to the 
two combatants; the Lacedaemonians in their excitement and dismay being actually engaged 
in a sea-fight on land, while the victorious Athenians, in their eagerness to push their success 
as far as possible, were carrying on a land-fight from their ships” (tr. Crawley). 
587 See Desmond (2006) 361, who identifies ἔκπληξις as “the most vehement [of Thucydidesʼ 
words for fear] – ʻterror, consternation, panicʼ – with the implication of being beside oneself, 
struck out of oneʼs wits with fear.” 
588 Roisman (1993) 33-34 argues that Demosthenes did not disclose his plan even to 
Eurymedon and Sophocles because of the great opposition such a novel strategy would have 
caused. 
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And yet the Athenian troopsʼ reasoning also undermines their morale.  
There are a number of factors that cause difficulty for the Athenians as the 
battle turns into a protracted siege, including lack of food and water,589 but 
Thucydides describes the biggest blow to their morale in terms of ἀθυμία.  
When the men trapped on the island hold out longer than expected, the 
Athenians become discouraged:  
ἀθυμίαν τε πλείστην ὁ χρόνος παρεῖχε παρὰ λόγον ἐπιγιγνόμενος, 
οὓς ᾤοντο ἡμερῶν ὀλίγων ἐκπολιορκήσειν ἐν νήσῳ τε ἐρήμῃ καὶ 
ὕδατι ἁλμυρῷ χρωμένους.590  
This is the last time in his account of the affair at Pylos that Thucydides 
describes either sideʼs morale in terms of προθυμία or ἀθυμία.  Looking only 
at προθυμία makes it seem like the Lacedaemonians have better morale than 
the Athenians in this campaign, but it actually ends in a colossal 
Lacedaemonian defeat.  Therefore, adding ῥώμη is necessary to understand 
morale in this episode.  Plus, the changes in moral advantage add suspense 
and vividness to the account of the important Pylos campaign. 
The second episode of the Pylos campaign builds on the same themes, 
but here Thucydides emphasizes Athenian ῥώμη rather than προθυμία.  
Although the initial Athenian forces under Demosthenes were no longer 
enthusiastic, the reinforcements under Cleon represent a serious commitment 
of mental and material resources by the Athenians.  And despite the feelings 
of his men before Cleonʼs arrival, Demosthenes has gained confidence from 
the recent fire on Sphacteria:  
τὸν δὲ Δημοσθένη προσέλαβε πυνθανόμενος τὴν ἀπόβασιν αὐτὸν 
ἐς τὴν νῆσον διανοεῖσθαι. οἱ γὰρ στρατιῶται κακοπαθοῦντες τοῦ 
                                            
589 T 4.26.1-3. 
590 4.26.4: “And the time continuing to pass contrary to their calculation caused the greatest 
loss of enthusiasm, since they thought they would reduce men on a desert island using 
brackish water by siege in a few days.” 
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χωρίου τῇ ἀπορίᾳ καὶ μᾶλλον πολιορκούμενοι ἢ πολιορκοῦντες 
ὥρμηντο διακινδυνεῦσαι. καὶ αὐτῷ ἔτι ῥώμην καὶ ἡ νῆσος 
ἐμπρησθεῖσα παρέσχεν.591 
Just like at 7.18.2-3 concerning Spartan ῥώμη, Thucydides relates at length 
the reasons for Demosthenes possessing ῥώμη in 4.29.3-4, and in both 
passages ῥώμη is based on a reasoned calculation of tactical superiority.  
Demosthenes knows that the fire will prevent another disaster like the one he 
suffered in the wooded areas of Aetolia,592 and the lack of cover allows a 
much better estimation of the enemiesʼ true strength and position. 
In the final assault against the Lacedaemonian outpost on Sphacteria, 
the Athenian and their allies defeat the Spartan hoplites because the light 
troopsʼ ranged tactics enable them to wear down the Spartan hoplites with 
minimal losses.593  An unnamed Messenian general hands final victory to the 
Athenians with a successful sneak attack that Thucydides compares to 
Thermopylae:594  
λαβὼν δὲ ἃ ᾐτήσατο, ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς ὁρμήσας ὥστε μὴ ἰδεῖν 
ἐκείνους, κατὰ τὸ αἰεὶ παρεῖκον τοῦ κρημνώδους τῆς νήσου 
προσβαίνων, καὶ ᾗ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι χωρίου ἰσχύι πιστεύσαντες 
οὐκ ἐφύλασσον, χαλεπῶς τε καὶ μόλις περιελθὼν ἔλαθε, καὶ ἐπὶ 
τοῦ μετεώρου ἐξαπίνης ἀναφανεὶς κατὰ νώτου αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν 
τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ ἐξέπληξε, τοὺς δὲ ἃ προσεδέχοντο ἰδόντας πολλῷ 
μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωσεν.595 
                                            
591 T 4.29.2: “His choice fell upon Demosthenes because he heard that he was contemplating 
a descent on the island; the soldiers distressed by the difficulties of the position, and rather 
besieged than besiegers, being eager to fight it out, while the firing of the island had raised the 
morale of the general even more” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
592 See Roisman (1993) 37-38, who argues that Demosthenes did not necessarily plan the fire 
on Sphacteria because of his experience of the fire in Aetolia, since the two fires did not serve 
the same function; indeed, the fire on Sphacteria before his assault allowed Demosthenes to 
plan at leisure with detailed knowledge of the terrain and the Spartan troops. 
593 Lazenby (2004) 78, Roisman (1993) 39. 
594 Hornblower 2 191-192. 
595 T 4.36.2: “Upon receiving what he asked for, he started from a point out of sight in order 
not to be seen by the enemy, and creeping on wherever the precipices of the island permitted, 
and where the Lacedaemonians, trusting to the strength of the ground, kept no guard, 
succeeded after the greatest difficulty in getting round without their seeing him, and suddenly 
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The sudden surprise attack causes ἔκπληξις for the Lacedaemonians, but 
gives ῥώμη to the Athenians and their allies.  Thucydides deliberately 
contrasts the unexpected causing terror to the Lacedaemonians and what is 
expected raising the morale of the Athenians and their allies.  In fact, he says 
that the Atheniansʼ morale increased much more than the Lacedaemoniansʼ 
fell. 
 Although Thucydides only uses ῥώμη related words twice in his 
description of the Pylos campaign, they appear at crucial moments.  These 
two occurrences, when Demosthenes is encouraged to undertake an assault 
on the island and when the surprise rear attack of the Messenians encourages 
the waiting Athenian forces, show that ῥώμη is an important psychological 
descriptor in Thucydidesʼ account of the fighting on Sphacteria.  Thucydides 
emphasizes the Lacedaemoniansʼ προθυμία in a number of phases of the 
Pylos campaign, but the Atheniansʼ possession of ῥώμη shows that they have 
not only enthusiasm for fighting but also a rational expectation of success.  
Demosthenes first gains ῥώμη when the fire on the island greatly improves 
the tactical situation for the Athenians.  Once the remaining Spartan troops are 
suffering a surprise attack from the rear, the Athenians have clear tactical and 
mental superiority.  Thucydidesʼ shift from describing morale in terms of 
προθυμία to ῥώμη shows that the Athenians enjoy a clear advantage in the 
later part of the campaign and foreshadows their resounding victory.  Unlike 
the Lacedaemoniansʼ early προθυμία, which does not assure their victory, the 
Atheniansʼ ῥώμη is decisive. 
 
                                            
appeared on the high grounding their rear, causing panic in the surprised enemy and raising 
the morale of his expectant friends” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Thucydidesʼ use of the term προθυμία and its variants overlaps 
significantly with the English concept of morale.  Like morale, προθυμία is one 
of the key elements of a successful military effort, and both can also play an 
important role in nonmilitary contexts.  And yet, the ability of fear both to raise 
and lower προθυμία suggests that it is more emotional than rational, and 
προθυμία can sometimes be excessive or harmful.  In fact, a complete lack or 
great excess of προθυμία causes a city to become dysfunctional, like during 
the plague or times of stasis.  On the other hand, a successful alliance 
depends on the προθυμία of its member states, and προθυμία is even 
stipulated in the one treaty that Thucydides records verbatim.  Thucydides 
also shows that generals have a great effect on προθυμία both actively and 
passively, and they can even turn it toward peace in the right circumstances.  
Speakers have limited success by referring to past προθυμία, since the 
persuasive power of the προθυμία that one has shown decreases over time.  
Most significantly, morale can be tracked in the Sicilian Expedition by looking 
at rising and falling προθυμία (see table 4.4, above), and the relationship of 
the λόγοι to the ἔργα highlights the effective leadership of Hermocrates and 
Gylippus, the unsuccessful generalship of Nicias, and especially the major 
effects on both sidesʼ morale of Alcibiadesʼ defection.  Furthermore, the 
Syracusans combine τόλμα and προθυμία throughout their fight against the 
Athenians, just like the Athenians claim to have done against the Persians 
(1.74.2).  Thus, προθυμία is an important strand in Thucydidesʼ complex 
analysis of morale throughtout the war and especially in Sicily.  And yet, 
understanding Thucydidesʼ account of morale completely also requires an 
investigation of ῥώμη. 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
A NEW VOCABULARY FOR MORALE: RHOME 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 Although Thucydides does not have a single word that corresponds to 
English ʻmorale,ʼ the term ῥώμη often comes close in meaning to English ʻhigh 
morale.ʼ  Thucydides innovatively uses ῥώμη, which originally referred to 
bodily power, to describe the psychological strength and military force of the 
various states and leaders involved in the Peloponnesian War.  Unlike earlier 
authors, such as Xenophanes and Aeschylus, who refer to ῥώμη as the 
physical in contrast to the mental, Thucydidean ῥώμη often depends on 
reason as well as material power.  Although Euripides innovates by using 
ῥώμη to refer to the impersonal force of wind and battle, Thucydides considers 
ῥώμη a purely human characteristic.  In Thucydidesʼ Histories, one side or the 
other typically has the edge in ῥώμη, so tracking this concept reveals 
Thucydidesʼ analysis of the psychological and material advantages enjoyed by 
different cities.  Thucydides emphasizes the possession or lack of ῥώμη at 
pivotal moments in the war, such as the episode at Pylos, Athensʼ decision to 
negotiate the Peace of Nicias, the departure and failure of the Sicilian 
Expedition, and Athensʼ recovery in book eight (see Table 5.1).  In addition, 
the way Thucydides deploys the terminology in direct and indirect speech 
adds to his characterization of political and military leaders.  The importance of 
ῥώμη to Thucydidesʼ psychology of war is most clear in his account of the 
Sicilian Expedition, where the author carefully uses the term in narrative and 
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speeches to explore how and why so great an Athenian force was so utterly 
destroyed.   
 
 
Table 5.1 – ῾Ρώμη-ῥώννυμι in Thucydides 
In reference to Athenians and allies In reference to Peloponnesians and allies 
 1.49.3 – this sea-battle was more a matter 
of spirit and power than skill (ῥώμῃ) 
2.8.1 & 2.8.4 – feeling on both sides at the 
beginning of the war (ἔρρωντο, ἔρρωτο) 
2.8.1 & 2.8.4 – feeling on both sides at the 
beginning of the war (ἔρρωντο, ἔρρωτο) 
2.43.6 – Periclesʼ Funeral Oration: going soft is 
worse than dying with power and common hope 
(ῥώμης) 
 
3.6.1 – the Athenians are encouraged by the 
stillness of the Mytilenaeans and assemble their 
allies (ἐπιρρωσθέντες) 
 
 3.16.1 – most of the Peloponnesian allies 
dally because of the harvest and their 
weakness at campaigning (ἀρρωστίᾳ) 
4.18.3 – the Peloponnesians argue that their 
current power should not lead the Athenians to 
think that fortune will always be with them 
(ῥώμην) 
 
4.29.2 – Demosthenes gains further confidence 
from Sphacteria being burned (ῥώμην)  
4.36.2 – the Athenians gain confidence when 
they see their unit attacking the Spartans from 
behind (ἐπέρρωσεν) 
 
4.72.1 – the Boeotians gain confidence when 
Brasidas appears (ἐρρώσθησαν)  
5.14.1 – the Athenians begin to negotiate for 
peace because they no longer have a firm 
expectation of power (ῥώμης) 
 
6.17.8 – Alcibiades argues that Lacedaemonian 
strength is limited to land (ἔρρωνται)  
6.31.1 – the power they see encourages the 
Athenians as the ships depart (ῥώμῃ) 
 
6.85.1 – Euphemus argues that the ῥώμη of 




6.93.1 – Alcibiadesʼ advice encourages the 
Spartans (ἐπερρώσθησαν) 
 
7.2.1 – the arrival of Gylippus encourages 
the Syracusans (ἐπερρώσθησαν) 
 
7.7.4 – completing counter-wall encourages 
Syracusans even more (ἐπέρρωντο) 
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Table 5.1 (Continued) 
7.15.2 – Nicias refers to his poor physical health 
in the letter (ἐρρώμην)  
 
7.17.3 – good news from Sicily encourages 
the Corinthians, who send reinforcements 
(ἐπέρρωντο) 
 
7.18.2 – the Atheniansʼ two-front war and 
their feelings of righteousness encourage 
the Lacedaemonians (ῥώμη) 
7.42.2 – Demosthenesʼ arrival encourages the 
Athenians (ῥώμη)  
 
7.46.1 – unexpected victory encourages 
the Syracusans (ἀναρρωσθέντες) 
7.47.1 – Athenian generals deliberate because 
of their lack of strength (ἀρρωστίαν)  
7.63.4 – Nicias argues that Athensʼ skill will 
overcome Syracuseʼs lucky energy (ῥώμης)  
7.75.4 – the Athenians leave behind the 
wounded, and whoever had bodily strength 
lamented (ῥώμη) 
 
7.77.2 – Nicias mentions his poor physical 
health in his final speech (ῥώμῃ)  
 8.78.1 – the Peloponnesian soldiery gets 
restive because their strength is being 
wasted (ἔρρωντο) 
 8.83.2 – Tissaphernes becomes less able 
to give pay and is hated because of the 
betrayal of Alcibiades (ἀρρωστότερον) 
8.89.1 – those disenchanted with the oligarchy 
gain confidence when Alcibiadesʼ message is 
announced (ἐπέρρωσαν) 
 
8.106.5 – announcement of the victory at 
Cynossema turns Athenian spirits around 
(ἐπερρώσθησαν) 
 
Words from the semantic field of ῥώμη-ῥώννυμι often occur at crucial 
descriptions of morale, including both the beginning and ending of the 
Archidamian War.  Thucydidesʼ repetition of ῥώννυμι in 2.8, an important 
chapter because of its authorial comments on different statesʼ thoughts and 
feelings at the outset of the war,596 indicates the importance of ῥώμη in his 
understanding of morale.  Thucydidesʼ account of the feeling on both sides at 
                                            
596 Hornblower 1 245. 
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the outset of the war is one such case, and it is marked with rhetorical 
emphasis through repetition of πολύς and precise construction:597 
ὀλίγον τε ἐπενόουν οὐδὲν ἀμφότεροι, ἀλλʼ ἔρρωντο ἐς τὸν 
πόλεμον οὐκ ἀπεικότως· ἀρχόμενοι γὰρ πάντες ὀξύτερον 
ἀντιλαμβάνονται, τότε δὲ καὶ νεότης πολλὴ μὲν οὖσα ἐν τῇ 
Πελοποννήσῳ, πολλὴ δʼ ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις οὐκ ἀκουσίως ὑπὸ 
ἀπειρίας ἥπτετο τοῦ πολέμου, ἥ τε ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς ἅπασα μετέωρος 
ἦν ξυνιουσῶν τῶν πρώτων πόλεων.598 
Here ῥώννυμι is very close in meaning to προθυμέομαι, since the eagerness 
of the youth is based on inexperience.  This contrasts with many of the 
examples discussed below, in which experience and knowledge are often the 
factors that differentiate ῥώμη from προθυμία.  Thucydides uses ῥώννυμι 
because he is making a general statement about war, that combatants are 
always mentally and materially strongest at the outset, and because the rarer 
ῥώννυμι is more forceful than προθυμέομαι.  Thucydides concludes his 
description of Greek morale at the outset of the war by repeating ῥώννυμι in 
his description of nominal neutrals: ἔρρωτό τε πᾶς καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ πόλις εἴ 
τι δύναιτο καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ξυνεπιλαμβάνειν αὐτοῖς· ἐν τούτῳ τε 
κεκωλῦσθαι ἐδόκει ἑκάστῳ τὰ πράγματα ᾧ μή τις αὐτὸς παρέσται.599  
Thus, Thucydides considers cities and individuals “to be moral agents about 
whom the same sort of language could be used.”600  By talking about cities 
                                            
597 Rusten (1990) 104. 
598 T 2.8.1: “And if both sides nourished the boldest hopes and had the highest morale for the 
war, this was only natural. Zeal is always at its height at the commencement of an 
undertaking; and on this particular occasion Peloponnese and Athens were both full of young 
men whose inexperience made them eager to take part in military action, while the rest of 
Hellas stood straining with excitement at the conflict of its leading cities” (adapted from 
Crawleyʼs translation). 
599 T 2.8.4: “Every individual and city, if he was at all able, confidently joined in helping in word 
and deed; and, in this time, each man thought matters would be hindered if he himself did not 
take part.” 
600 Hornblower 1 247. 
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and individuals in the same terms, Thucydides shows that he also 
conceptualizes the morale of both in the same way. 
 Thucydides also relates ῥώμη to the conclusion of the Archidamian 
War.  He explains that the Athenians no longer believed they could count on 
their ῥώμη when they decided to negotiate with the Lacedaemonians:  
ξυνέβη τε εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει μάχην καὶ τὴν Ῥαμφίου 
ἀναχώρησιν ἐκ Θεσσαλίας ὥστε πολέμου μὲν μηδὲν ἔτι ἅψασθαι 
μηδετέρους, πρὸς δὲ τὴν εἰρήνην μᾶλλον τὴν γνώμην εἶχον, οἱ 
μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι πληγέντες ἐπί τε τῷ Δηλίῳ καὶ διʼ ὀλίγου αὖθις ἐν 
Ἀμφιπόλει, καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς ῥώμης πιστὴν ἔτι, ᾗπερ 
οὐ προσεδέχοντο πρότερον τὰς σπονδάς, δοκοῦντες τῇ παρούσῃ 
εὐτυχίᾳ καθυπέρτεροι γενήσεσθαι·601 
This is the first part of the final and most detailed of what Hornblower identifies 
as six excursus on both sidesʼ morale in the unit formed by book four and book 
five up to chapter twenty-five,602 and Thucydidesʼ use of ῥώμη here combined 
with the repetition of ἅπτομαι πολέμου also recalls his explanation of morale 
at 2.8.  Thus, Thucydides describes morale at both the beginning and the end 
of the Archidamian War in terms of ῥώμη.  Although Graves argues that ῥώμη 
at 5.14.1 refers strictly to material strength, he grants that it clearly means 
mental confidence at other places and cites 2.43.3 and 7.75.3 as instances 
where it could be mental or material.603  Even when the more material or 
physical senses of the word predominate, Thucydides still links ῥώμη to 
morale, since material and physical strength typically induce confidence.604  
                                            
601 T 5.14.1: “And it came to pass immediately after the battle at Amphipolis and the return of 
Rhamphias from Thessaly that neither side still took part in military action at all, but they 
instead became intent on peace; the Athenians because they were disheartened over Delium 
and a little later Amphipolis and because they no longer had a firm expectation of strength, 
which caused them not to accept the treaty before, when in their momentary good fortune they 
thought they would come out on top.” 
602 Hornblower 2 109. 
603 Graves (1891) s.v. 5.14.1, also arguing that the “passive of ῥώννυμι seems generally used 
of eagerness and confidence” in Thucydides. 
604 See below on 6.31.2, which Hornblower 3 383 compares to the present passage. 
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Thucydidesʼ explanation of the Athenian decision to negotiate also echoes part 
of the Spartansʼ plea to come to terms while the Pylos campaign is still in 
progress: ὥστε οὐκ εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν νῦν ῥώμην πόλεώς τε 
καὶ τῶν προσγεγενημένων καὶ τὸ τῆς τύχης οἴεσθαι αἰεὶ μεθʼ ὑμῶν 
ἔσεσθαι.605  Thus, Thucydides confirms Athenian morale has worsened 
because of misfortune, just as the Lacedaemonian speakers suggested it 
eventually would.  Although actually accepting alliance with the 
Lacedaemonians before the conclusion of the Pylos campaign would have 
deprived the Athenians of the prisoners who became a powerful bargaining 
chip, both of these passages are also part of a wider contrast between 
Athenian πλεονεξία and Spartan concern for securing εὐτυχία that runs 
through the whole Pylos episode.606  The Lacedaemonian ambassadors fail to 
persuade the Athenians, but they are right in broad terms when they explain 
that good fortune will not always last.607  Thucydides confirms that the defeats 
at Delium and Amphipolis were enough to lower Athenian morale significantly, 
at least until the Athenians set their sights on Sicily. 
As Table 5.1 shows, ῥώμη and related words appear at a number of 
pivotal moments in books six and seven.  Romilly has noted that Thucydides 
creates a connecting thread in the narrative by using ῥώμη and ῥώννυμι to 
describe morale starting with the Spartan reaction to Alcibiadesʼ speech at 
6.88 and ending at 7.46.1 with the recovery of Syracusan morale after 
                                            
605 T 4.18.3: “So you should not believe that fortune will always be with you because of the 
current strength of your city and empire right now.”  
606 Connor (1984) 120. 
607 Hornblower (1987) 47-49 suggests a two-way influence between Thucydides and the 
rhetorical tradition, noting a similarity between the argument at 4.18.3-4 and the Rhetoric to 
Alexander 1425a36ff. 
 187 
Demosthenesʼ defeat at Epipolae,608 but the thread extends throughout 
Thucydidesʼ account of the Sicilian expedition.  Despite Lacedaemonian power 
on land (6.17.8), the Athenians direct their ῥώμη against Sicily (6.31.1).  When 
Alcibiades defects, his sound military advice instills ῥώμη in the enemies of 
Athens (6.91.3, 7.2.1, 7.17.3, 7.18.2).  Lacedaemonian help causes the 
Syracusans to gain ῥώμη (7.2.1, 7.7.4), while Niciasʼ reference to his poor 
physical ῥώμη mimics the effect of his leadership on Athenian military ῥώμη 
(7.15.2).  Despite a brief resurgence of Athenian ῥώμη when Demosthenes 
brings reinforcements (7.42.2), the Syracusans maintain their psychological 
edge (7.46.1).  These reverses lead to the utter destruction of Athenian ῥώμη 
in Sicily (7.47.1, 7.63.4, 7.75.4, 7.77.2).  Thucydides uses the vocabulary of 
ῥώμη to highlight his analysis of morale during the war in Sicily.  By carefully 
deploying the word group in various contexts, he is able not only to show how 
morale varied on both sides but also to suggest why the Athenians ultimately 
failed in Sicily. 
The word group I typically refer to as ῥώμη includes the nominal form 
and the verb ῥώννυμι, usually in the perfect ἔρρωμαι.  The forms ῥώμη and 
ἔρρωμαι occur earliest and may be linked with the Homeric ῥώομαι (“rush 
with vigor, quickness”), but the etymology is uncertain.609  The basic meaning 
of the verb is “to be strong, well” and the sense sometimes approaches that of 
ὑγιαίνειν.610  According to Chantraine, the noun generally means “force, 
vigor” and usually has a physical sense close to ὑγιεία and ἰσχύς; it suggests, 
however, a more active force than ἰσχύς, since it can refer to the power of an 
                                            
608 Romilly (1956) 36-37. 
609 Chantraine (1999), s.v. ῥώννυμι, ῥώομαι.  In Thucydides, only Nicias uses ἔρρωμαι as a 
synonym of ὑγιαίνειν (7.15.2). 
610 Ibid. 
 188 
army or the force of love.611  In Thucydides, ἔρρωμαι occurs six times in the 
simplex and also appears compounded with ἀνα- once and with ἐπι- eight 
times.612  To refer to a lack of ῥώμη, Thucydides uses the abstract noun 
ἀρρωστία twice and a comparative form of the adjective ἄρρωστος once.613  
The noun ῥώμη occurs twelve times in Thucydides and can refer to physical, 
mental, or military power, and most occurrences of the word partake of more 
than one sense or appear in a context that prevents certain identification.614  
The verbal forms also have a range of meaning but seem to refer especially to 
confidence or high morale.615  Good English translations for ῥώμη in 
Thucydides include “confidence” (7.18.2), “strength” (6.85.1), and “health” 
(7.77.2); similarly, ἔρρωμαι can mean “become confident” (4.72.1), “be 
strong” (8.78.1), and “be healthy” (7.15.2).  And yet translating ῥώμη with 
different English words and distinguishing the physical from more metaphorical 
senses can obscure the essential unity of what is a single word or a group of 
words from a single root in the original Greek.  Despite the different contexts in 
which they appear, the words ῥώμη and ἔρρωμαι always refer to some kind 
of strength or force. 
 
                                            
611 Ibid.; cf. Huart (1968) 416-418, which defines ῥώμη in Thucydides as “énergie” or “ardeur.” 
612 ἔρρωμαι: 2.8.1, 2.8.4, 4.72.1, 6.17.8, 7.15.2, 8.78.1; ἀνερρωμαι: 7.46.1; ἐπερρωμαι: 
3.6.1, 4.36.2, 6.93.1, 7.2.2, 7.7.4, 7.17.3, 8.89.1, 8.106.5; see also Huart (1968) 416-418. 
613 ἀρρωστία: 3.15.2, 7.47.1; ἄρρωστος: 8.83.2; see Huart (1968) 418 n; Chaintraine (1999) 
loc. cit. says that it is impossible to account for the σ in this form etymologically. 
614 Huart (1968) 417 n 2 attempts to distinguish the different senses, but this approach risks 
dividing what is a unified Greek concept. 
615 A notable exception is ἐρρώμην (T 7.15.2) in the letter of Nicias, who also uses the noun 
ῥώμη to refer to his bodily strength in his final speech (7.77.2).   
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5.2 – ῾Ρώμη in Sicily 
 Half of Thucydidesʼ uses of words from the ῥώμη-ῥώννυμι family occur 
in books six and seven, since Thucydides makes a number of observations 
about the morale of cities in mainland Greece as well as concentrating 
especially on the alternations of ῥώμη between the Syracusans and the 
Athenians in Sicily.  The concept of ῥώμη is not only an important part of 
Thucydidesʼ assessment of the psychological state of cities and soldiers; it 
also features prominently in the words and thoughts of generals like Nicias 
and Alcibiades.  Thus, analysis of ῥώμη in Thucydidesʼ account of the Sicilian 
Expedition serves as an excellent case study for the different ways in which 
ῥώμη appears in both the narrative and speeches.  At the sailing of the 
Athenian expedition, Athens possesses great ῥώμη;616 but over the course of 
the campaign, the Athenians suffer a failure of ῥώμη while the Syracusans 
gain it.  As Thucydides develops the motif of rising and falling ῥώμη, he 
carefully deploys the different lexical values of words from the ῥώμη-ῥώννυμι 
family to comment on why the Athenians fail.   
Although Romilly and Hornblower have noted Thucydidesʼ use of this 
word group to describe morale during the Sicilian expedition,617 no one has yet 
fully explored the thematic significance of all of Thucydidesʼ usages in books 
six and seven.  The Athenians lose the contest of ῥώμη not so much because 
of material disadvantage, but because their leaders do not rationally utilize 
their military power.618  His account of the expedition allows Thucydides to 
explore the different meanings of ῥώμη, and speeches of Alcibiades and 
                                            
616 T 6.31.1. 
617 Romilly (1956) 36-38; Hornblower 3 383-384, 571, 573, 621, 630, 632. 
618 See Kallet (2001) 147-182 on the lack of γνώμη in the Athenian leadership in Sicily.  
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Nicias play out a struggle over the termʼs lexical and practical values.  Niciasʼ 
relationship to this term also contributes to the theme of ʻtragicʼ failure, since 
he uses ῥώμη in reference to his poor health as the narrative recounts 
Syracuse gaining ῥώμη at the expense of Athens.  Tracking how ῥώμη shifts 
from Athens to Syracuse and her Peloponnesian allies even reveals 
Thucydidesʼ own analysis of how Athenian morale broke apart as their 
enemies gained confidence.  More than any other lexical category, 
Thucydidesʼ use of ῥώμη-ῥώννυμι shows an appreciation for the importance 
of what English designates ʻmorale.ʼ619  Proper understanding of the interplay 
between character, experiences, and events is crucial for a general or a 
historian, and Thucydides deploys ῥώμη vocabulary to comment on how well 
the political and military leaders analyzed events during the war in Sicily. 
Thucydides uses the noun ῥώμη to describe Athenian power at its 
highest and lowest points, the glorious departure of the expedition and the 
pitiful abandonment of the sick and wounded at the camp outside Syracuse.  
When the expedition is on the point of sailing, Thucydides highlights Athenian 
ῥώμη: 
καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ, ὡς ἤδη ἔμελλον μετὰ κινδύνων 
ἀλλήλους ἀπολιπεῖν, μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς ἐσῄει τὰ δεινὰ ἢ ὅτε 
ἐψηφίζοντο πλεῖν· ὅμως δὲ τῇ παρούσῃ ῥώμῃ, διὰ τὸ πλῆθος 
ἑκάστων ὧν ἑώρων, τῇ ὄψει ἀνεθάρσουν.620 
The meaning of ῥώμη in this passage has troubled scholars, since “strength of 
resources” would be redundant with τὸ πλῆθος ἑκάστων but “confidence” 
would contradict what was said about apprehensions in the first part of the 
                                            
619 See section 1.1 for a definition of morale. 
620 T 6.31.1: “At the present moment, when they were about to leave one another amidst 
danger, the gravity of the undertaking came to them more than when they voted to sail; 
nevertheless, in their present consciousness of strength, through the multitude of each of the 
things they were seeing, they were encouraged by the sight.” 
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sentence.621  Although Dover rejects attempts to emend the text, he admits 
that the two datives, ῥώμῃ and ὄψει, are “stylistically objectionable.”622  He 
then denies the possibility that ῥώμη here could mean “confidence” or 
“energy” and concludes that it must refer to material strength, despite the 
tautology.623  Hornblower, however, follows Classen and Marchant by arguing 
that ῥώμη in this sentence partakes of both its overlapping senses and refers 
to spirit and material strength.624  This interpretation leads Hornblower to 
translate the phrase τῇ παρούσῃ ῥώμῃ quite elegantly as “in their present 
consciousness of strength.”  As argued above, Thucydides often uses ῥώμη 
to mean confidence based on military resources. 
Furthermore, Thucydides emphasizes the high emotional tension of the 
Athenians by repeating παρών to express the near simultaneity of the 
contradictory feelings of apprehension and confidence.625  Although Athens is 
at the height of her power, the Athenians are not completely confident.  The 
variability of their emotions, especially at such an important occasion, 
suggests that their morale is fragile and subject to the same variation.  
Moreover, the emphasis on sight hints that the Athenians are dangerously 
misjudging the power of the expedition.626  In fact, this passage functions 
together with Thucydidesʼ description of the abandonment of the Athenian 
camp, where Thucydides repeats many of the same terms, including ῥώμη.627  
                                            
621 Hornblower 3 383. 
622 Gomme, Andrewes and Dover (1970) 291-292. 
623 Ibid. 
624 Classen (1881) 197; Marchant (1909), s.v. 6.31.2; Hornblower 3 383. 
625 Hornblower 3 384. 
626 Kallet (2001) 49-50. 
627 Kallet (2001) 51, which identifies the parallelism between these two passages, argues that 
this relationship helps “the reader think about the relationship among size, resources, and 
strength.” 
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Repetition of ῥώμη at these two key moments alerts the reader that 
Thucydides is offering analysis of the state of Athenian morale at these two 
momentous departures. 
In a passage rich with Homeric allusions,628 Thucydides relates the total 
failure of ῥώμη as the Athenians leave their camp near Syracuse.  Here ῥώμη 
does not refer to morale explicitly, but leaving wounded comrades behind has 
a powerful impact on morale.629  
πρὸς γὰρ ἀντιβολίαν καὶ ὀλοφυρμὸν τραπόμενοι ἐς ἀπορίαν 
καθίστασαν, ἄγειν τε σφᾶς ἀξιοῦντες καὶ ἕνα ἕκαστον 
ἐπιβοώμενοι, εἴ τινά πού τις ἴδοι ἢ ἑταίρων ἢ οἰκείων, τῶν τε 
ξυσκήνων ἤδη ἀπιόντων ἐκκρεμαννύμενοι καὶ ἐπακολουθοῦντες 
ἐς ὅσον δύναιντο, εἴ τῳ δὲ προλίποι ἡ ῥώμη καὶ τὸ σῶμα, οὐκ ἄνευ 
ὀλίγων ἐπιθειασμῶν καὶ οἰμωγῆς ὑπολειπόμενοι, ὥστε δάκρυσι 
πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα πλησθὲν καὶ ἀπορίᾳ τοιαύτῃ μὴ ῥᾳδίως 
ἀφορμᾶσθαι, καίπερ ἐκ πολεμίας τε καὶ μείζω ἢ κατὰ δάκρυα τὰ 
μὲν πεπονθότας ἤδη, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν ἀφανεῖ δεδιότας μὴ 
πάθωσιν.630 
In the previous passage, seeing an abundance of ῥώμη encouraged the 
Athenians, but now seeing and hearing their ῥώμη failing causes despair.631  
Thucydides shows the powerful sensory impact of these sights and sounds by 
twice mentioning tears, which appear nowhere else in the History.632  The 
change in the meaning of ῥώμη between 6.31 and 7.75 is also instructive, 
                                            
628 Allison (1997b) 502-509. 
629 Compare the US Marine Corpsʼ doctrine of “no man left behind,” which calls for the 
recovery of soldiers even if they have perished, since abandoning comrades has a deleterious 
effect on unit cohesion and morale. 
630 T 7.75.4: “These fell to entreating and bewailing until their friends knew not what to do, 
begging them to take them and loudly calling to each individual comrade or relative whom they 
could see, hanging upon the necks of their tent-fellows in the act of departure, and following 
as far as they could, and when their bodily strength failed them, calling again and again upon 
heaven and shrieking aloud as they were left behind. So that the whole army being filled with 
tears and distracted after this fashion found it not easy to go, even from an enemy's land, 
where they had already suffered evils too great for tears and in the unknown future before 
them feared to suffer more” (tr. Crawley). 
631 Kallet (2001) 169. 
632 Hornblower 3 709-710. 
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since the word first referred to confidence based on material resources but 
now means bodily strength.633  Kallet notes that the surviving Atheniansʼ 
realization of their position recalls a tragic ʻrecognition sceneʼ and the fall of 
Croesus in Herodotus 1.68.634  Thus, only at their wretched departure do the 
Athenians in Sicily understand that they have squandered everything that 
made up the expeditionʼs ῥώμη except the soldiersʼ bodies, which are also 
soon to be lost. 
Thucydides develops the theme of misunderstood ῥώμη in the 
speeches and letter of Nicias, who mentions ῥώμη only as a possession of the 
Syracusans or in relation to his own poor health.  His inability to see ῥώμη as 
the mental and material strength of his forces mimics his inability to deploy 
these forces effectively.  Furthermore, Niciasʼ repeated invocations of his 
personal sickness subtly reflect the dwindling power of the Athenian 
expedition.  In his letter to the Athenian assembly, Nicias refers to his 
benefactions to the city when he was healthy: ἀξιῶ δʼ ὑμῶν ξυγγνώμης 
τυγχάνειν· καὶ γὰρ ὅτʼ ἐρρώμην πολλὰ ἐν ἡγεμονίαις ὑμᾶς εὖ ἐποίησα.635  
This type of reference to past service is common in defense oratory,636 but the 
lack of Athenian ῥώμη also fits the overall theme.  The shift in emphasis at the 
beginning of book seven also leads the reader to assess the letter differently 
from the Athenian assembly, since it is now clearly a mistake to refuse Niciasʼ 
request to be relieved of command.637  Nicias uses ῥώμη to refer to his 
                                            
633 ἡ ῥώμη καὶ τὸ σῶμα is hendiadys for ʻstrength of the body.ʼ  The interplay between these 
two meanings of ῥώμη is a major feature of Thucydidesʼ analysis of Athenian morale during 
the war in Sicily. 
634 Kallet (2001) 169. 
635 T 7.15.2: “I am worthy of receiving your indulgence, since I did you much good in my 
commands when I was healthy.” 
636 Hornblower 3 568. 
637 Connor (1984) 188. 
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physical health again in his final speech.  Much like he did in the letter, Nicias 
contrasts his poor physical state with his good character: 
κἀγώ τοι οὐδενὸς ὑμῶν οὔτε ῥώμῃ προφέρων (ἀλλʼ ὁρᾶτε δὴ ὡς 
διάκειμαι ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου) οὔτʼ εὐτυχίᾳ δοκῶν που ὕστερός του 
εἶναι κατά τε τὸν ἴδιον βίον καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα, νῦν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ 
κινδύνῳ τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις αἰωροῦμαι· καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν ἐς θεοὺς 
νόμιμα δεδιῄτημαι, πολλὰ δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια καὶ 
ἀνεπίφθονα.638 
Unlike the letter, where he used the verbal form, Nicias here uses the noun 
ῥώμη.  This recalls the similar use of ῥώμη two sections earlier at 7.75.4, 
reinforcing the idea that Athenian power is nearly spent.  Athenian ῥώμη is no 
longer the glorious power, wealth, and confidence of the expedition in 415; 
instead, it consists of human bodies, many of which are sick and wounded. 
And yet Nicias does show in his speech before the battle in the Great 
Harbor that he understands ῥώμη as more than simply physical strength, 
when he contrasts Syracusan ῥώμη with Athenian episteme: καὶ δείξατε ὅτι 
καὶ μετʼ ἀσθενείας καὶ ξυμφορῶν ἡ ὑμετέρα ἐπιστήμη κρείσσων ἐστὶν 
ἑτέρας εὐτυχούσης ῥώμης.639  Niciasʼ invocation of the Syracusansʼ ʻlucky 
energyʼ reveals a clear underestimation of the enemyʼs power, since the 
narrative has shown that Syracusansʼ strength is not based on luck.640  In fact, 
his use of the phrase εὐτυχούσης ῥώμης implies that Nicias does not 
understand military ῥώμη.  As has been shown above, this type of ῥώμη 
refers to confidence based on a rational understanding of oneʼs resources and 
                                            
638 T 7.77.2: “I myself who am not superior to any of you in strength—indeed you see how I am 
in my sickness—and who in the gifts of fortune am, I think, whether in private life or otherwise, 
the equal of any, am now exposed to the same danger as the meanest among you; and yet 
my life has been one of much devotion towards the gods, and of much justice and without 
offence towards men” (tr. Crawley). 
639 T 7.63.4: “And show that your knowledge is more powerful amidst weakness and 
misfortune than anotherʼs lucky energy.” 
640 Hunter (1973) 110, admitting that chance plays some role in the Athenian reverses, but 
arguing that the Atheniansʼ errors and lost opportunities are more important. 
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position.  Therefore, it cannot be ʻlucky.ʼ  Nicias is right that the Syracusans 
hold the edge in ῥώμη, but he is wrong about the nature of their ῥώμη.  As the 
arguments of the paired speeches make clear, the Syracusans have all the 
rational reasons for confidence.641  In fact, the contrasts with the battle of 
Naupactus show that the Syracusans have successfully neutralized the 
advantages of Athenian ἐπιστήμη by cleverly using topography and technical 
innovation to invalidate the Atheniansʼ usual tactics.642  Thus, Niciasʼ claim that 
Athenian ἐπιστήμη will defeat Syracusan ῥώμη rests on misunderstandings of 
his opponents, the tactical situation, and the nature of ῥώμη itself.643  
Thucydides shows that Alcibiades, on the other hand, understands 
ῥώμη as military power and confidence, since Thucydides links him with this 
meaning of the word both implicitly and explicitly.  When speaking in favor of 
the expedition to Sicily, Alcibiades argues that, in spite of Peloponnesian 
ῥώμη, the enemy only has power on land and cannot harm Athens nautically:  
καὶ νῦν οὔτε ἀνέλπιστοί πω μᾶλλον Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς ἡμᾶς 
ἐγένοντο, εἴ τε καὶ πάνυ ἔρρωνται, τὸ μὲν ἐς τὴν γῆν ἡμῶν 
ἐσβάλλειν, κἂν μὴ ἐκπλεύσωμεν, ἱκανοί εἰσι, τῷ δὲ ναυτικῷ οὐκ ἂν 
δύναιντο βλάπτειν· ὑπόλοιπον γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἀντίπαλον 
ναυτικόν.644 
This statement shows that Alcibiades understands how to project ῥώμη 
effectively and make use of different citiesʼ particular strengths.  Indeed, the 
annual Peloponnesian invasions did very little actual harm to Athensʼ 
                                            
641 Romilly (1956) 156-159. 
642 Romilly (1956) 159-161. 
643 Compare Kallet (2001) 147-182, which argues that Nicias fails as a leader because he is 
excessively focused on financial considerations and lacks γνώμη.  Her thesis complements 
my analysis of Niciasʼ relationship to ῥώμη as an indicator of his poor leadership. 
644 T 6.17.8: “The Peloponnesians had never so little hope against us at present; and let them 
be ever so sanguine, although they have the power to invade our country even if we stay at 
home, they can never hurt us with their navy, as we leave one of our own behind us that is a 
match for them” (modified from Crawleyʼs translation). 
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economy.645  Later, Thucydides links Alcibiades with ῥώμη explicitly, as 
Alcibiades explains to the Lacedaemonians how to overcome the very 
deficiencies on which he had told the Athenians to rely.  Thucydides twice 
connects Alcibiadesʼ advice to send help to Syracuse and fortify Decelea with 
Lacedaemonian ῥώμη.  After Alcibiades initially defects to Sparta, Thucydides 
relates how his speech affected Spartan thinking: 
Ὁ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδης τοσαῦτα εἶπεν, οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι 
διανοούμενοι μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ πρότερον στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας, 
μέλλοντες δʼ ἔτι καὶ περιορώμενοι, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπερρώσθησαν 
διδάξαντος ταῦτα ἕκαστα αὐτοῦ καὶ νομίσαντες παρὰ τοῦ 
σαφέστατα εἰδότος ἀκηκοέναι· ὥστε τῇ ἐπιτειχίσει τῆς Δεκελείας 
προσεῖχον ἤδη τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ παραυτίκα καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ 
πέμπειν τινὰ τιμωρίαν.646 
The fortification of Decelea, which Alcibiades stridently advocates, does more 
material harm to Athens than all of the ineffectual Peloponnesian invasions.647  
Furthermore, the decision to build a permanent fortification in Attica and send 
Spartan leadership to Syracuse also have important psychological effects, by 
encouraging Athensʼ allies to revolt and using Spartaʼs reputation to 
strengthen the morale of the Syracusans.648  Thucydidesʼ emphasis on 
Alcibiadesʼ clear knowledge and teaching also shows that the 
Lacedaemoniansʼ ῥώμη is based on a reasoned interpretation of the facts.   
                                            
645 Hanson (2005) 48-59. 
646 T 6.93.1-2: “Such were the words of Alcibiades. The Lacedaemonians, who had 
themselves before intended to march against Athens, but were still waiting and looking about 
them, at once became much more vigorous when they received this particular information 
from Alcibiades, and considered that they had heard it from the man who best knew the truth 
of the matter. Accordingly they now turned their attention to the fortifying of Decelea and 
sending immediate aid to the Sicilians” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
647 Hanson (2005) 60. 
648 Forde (1989) 104-105.  See below for more on Thucydidesʼ use of ῥώμη to describe 
Syracusan morale. 
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And yet the Lacedaemonians, probably because of religious scruples, 
delay fortifying Decelea even as they send help to Sicily immediately.649  When 
they finally prepare to invade and hold Decelea, at the insistence of their allies 
and Alcibiades, Thucydides explains that the ῥώμη they possess is based on 
their strategic position and their feeling of righteousness: 
Παρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβολὴν οἱ 
Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥσπερ τε προυδέδοκτο αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν 
Συρακοσίων καὶ Κορινθίων ἐναγόντων, ἐπειδὴ ἐπυνθάνοντο τὴν 
ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βοήθειαν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ὅπως δὴ ἐσβολῆς 
γενομένης διακωλυθῇ. καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης προσκείμενος ἐδίδασκε 
τὴν Δεκέλειαν τειχίζειν καὶ μὴ ἀνιέναι τὸνπόλεμον. μάλιστα δὲ 
τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐγεγένητό τις ῥώμη, διότι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους 
ἐνόμιζον διπλοῦν τὸν πόλεμον ἔχοντας, πρός τε σφᾶς καὶ 
Σικελιώτας, εὐκαθαιρετωτέρους ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι τὰς σπονδὰς 
προτέρους λελυκέναι ἡγοῦντο αὐτούς·650   
The success of the war in Sicily, based especially on the psychological effects 
of Gylippusʼ arrival, also causes the Corinthians to gain ῥώμη.651  Thus, the 
loss of Alcibiades represents a transfer of ῥώμη from Athens to the 
Peloponnesians, since he is the Athenian leader who best knows how to 
deploy power rationally to maximize its potential.  Plus, his defection 
represents a transfer of ῥώμη from Athens through Sparta to Syracuse, since 
                                            
649 Hornblower 3 518, see Herodotus 9.73 concerning the religious reasons for the Spartans 
not fortifying Decelea during the Archidamian War. 
650 T 7.18.1-2: “In the meantime the Lacedaemonians prepared for their invasion of Attica, in 
accordance with their own previous resolve, and at the instigation of the Syracusans and 
Corinthians, who wished for an invasion to arrest the reinforcements which they heard that 
Athens was about to send to Sicily. Alcibiades also urgently advised the fortification of 
Decelea, and a vigorous prosecution of the war. But the Lacedaemonians derived most 
strength from the belief that Athens, with two wars on her hands, against themselves and 
against the Siceliots, would be more easy to subdue, and from the conviction that she had 
been the first to infringe the truce” (adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
651 T 7.17.3: οἱ γὰρ Κορίνθιοι, ὡς αὐτοῖς οἱ πρέσβεις ἧκον καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ βελτίω 
ἤγγελλον, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἄκαιρον καὶ τὴν προτέραν πέμψιν τῶν νεῶν ποιήσασθαι, 
πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωντο, “the Corinthians, believing that their prior sending of ships was 
quite timely, since ambassadors had come to them and were recounting that things were 
better in Sicily, were encouraged much more.” 
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one of the pieces of advice he gives is to send a commander to Syracuse, 
whom Thucydides strongly associates with Syracusan ῥώμη.652  The 
confidence and success of the Syracusans brings ῥώμη to the 
Lacedaemonians and the Corinthians in turn, so that Alcibiades is ultimately 
implicated in the growing ῥώμη of all three of the Atheniansʼ main adversaries. 
The only other Athenian leader who speaks of ῥώμη in books six and 
seven is Euphemus.  He uses ῥώμη to mean military resources and 
confidence when he claims that the ῥώμη of allies is beneficial to the interests 
of Athens.653  And yet Euphemus has no military role in the expedition, serving 
only as a mouthpiece for Athenian cynicism.654  In fact, his argument that 
Athens will not mistreat her allies is the lie at the heart of this deceptive 
speech.655  Thus, Thucydides carefully deploys the different senses of ῥώμη 
and related words to reinforce the theme of failing Athenian leadership.656  
Alcibiades, and to a lesser extent Euphemus, understand the role of ῥώμη in 
warfare, but neither one influences the military leadership of the expedition in 
book seven.  Nicias, who repeatedly mentions his own lack of physical ῥώμη, 
does not seem to conceive of ῥώμη as confidence and military resources and 
squanders those resources, until the only ῥώμη the Athenians possess is that 
of their own bodies, which are also lost in the end.   
                                            
652 See below. 
653 T 6.85.1: καὶ ἡμᾶς τοῦτο ὠφελεῖ ἐνθάδε, οὐκ ἢν τοὺς φίλους κακώσωμεν, ἀλλʼ ἢν οἱ 
ἐχθροὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν φίλων ῥώμην ἀδύνατοι ὦσιν. “And we are benefitted here, not if we 
treat out allies unjustly, but if our enemies are impotent because of the strength of our allies.” 
654 Hornblower 3 493 compares the contrast between the fully described Hermocrates and the 
otherwise unknown Euphemus to Cleon and Diodotus. 
655 Rawlings (1981) 121-122. 
656 Demosthenes, whom Thucydides associates with ῥώμη but who does not use the word in 
a speech in books six and seven, will be discussed below.
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Unlike Athenian ῥώμη, which Thucydides uses for implicit 
characterization of different leaders and more general evaluations of Athenian 
morale, Syracusan ῥώμη is strongly associated with the theme of growing 
confidence and military power.  Thucydides uses this type of ῥώμη, often 
expressed by forms of ἐπιρώννυμι, to highlight the strengthening of 
Syracusan morale and the weakening of Athenian morale as the tide turns in 
the war.  Thucydides describes major psychological turning points in terms of 
one side or the other gaining ῥώμη, beginning with the arrival of Gylippus and 
ending with the defeat of Demosthenesʼ attack on Epipolae.  More than half of 
the fifteen uses of words from the ῥώμη-ῥώννυμι family in books six and 
seven are Thucydidesʼ own evaluations of morale in Sicily or the 
Peloponnese.657  Thus, tracking Thucydidesʼ use of these terms allows one to 
see clearly how the mental states of the two sides both shape and are shaped 
by events.  Earlier in this section, I discussed Thucydidesʼ use of ῥώμη to 
describe the highest and lowest points in Athenian power and characterize 
different leaders.  When joined with the passages about to be discussed, 
these uses of ῥώμη and related words reveal Thucydidesʼ careful analysis of 
the trajectory of morale on both sides.  Thucydidesʼ implicit characterization of 
different Athenian leaders by the way they rhetorically deploy ῥώμη sets up 
the failure of Athenian ῥώμη and the destruction of the expedition.  Even 
before Thucydides explicitly recounts the step by step shift of ῥώμη from 
Athens to Syracuse, he cues the reader to expect it.658 
                                            
657 T 6.93.1, 7.2.1, 7.7.4, 7.17.3, 7.18.2, 7.42.2, 7.46.1, 7.47.1.  Hornblower 3 383 notes the 
regular use of ῥώμη-ῥώννυμι to refer to “high morale, confidence” in book seven, but he does 
not explore its thematic significance. 
658 Compare Romilly (1956) 160-161, analyzing how the complex of speeches and narrative 
prefigure the results of the battle in the Great Harbor. 
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The first time Thucydides mentions the Syracusans gaining ῥώμη is 
when they hear of the imminent arrival of Gylippus.  He arrives at the nadir of 
Syracusan spirits and immediately begins to turn them around mentally.659  
The abrupt rebound in Syracusan morale confirms the efficacy of Alcibiadesʼ 
advice to the Lacedaemonians,660 who transfer the confidence that Alcibiades 
brought them to the Syracusans via Gylippus.  Gongylus, a Corinthian, 
announces to the Syracusans that Gylippus is coming from Sparta, and they 
are encouraged just to hear it: καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ἐπερρώσθησάν τε καὶ 
τῷ Γυλίππῳ εὐθὺς πανστρατιᾷ ὡς ἀπαντησόμενοι ἐξῆλθον.661  Although 
the Syracusan and allied forces suffer defeat in their initial engagement under 
Gylippus, their subsequent victory causes the Syracusans to gain even more 
confidence: οἵ τε Συρακόσιοι ναυτικὸν ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἀνεπειρῶντο ὡς καὶ 
τούτῳ ἐπιχειρήσοντες, καὶ ἐς τἆλλα πολὺ ἐπέρρωντο.662  These two 
passages frame the decisive moment in the siege, when it becomes clear that 
the Athenian circumvallation cannot succeed.663  The tenses of the verb also 
suggest the different impact of the two events on Syracusan morale.  The 
ingressive aorist at 7.2.1 refers to the beginning of their improved morale; and 
the pluperfect, representing the imperfect,664 at 7.7.4 shows that Syracusan 
morale has become and continues to be quite good.  Preventing the Athenians 
from completing their siege works is the first step toward superiority on land, 
                                            
659 Hornblower 3 544 questions whether the arrival of Gylippus really pulled the Syracusans 
back from considering ending the war, but he concludes the possible exaggeration enables 
Thucydides to present this moment as a turning point. 
660 T 6.93.1. 
661 T 7.2.1: “the Syracusans gained confidence and immediately went out in full force to meet 
Gylippus.” 
662 T 7.7.4: “the Syracusans proceeded to man a fleet and to exercise, meaning to try their 
fortune in this way also, and generally became exceedingly confident” (tr. Crawley). 
663 Hornblower 3 552. 
664 LSJ, s.v. ἐπιρρώννυμι. 
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and accordingly it causes the Syracusans to gain ῥώμη when they succeed.  
The abrupt reversal of Syracusan morale after the arrival of Gylippus is 
shocking, since book six has conditioned the reader to expect more Athenian 
success and Syracusan failure.665  Yet Thucydidesʼ use of ἐπιρρώννυμι to 
describe the Syracusansʼ psychological change implies more than just a 
switch in the two sidesʼ morale, since the possession of ῥώμη usually implies 
concrete material and strategic advantages as well as confidence.  Thus, 
ῥώμη is not an exact equivalent for ʻmorale,ʼ since ῥώμη can have physical or 
material as well as psychological aspects.  The arrival of Gylippus starts to 
instill confidence in the Syracusans (ἐπερρώσθησάν), but only after stopping 
the siege do they have good reasons to be really confident (πολὺ ἐπέρρωντο) 
in their strategic position and resources for the war. 
The general trend of Syracuseʼs power growing and Athensʼ waning 
continues until Demosthenes reaches Sicily with reinforcements equal to the 
original expedition.  This “marks a kind of second beginning,”666 restoring 
Athenian ῥώμη and instantly reversing the progress the Syracusans have 
made over the course of book seven.667  Thucydides gives the reasons for 
these changes in morale:  
καὶ τοῖς μὲν Συρακοσίοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις κατάπληξις ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα 
οὐκ ὀλίγη ἐγένετο, εἰ πέρας μηδὲν ἔσται σφίσι τοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆναι 
τοῦ κινδύνου, ὁρῶντες οὔτε διὰ τὴν Δεκέλειαν τειχιζομένην 
οὐδὲν ἧσσον στρατὸν ἴσον καὶ παραπλήσιον τῷ προτέρῳ 
ἐπεληλυθότα τήν τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύναμιν πανταχόσε πολλὴν 
                                            
665 Connor (1984) 185-188, see especially 186 n 3, which relates Thucydidesʼ account of the 
victory trophies erected by both sides to their morale. 
666 Kallet (2001) 154. 
667 Hornblower 3 583-584 discusses κατάπληξις, a stronger variant of ἔκπληξις, in 
Thucydides books seven and eight. 
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φαινομένην· τῷ δὲ προτέρῳ στρατεύματι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὡς ἐκ 
κακῶν ῥώμη τις ἐγεγένητο.668   
The reinforcements represent a temporary reinfusion of ῥώμη on the Athenian 
side, since they have all the material strength of the initial expedition, but the 
Atheniansʼ ultimate failure shows that ῥώμη is more than just men and ships. 
The phrase ὡς ἐκ κακῶν is telling, since the Atheniansʼ encouragement is 
based on the mistaken belief that their misfortunes are over.  Athenian 
δύναμις appears great to the Syracusans, just as Athensʼ ῥώμη appears 
great at 6.31, but the Athenian generals lack the intelligence to exert this 
power successfully.669  Thus, the ʻnew beginningʼ brought by Demosthenes 
becomes a false turning point. 
Indeed, Demosthenesʼ overbold stratagem squanders Athenian ῥώμη, 
and Syracusan morale is restored almost as quickly as it broke down.  The 
unexpected good fortune of their victory on Epipolae totally restores the 
Syracusansʼ confidence: 
Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ὡς ἐπὶ ἀπροσδοκήτῳ εὐπραγίᾳ 
πάλιν αὖ ἀναρρωσθέντες, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, ἐς μὲν Ἀκράγαντα 
στασιάζοντα πέντε καὶ δέκα ναυσὶ Σικανὸν ἀπέστειλαν, ὅπως 
ὑπαγάγοιτο τὴν πόλιν, εἰ δύναιτο· Γύλιππος δὲ κατὰ γῆν ἐς τὴν 
ἄλλην Σικελίαν ᾤχετο αὖθις, ἄξων στρατιὰν ἔτι, ὡς ἐν ἐλπίδι ὢν 
καὶ τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἱρήσειν βίᾳ, ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἐν ταῖς 
Ἐπιπολαῖς οὕτω ξυνέβη.670 
                                            
668 T 7.42.2: “The Syracusans and their allies were for the moment not a little dismayed at the 
idea that there was to be no term or ending to their dangers, seeing, in spite of the fortification 
of Decelea, a new army arrive nearly equal to the former, and the power of Athens proving so 
great in every quarter. On the other hand, the first Athenian armament regained a certain 
confidence in the midst of its misfortunes” (tr. Crawley). 
669 Kallet (2001) 153-154. 
670 T 7.46.1: “After this the Syracusans, recovering their old confidence at such an unexpected 
stroke of good fortune, despatched Sicanus with fifteen ships to Agrigentum where there was 
a revolution, to induce if possible the city to join them; while Gylippus again went by land into 
the rest of Sicily to bring up reinforcements, being now in hope of taking the Athenian lines by 
storm, after the result of the affair on Epipolae” (tr. Crawley). 
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The Syracusansʼ attribution of the victory to good fortune shows how far their 
spirits had fallen.671  And yet the quick return of Syracusan confidence shows 
that Demosthenes and the reinforcements had no lasting effect on morale.672  
A less daring attack probably would have been successful, since the 
Syracusans are even more despondent at the sight of the reinforcements than 
when the Athenians originally attacked.673  Instead, the brief advantage in 
ῥώμη enjoyed by the Athenians has been completely reversed, as the 
pleonasm of πάλιν, αὖ, ἀνα-, and ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον vigorously stress.674  
Furthermore, Thucydidesʼ use of the compound ἀναρώννυμι, which occurs 
nowhere else in his work, shows that the Syracusansʼ moral advantage is 
decisive.675 
Indeed, the newly reinforced Athenian expedition no longer has ῥώμη 
at all, as Thucydides makes explicit in the next chapter:  
Οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἐβουλεύοντο πρός τε 
τὴν γεγενημένην ξυμφορὰν καὶ πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν ἐν τῷ 
στρατοπέδῳ κατὰ πάντα ἀρρωστίαν.676   
The word ἀρρωστίαν, ʻloss of morale,ʼ is the inverse of the Syracusans 
ἀναρρωσθέντες in the previous chapter.677  Although Thucydides implies that 
Athenian resources are still sufficient for victory in the speech of Nicias during 
this war council,678 the development of the ῥώμη theme shows that the 
Athenians have already lost the campaign mentally.  Since the Athenian 
                                            
671 Kallet (2001) 156. 
672 Romilly (1956) 154-155 argues that Demosthenesʼ arrival does improve Athenian spirits 
but, on the contrary, that the loss at Epipolae contributes to the exchange in Athenian and 
Syracusan morale. 
673 Kallet (2001) 155-156. 
674 Hornblower 3 630. 
675 Romilly (1956) 37. 
676 T 7.47.1: “Meanwhile, the Athenian generals deliberated on the disaster which had 
happened and the lack of strength of the army in all respects.” 
677 Hornblower 3 632. 
678 Kallet (2001) 158, especially n 27. 
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soldiery suffer from κατὰ πάντα ἀρρωστίαν, they do not have the confidence 
to employ their resources successfully.  This lack of strength despite their 
material power suggests why the Athenians ultimately face defeat.  The final 
confirmation of Athenian failure in Sicily is the lack of ῥώμη, discussed above, 
as the Athenians abandon their camp and Nicias gives his last speech. 
 
5.3 ῾Ρώμη in Extant Sixth and Fifth Century Literature 
 The noun ῥώμη and the related verb ἔρρωμαι are post-Homeric, with 
the noun occurring for the first time in the poetry of Xenophanes and an 
adverbial form of the participle occurring in Aeschylusʼ Prometheus Bound.  
The words initially refer strictly to physical, bodily strength, and Sophocles is 
the first who uses both in more metaphorical senses.  In Xenophanes 2, the 
inferiority of athletesʼ ῥώμη to the thinkerʼs wisdom is a major theme.  This 
mind/body antithesis is one of the more common contexts for ῥώμη, although 
ῥώμη also begins to appear frequently in the old/young antithesis in the 
second half of the fifth century.  In fact, the usages of Xenophanes, Simonides, 
and Aeschylus all refer explicitly to physical strength.  Xenophanes contrasts 
the ῥώμη of athletes and animals with his own wisdom three times: 
ῥώμης γὰρ ἀμείνων 
    ἀνδρῶν ἠδʼ ἵππων ἡμετέρη σοφίη. 
  ἀλλʼ εἰκῆι μάλα τοῦτο νομίζεται, οὐδὲ δίκαιον 
    προκρίνειν ῥώμην τῆς ἀγαθῆς σοφίης. 
  οὔτε γὰρ εἰ πύκτης ἀγαθὸς λαοῖσι μετείη 
    οὔτʼ εἰ πενταθλεῖν οὔτε παλαισμοσύνην, 
  οὐδὲ μὲν εἰ ταχυτῆτι ποδῶν, τόπερ ἐστὶ πρότιμον 
    ῥώμης ὅσσʼ ἀνδρῶν ἔργʼ ἐν ἀγῶνι πέλει, 
  τοὔνεκεν ἂν δὴ μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομίηι πόλις εἴη.679 
                                            
679 Xenophanes 2.13-21 (Diels-Kranz): “My skill is better than the strength of men and horses.  
But this thing is especially esteemed for no reason, and it is not right to prefer strength to good 
knowledge.  Not if a good boxer, nor if someone good at the pentathlon or wrestling, and not 
 205 
By Xenophanesʼ argument sophia is a purely mental quality but physical ῥώμη 
is common to men and beasts.  This is part of his rhetoric privileging his own 
contribution to the polis, but the antithesis between ῥώμη as a physical quality 
and mental attributes recurs in Simonides 6.50.  The epigram commemorates 
the Greek victory over the Persians:  
Τόνδε ποθʼ Ἕλληνες ῥώμῃ χερὸς ἔργῳ Ἄρηος, 
  εὐτόλμῳ ψυχῆς λήματι πειθόμενοι, 
Πέρσας ἐξελάσαντες, ἐλεύθερον Ἑλλάδι κόσμον 
  ἱδρύσαντο Διὸς βωμὸν Ἐλευθερίου.680 
Here again ῥώμη is purely physical, since it is modified by ʻhandʼ and followed 
by a list of mental terms.681   
In the Persians, Aeschylus uses a similar expression when Xerxes cries 
out at the misfortune: λέλυται γὰρ ἐμοὶ γυίων ῥώμη / τήνδʼ ἡλικίαν 
ἐσιδόντʼ ἀστῶν.682  The theme of failing ῥώμη in times of emotional distress 
recurs in Sophocles and becomes more common in Euripides.  An adverbial 
form of the participle (ἐρρωμένως), meaning ʻstrongly, with force,ʼ is used 
twice by Kratos urging on Hephaestus as he transfixes Promotheus at the 
beginning of Prometheus Bound.683  Kratos refers elsewhere to binding 
securely,684 so the application of the participle only to hammering and piercing 
shows that physical force is meant in this context, as well. 
                                            
even if someone with fleetness of foot, which is preferred to all the feats of strength in 
competition, is among the people, would the city for that reason be in better order.” 
680 Simonides Epigrams 6.50: “The Hellenes erected this altar in accordance with the strength 
of their hands, the deed of Ares, the daring of their hearts, and their resolution, after they 
drove out the Persians, as a monument to the freedom of Hellas, for Zeus Eleutherius.” 
681 For other instances of ῥώμη and χεῖρ, see Sophocles OT 122-123, Antiphon 4.3.3; for 
another juxtaposition of ῥώμη and λῆμα, see Herodotus 9.62. 
682 Aeschylus Persians 913-914: “the strength of my limbs left me when I looked at the age of 
the townspeople here.” 
683 Aeschylus Prometheus Bound 65, 76. 
684 Aeschylus Prometheus Bound 61: ἀσφαλῶς. 
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 Sophocles, who uses a finite form of the verb for the first time in extant 
literature, explores more metaphorical meanings for ῥώμη.  When describing 
the murder of Laius, Creon says λῃστὰς ἔφασκε συντυχόντας οὐ μιᾷ / 
ῥώμῃ κτανεῖν νιν, ἀλλὰ σὺν πλήθει χερῶν.685  This seems to be a play on 
phrases like ῥώμῃ χερὸς in Simonides, and here ῥώμη refers to the force of a 
single person.  Later in the play, a messenger says that Oedipus cannot yet 
come out since ῥώμης γε μέντοι καὶ προηγητοῦ τινος / δεῖται.686  Here, the 
messenger seems to be referring to Oedipusʼ physical weakness because of 
his emotional state, like Aeschylus in the Persians and Euripides in multiple 
plays.  In Trachiniae, the old man refers to his inability to help Hyllus: τοὔργον 
τόδε μεῖζον ἀνήκει / ἢ κατʼ ἐμὰν ῥώμαν.687  Although the context does not 
show conclusively that he refers to bodily strength, this theme of diminishing 
ῥώμη in old age recurs in Antiphon and Euripides.  The first usage that 
certainly refers to mental rather than physical strength is the impersonal verb 
in Oedipus at Colonus: κείνοις δʼ ἴσως κεἰ δείνʼ ἐπερρώσθη λέγειν / τῆς 
σῆς ἀγωγῆς.688  The use of the verb plus an infinitive to mean “have the 
strength or confidence to do” reappears in Thucydides but not elsewhere in 
lyric or tragedy. 
 Euripides uses ῥώμη in some of the same contexts as earlier authors 
and expands the meaning even further, mentioning the feeble ῥώμη of old age 
like Sophocles and Antiphon, a lack of ῥώμη as a reaction to powerful 
                                            
685 Sophocles Oedipus Tyrannus 122-123: “he said that bandits happened upon him and killed 
him not with one [manʼs] power but with a number of hands.” 
686 Sophocles Oedipus Tyrannus 1292-1993: “he is, however, in need of strength and 
someone as guide.” 
687 Sophocles Trachiniae 1018-1019: “this deed has become greater than my strength.” 
688 Sophocles Oedipus Coloneus 661-662: “if, perhaps, the confidence comes to them to say 
terrible things about your removal.” 
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emotions like Sophocles and Aeschylus, the ῥώμη of things like the wind or a 
spear, and even the ῥώμη of Agamemnon as king.  In his extant plays, 
Euripides refers to a lack of ῥώμη as a symptom of aging four times, three 
times using the noun and once using the verb.  In Andromache, Peleus urges 
his slave to lead more quickly and says ἀνηβητηρίαν / ῥώμην με καὶ νῦν 
λαμβάνειν, εἴπερ ποτέ.689  The theme appears twice in Heraclidae.  When 
the servant of Hyllus asks the dejected Iolaus to rouse himself, Iolaus replies 
γέροντές ἐσμεν κοὐδαμῶς ἐρρώμεθα.690  Here the weakness claimed by 
the old man is in reality caused by his emotional state, but the servant refers to 
it again a little later.  When Iolaus perks up and says he intends to join in the 
battle, the servant reminds him that οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ τᾶν, ἥ ποτ᾽ ἦν ῥώμη 
σέθεν.691  Similarly, Amphitryon laments that he no longer has the strength to 
settle disputes with the spear in Hercules: ῥώμη γὰρ ἐκλέλοιπεν ἣν πρὶν 
εἴχομεν, / γήρᾳ δὲ τρομερὰ γυῖα κἀμαυρὸν σθένος.692 
Like the other great tragedians, Euripides refers to failing ῥώμη in times 
of high emotional tension.  Near the end of the Suppliant Women, the chorus 
asks servants to take their sonsʼ ashes because of weakness from the 
mourning: οὐ γὰρ ἔνεστιν / ῥώμη παίδων ὑπὸ πένθους.693  Similarly, Electra 
at the beginning of Orestes worries whether or not Menelaus will come to 
rescue her and Orestes: ὡς τά γ᾽ ἄλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀσθενοῦς / ῥώμης ὀχούμεθ᾽.694 
Finally, when Alcmene sees that a messenger has come in Heraclidae, she 
                                            
689 Euripides Andromache 552-553: “now, if ever, is the time to take up my youthful strength.” 
690 Euripides Heraclidae 636: “I am an old man and in no way have the strength.” 
691 Euripides Heraclidae 688: “the strength which once was yours is no more, my friend.” 
692 Euripides Hercules 230-231: “the power which I used to have has gone, my limbs tremble 
with age, and my strength is withered.” 
693 Euripides Supplices 1116-1117: “our strength is gone because of mourning the children.” 
694 Euripides Orestes 68-69: “otherwise, we ride at anchor depending on weak strength.” 
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also becomes weak: ἀσθενὴς μὲν ἥ γ᾽ ἐμὴ / ῥώμη.695  In this case, ῥώμη is 
almost synonymous with ʻbodyʼ by metonymy.  All three tragedians use ῥώμη 
to refer to bodily strength, and discussing the effects of powerful emotions on 
this strength allows them to enhance the emotional tension of their drama. 
Similar to the phrase ἀσθενὴς ῥώμη, a fragment of Euripides 
preserves the phrase ῥώμη ἀμαθὴς: ῥώμη δέ τʼ ἀμαθὴς πολλάκις τίκτει 
βλάβην.696  The lack of context makes analysis of this occurrence difficult,697 
but the relationship between knowledge and ῥώμη becomes an important 
issue in Thucydides.  Euripides, on the other hand, twice uses ῥώμη to refer to 
the force of inanimate objects.  In Hercules, he uses ῥώμη to mean the force 
of wind: καὶ πνεύματ᾽ ἀνέμων οὐκ ἀεὶ ῥώμην ἔχει.698  Similarly, in the 
Suppliant Women, Aethra refers to the force of the spear:  
ὅς μ᾽ ἐξοτρύνει παῖδ᾽ ἐμὸν πεῖσαι λιταῖς 
νεκρῶν κομιστὴν ἢ λόγοισιν ἢ δορὸς 
ῥώμῃ γενέσθαι καὶ τάφου μεταίτιον.699 
Although ῥώμη here properly refers to the force of the inanimate spear, 
Herodotus and Thucydides often connect ῥώμη with battle. 
Euripides himself associates ῥώμη with battle or military power on two 
further occasions.  In Rhesus, Athena calls to Odysseus and Diomedes to hold 
back and sheath their swords: ὑμᾶς δ᾽ ἀυτῶ τοὺς ἄγαν ἐρρωμένους, / 
Λαερτίου παῖ, θηκτὰ κοιμίσαι ξίφη.700  This is the first time in poetry that the 
verb is used absolutely to mean “be confident,” a sense that is common in 
                                            
695 Euripdes Heraclidae 648-649: “my body is weak.” 
696 Euripides Fragmenta 732 (Nauck): “ignorant strength often begets harm.” 
697 It could, for instance, refer to a man of great physical strength but little intelligence or the 
mistakes of an inexperienced youth. 
698 Euripides Hercules 102: “the blowing of the winds does not always have force.” 
699 Euripides Supplices 24-26: “[Adrastus], who urges me to persuade my son by entreaty to 
retrieve the bodies, either with words or by force of arms, and help in the burial.” 
700 Euripides Rhesus 668-669: “I call on you, men too confident, to calm your sharpened 
blades, Laertesʼ son.” 
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Thucydides for finite forms of the verb and the aorist participle.  Another 
interesting metaphorical use occurs in Orestes, when Orestes refers to his 
fatherʼs royal power as ῥώμη: Ἀγαμέμνονός τοι παῖς πέφυχ᾽, ὃς Ἑλλάδος / 
ἦρξ᾽ ἀξιωθείς, οὐ τύραννος, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως / ῥώμην θεοῦ τιν᾽ ἔσχε.701  Orestes 
here likens the supreme imperial power over Greece to the power of a god, 
and the use of tyrannos implies this ῥώμη has a political dimension.  And yet 
the mention of ruling Hellas gives ῥώμη a military connotation as well, since 
his empire ultimately depended on military strength.702 
Before Thucydides, the vocabulary of ῥώμη appears in the prose 
writers Antiphon and Herodotus.  In Tetralogy 3, one of Antiphonʼs arguments 
is that the older defendant lacks the ῥώμη to have started the fight.  This 
antithesis of young ῥώμη and old infirmity appears in Sophoclesʼ Trachiniae 
and is more common in Euripides.  The rhetorical exercise envisions an older 
man defending himself for killing a younger man in a street fight, so the 
hypothetical defendant argues that he would not have started the fight by 
referring to a young manʼs greater strength and inexperience with drinking: 
τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἥ τε μεγαλοφροσύνη τοῦ γένους ἥ τε ἀκμὴ τῆς ῥώμης ἥ 
τε ἀπειρία τῆς μέθης ἐπαίρει τῷ θυμῷ χαρίζεσθαι.703  He continues with 
the theme of ῥώμη peaking in youth a little later: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκμαζούσῃ τῇ 
ῥώμῃ τῶν χειρῶν χρώμενος ἀπέκτεινεν.704  Here again ῥώμη is connected 
with the hands, showing that, in Antiphonʼs extant works at least, the word is 
closely connected with the bodily strength of youth.  The recurrence of this 
                                            
701 Euripides Orestes 1167-1169: “I was born a son of Agamemnon, who was deemed worthy 
and ruled Hellas; he was not a tyrant, but he had something of the power of a god.” 
702 Compare Thucydidesʼ account of Agamemnonʼs dunamis (1.9). 
703 Antiphon 4.3.2: “the arrogance of their age, the peak of their power, and their inexperience 
with drink drives them to indulge their spirit.” 
704 Antiphon 4.3.3: “the man enjoying his handʼs peaking strength killed him.” 
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theme in Antiphon, Sophocles, and Euripides shows that by the later 5th 
century the Greeks, or at least the Athenians, commonly associated ῥώμη 
with youth.705  In fact, Antiphonʼs argument is predicated on the hypothetical 
juryʼs belief that ῥώμη reaches its ἀκμή in youth. 
Like Xenophanes, Herodotus typically uses ῥώμη to mean physical 
strength, sometimes even explicitly contrasting it with mental qualities.  
Although Herodotus does not criticize ῥώμη like his Ionian predecessor, he 
does not consider it a decisive factor in military contexts like Thucydides does.  
Herodotus associates ῥώμη with youth but does not show a concern for its 
failure in old age like the tragedians.  The ῥώμη of the two youths is the theme 
of Solonʼs Cleobis and Biton anecdote.  Solon introduces the story as ῥώμη 
σώματος τοιήδε, and after the boys pull their mother to town, Ἀργεῖοι μὲν 
γὰρ περιστάντες ἐμακάριζον τῶν νεηνιέων τὴν ῥώμην.706  Their mother 
then prays for them to receive the greatest gift from Hera, so the boys go to 
sleep and never awaken.  Here again ῥώμη is strictly physical and a feature of 
their age, and the Argivesʼ response to the boysʼ death immortalizes their 
youthful strength.  When Croesus sends the exiled Phrygian Adrastus to 
escort his son on a hunt, the king refers to the youthʼs lineage and strength: 
πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ καὶ σέ τοι χρεόν ἐστι ἰέναι ἔνθα ἀπολαμπρυνέαι τοῖσι 
ἔργοισι· πατρώιόν τε γάρ τοί ἐστι καὶ προσέτι ῥώμη ὑπάρχει.707  
Unfortunately for Croesus, the strength he praises inadvertently causes the 
death of his son. 
                                            
705 Compare T 2.9, where ῥώμη for the war is associated with youth not because of young 
menʼs strength but because of their inexperience. 
706 Herodotus 1.31.2: “the following [feat of] bodily strength,” 1.31.3: “the Argive men stood 
around congratulating the youths for their strength.” 
707 Herodotus 1.41.3: “In addition, you also should go where you can win renown with your 
deed; it suits your lineage, and you have strength besides.” 
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Herodotus twice pairs ῥώμη with a mental quality, showing explicitly 
that he considers ῥώμη to be one half of the mind/body antithesis.  After he 
recounts the restoration of some exiles by Telines using holy artifacts rather 
than force, Herodotus expresses amazement that a man reputed to be 
effeminate and cowardly could accomplish such a deed:  
τὰ τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἔργα οὐ πρὸς [τοῦ] ἅπαντος ἀνδρὸς νενόμικα 
γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ψυχῆς τε ἀγαθῆς καὶ ῥώμης ἀνδρηίης· ὁ δὲ 
λέγεται πρὸς τῆς Σικελίης τῶν οἰκητόρων τὰ ὑπεναντία τούτων 
πεφυκέναι θηλυδρίης τε καὶ μαλακώτερος ἀνήρ.708   
In this sentence, ψυχή describes the hypothetical heroʼs mental goodness and 
ῥώμη describes his physical attributes.  Although in Thucydides a phrase like 
ῥώμη ἀνδρεῖα would probably mean something like “courageous confidence,” 
Herodotus contrasts it with θηλυδρίης and so means something more like 
“masculine physique.”  Herodotusʼ essential explanation of the Persiansʼ 
defeat also addresses the ῥώμη of both sides in the war, but he concludes 
that possessing this physical quality did not help the Persians against the 
Greeks.  In Herodotusʼ view, the Persians did not lack spirit or strength but lost 
because of their deficiency in equipment and intelligence: λήματι μέν νυν καὶ 
ῥώμῃ οὐκ ἥσσονες ἦσαν οἱ Πέρσαι, ἄνοπλοι δὲ ἐόντες καὶ πρὸς 
ἀνεπιστήμονες ἦσαν καὶ οὐκ ὅμοιοι τοῖσι ἐναντίοισι σοφίην.709  The 
essential contrast is of valor and bodily strength, in which the Persians 
matched the Greeks, with arms and knowledge, in which the Persians were 
inferior.  Thus, Herodotus generously attributes physical strength and courage 
                                            
708 Herodotus 7.153.4: “I have always thought that such actions were not the part of every 
man, but of a good spirit and manly strength; but it is said by the inhabitants of Sicily that he 
was the opposite of these things, a rather cowardly and effeminate man.” 
709 Herodotus 9.62.3: “the Persians were not inferior in valor or strength, but being without 
hoplite regalia and in addition lacking knowledge, they were also not equal to their opponents 
in skill.” 
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to the Persians, but these are not decisive factors in his eyes, since tactics 
and equipment made the difference in this battle.710  For Thucydides, ῥώμη 
typically brings or results from victory, but ῥώμη does not have a causal 
relationship with victory in Herodotus.   
Herodotus also uses the verb ἔρρωμαι in connection with battle but 
applies it to things like the wing of an army or the battle itself.  He does not use 
the verb to describe the physical or mental strength of individuals or groups of 
men.  At Marathon, Herodotus calls the wings of the Athenian army strong in 
numbers: 
τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐξισούμενον τῷ Μηδικῷ στρατοπέδῳ, τὸ μὲν 
αὐτοῦ μέσον ἐγίνετο ἐπὶ τάξις ὀλίγας, καὶ ταύτῃ ἦν ἀσθενέστατον 
τὸ στρατόπεδον, τὸ δὲ κέρας ἑκάτερον ἔρρωτο πλήθεϊ.711  
In this passage, Herodotus describes the thickness and thinness of the battle 
line in terms of strength and weakness.  The reasoning for this arrangement 
was probably topographical, since the ground on the wings may have been 
more level and open.712  Herodotus uses an irregular comparative form of the 
participle to describe the Greeksʼ battle for the Persian camp.  The Persians 
flee to their fortified camp, and the Lacedaemonians pursue: προσελθόντων 
δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων κατεστήκεέ σφι τειχομαχίη ἐρρωμενεστέρη.713  
The comparative participle is a bit awkward in this sentence, but it probably 
means something like “stronger than the Lacedaemonians could deal with.”714  
Thus, it refers to the Lacedaemoniansʼ recurring problems with siege craft, 
                                            
710 Macan (1908) s.v. 9.62. 
711 Herodotus 6.111.3: “the [Athenian] army matched the Persian army in length, but it was in 
few ranks there in the middle, and the army was weakest here, but each wing was strong in 
numbers.” 
712 How and Wells (1928) s.v. 6.111. 
713 Herodotus 9.70.1: “when the Lacedaemonians approached, a battle for the walls more 
powerful [than they could handle] ensued.” 
714 Macan (1908) s.v. 9.70. 
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since they cannot take the walls until the Athenians arrive to help.715  In any 
case, Herodotus applies the word to the battle itself rather than the 
combatants, a usage that is unparalleled in Thucydides. 
Two additional appearances of the noun ῥώμη are comparable to 
Thucydidesʼ use of ῥώμη to mean physical and mental power, although they 
do not refer conclusively to more than physical strength.  In the catalogue of 
Persian contingents, Herodotus says that the Medes were not fewer than the 
Persians in number but were inferior in strength: οὗτοι δὲ πλῆθος μὲν οὐκ 
ἐλάσσονες ἦσαν τῶν Περσέων, ῥώμῃ δὲ ἥσσονες.716  Thus, the ῥώμη of 
the Persians to which Herodotus returns when explaining the outcome of the 
war is first introduced here.  Herodotus also associates ῥώμη with the 
Spartans at Thermopylae.  Although the Persians have discovered a mountain 
track that will enable them to attack the Spartans from behind, the Spartans 
continue fighting:  
ἃτε γὰρ ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν μέλλοντά σφι ἔσεσθαι θάνατον ἐκ τῶν 
περιιόντων τὸ ὄρος, ἀπεδείκνυντο ῥώμης ὅσον εἶχον μέγιστον ἐς 
τοὺς βαρβάρους, παραχρεώμενοί τε καὶ ἀτέοντες.717  
Again, their ῥώμη is amazing, but the Spartan warriors can only prove how 
great it is by recklessly giving their lives.  Although Herodotus mentions ῥώμη 
in connection with some of the most important battles in his Histories, it is 
ultimately an ineffectual quality.  Herodotus shows that the ῥώμη of the 
Persians and the three hundred Spartans is noteworthy, but this ῥώμη is not a 
determinant of victory in his eyes.  Herodotus uses ῥώμη in military contexts 
                                            
715 Ibid.; How and Wells (1928) s.v. 9.70. 
716 Herodotus 8.113.3: “these were no fewer than the Persians in number but were inferior in 
strength.” 
717 Herodotus 7.223.4: “since they knew death would result for them from those coming around 
the mountain, they showed recklessly and madly against the barbarians how very great the 
strength they had was.” 
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much differently from Thucydides, since ῥώμη either comes from or results in 
victory in Thucydides. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 Throughout his account of the Sicilian Expedition, Thucydides uses 
ῥώμη as a recurrent motif that invites the reader to compare the power of 
different combatants.  The transformation of the material and mental ῥώμη 
represented by the initial expedition and Demosthenesʼ reinforcements into the 
broken physical ῥώμη of Nicias and the wounded is symptomatic of the 
decline of Athenian power and morale.  Furthermore, the conflicting 
understanding of ῥώμη exhibited by Alcibiades and Nicias prefigures the 
latterʼs failure to direct Athenian power effectively.  Even though Demosthenes 
came with ῥώμη equal to the initial force, the decision not to recall Nicias 
prevented that ῥώμη from changing morale on either side in a lasting way.   
 Although ῥώμη and related words require a number of different 
renderings in English, Thucydides develops a unified concept that significantly 
overlaps with the definition of morale advanced in chapter one.718  Not only 
does possession or lack of ῥώμη reflect how high or low a groupʼs morale is 
during the war in Sicily, Thucydides suggests that a lack of ῥώμη based on a 
feeling of guilt for breaking the treaty was behind Spartaʼs poor performance in 
the Archidamian War (7.18.1-2).  Indeed, this passage reveals that 
Thucydides analyzed momentum in all phases of the war in terms of ῥώμη.  
Like high morale, ῥώμη involves confidence, reasonable expectations of 
success, physical well-being, and even a belief in the essential rightness of 
                                            
718 See chapter 1.1. 
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oneʼs actions.  Furthermore, possessing ῥώμη correlates to willingness to 
prosecute the war.  The Lacedaemonians sued for peace after the campaign 
at Pylos revealed their lack of ῥώμη (4.18.3, 4.29.2, 4.36.2), and the 
Athenians only seriously negotiated when the deficiency of their own ῥώμη 
came to light (5.14.1).  Thus, Thucydides has transformed a word that 
originally referred to physical strength into a basic descriptor of mental and 
material power during the war.   
Although the occasional usage in Sophocles and Euripides are similar 
to the senses in which Thucydides uses ῥώμη, no other author explores ῥώμη 
as one of the most important qualities for war.  Even Herodotus, who like his 
Ionian predecessor Xenophanes seems mostly to use ῥώμη to describe 
physical attributes, does not consider ῥώμη a determinant of victory.  
Thucydides is the first author to recognize ῥώμη as the psychological, 
material, and physical power that can bring success in warfare.  And yet the 
vocabulary of ῥώμη does not only occur in Thucydidesʼ own analysis in the 
narrative.  Using the campaign in Sicily as a case study has shown that ῥώμη 
also appears in direct and indirect speeches in a way that contributes to 
Thucydidesʼ implicit characterization of different groups and leaders.  
Understanding how Thucydides conceptualizes ῥώμη reveals the richness of 
his psychology of war, and the subsequent chapters will show how Thucydides 
innovatively uses other semantic fields to give a fuller picture of the morale of 
soldiers and cities throughout his account of the Peloponnesian War. 
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 As a general himself, Thucydides had firsthand knowledge of the 
importance of soldiersʼ morale, and his emphasis on seeing the entirety of the 
war shows that he was also able to observe the collective morale of city-states 
over the long term.719  In books six and seven, morale becomes a major 
theme, as Thucydides repeatedly returns to the mindset of the Athenians, 
Syracusans, Lacedaemonians, and Corinthians.  The confidence (ῥώμη) and 
enthusiasm (προθυμία) of Athensʼ enemies keep increasing, until the morale 
(ῥώμη) of the Athenians in Sicily totally disintegrates because Athens shows 
too much boldness (τόλμα) rather than courage (ἀνδρεία).  Although the 
terms and methods of analysis constantly evolve, morale remains a chief 
concern even in contemporary conflicts.  For instance, David Brooks explains 
that the rise of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran to prominence in the struggle in 
the Middle East has led to a “new game” that is   
a struggle for confidence, a series of psychological exchanges 
designed to shift the balance of morale. The material destroyed in an 
episode can be replaced, but the psychological effects are more lasting. 
What is really important is how each episode ends, because the ending 
defines the meaning — who mastered events and who was mastered 
by them.720  
Thucydides also relates a struggle to ʻmaster events,ʼ as shown by Niciasʼ 
deleterious effects on Athenian morale and Alcibiadesʼ positive effects on the 
morale of the Lacedaemonians, the Corinthians, and, by extension, the 
                                            
719 T 4.104.4, 5.26.5. 
720 Brooks (2009). 
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Syracusans.  In Thucydidesʼ view, it was the failure of Athensʼ leadership 
rather than military or material concerns that led to the Atheniansʼ defeat.721  
 Furthermore, the description and even experience of an individualʼs 
broken morale changes according to the nature of the conflict.  In World War I, 
“shell shock” caused trembling, paralysis, and loss of sight or hearing; in World 
War II, “battle fatigue” or “war neurosis” caused nightmares, startling, and 
anxiety; in contemporary conflicts, the flashbacks, nightmares, and other 
symptoms of combat stress are attributed to “post-traumatic stress 
disorder.”722  The ancients tended to talk about morale in binary terms, 
contrasting eagerness and discipline to panic and fear,723 and Thucydides is 
no exception.  In addition to negative forms of the major words discussed in 
this study, Thucydides shows how φόβος, ἔκπληξις, δέος, and a number of 
words or phrases referring to the reversal of expectations can undermine 
morale.  Thucydides also relates terms like θάρσος, εὐψυχία, and εὐταξία to 
good morale,724 but the most important concepts for understanding morale in 
his Histories thematically are ἀνδρεία, τόλμα, προθυμία, and ῥώμη. 
 Since the investigations of ἀνδρεία, τόλμα, προθυμία, and ῥώμη are 
complete, it is now possible to reassess the two passages with which this 
discussion of morale started in chapter one.  In 6.69.1, Thucydidesʼ 
assessment of Syracusan morale weaves together numerous thematic threads 
and alerts the reader that the Athenians are facing a formidable adversary 
                                            
721 T 2.65.11, discussed at length below. 
722 Goode (2009). 
723 Lendon (1999) 291. 
724 Romilly (1956) 37 notes that θάρσος is conspicuously absent from descriptions of morale 
in the in the Sicilian Expedition, although Woodhead (1970) 40-50 relates Pericles to Athenian 
democratic θάρσος; see also chapter 2.1 on εὐψυχία and a use of εὐταξία by Hermocrates 
discussed in chapter 2.5. 
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despite their initial victory.  This authorial statement is divided into two parts, 
first addressing Syracusan προθυμία and τόλμα, then ἀνδρεία and 
ἐπιστήμη:  
οὐ γὰρ δὴ προθυμίᾳ ἐλλιπεῖς ἦσαν οὐδὲ τόλμῃ οὔτʼ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ 
μάχῃ οὔτʼ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν ἀνδρείᾳ οὐχ ἥσσους ἐς 
ὅσον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἀντέχοι, τῷ δὲ ἐλλείποντι αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν 
βούλησιν ἄκοντες προυδίδοσαν.725  
The first half, with its combination of daring and enthusiasm, recalls the 
Atheniansʼ claim to have show the most daring enthusiasm (προθυμίαν δὲ 
καὶ πολὺ τολμηροτάτην) against Persia (1.74.2); but it also reinforces the 
rhetorical uses of προθυμία and τόλμα by Syracusan leaders within 
Thucydidesʼ narrative of the Sicilian expedition.  This positive depiction of 
Syracusan προθυμία is also enclosed by more negative portrayals of 
Athenian προθυμία at 6.68.4 and 6.69.3.  The second half recalls the victory 
of the Spartans at Mantinea, in which their ἀνδρεία makes up for adeficiency 
in ἐμπειρία.  Although the Syracusans cannot overcome their lack of 
ἐπιστήμη in this battle, Thucydides implies they eventually will through his 
authorial statement about Hermocratesʼ ἀνδρεία and ἐμπειρία (6.72.2) and 
Hermocratesʼ indirect speech about augmenting their ἀνδρεία by acquiring 
ἐπιστήμη through training (6.72.4).  This implicit analysis of ἀνδρεία, 
experience, and skill also recalls the speeches and battles at Naupactus, and 
Thucydides depicts the Syracusans here as combining the best qualities of 
both the Athenian and Peloponnesian forces there.  Thus, although the 
Syracusans lose this initial battle, Thucydides prepares the reader to 
understand their ultimate victory even in their first unsuccessful engagement. 
                                            
725 T 6.69.1: “In fact, they were not deficient in enthusiasm or daring either in this battle or in 
the others; and they were no worse in courage as long as their knowledge held out, but when 
it ran short they unwillingly gave up their resolve as well.” 
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 In 7.18.2, one of his most substantial and wide-ranging excursuses on 
morale,726 Thucydides comments on Lacedaemonian morale near the 
beginning of the Decelean War in a way that also sheds new light on their 
morale during the Archidamian War.  In addition, this passage is part of a 
larger motif of power flowing from Athens to her enemies during the war in 
Sicily.  The Lacedaemonians are preparing an invasion when they hear about 
Demosthenesʼ relief force for the Athenians in Sicily, and Alcibiades instructs 
(ἐδίδασκε) them to fortify Decelea and not relax their war efforts.727  Then, 
Thucydides discusses both the ῥώμη and προθυμία of the Lacedaemonians: 
μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐγεγένητό τις ῥώμη, διότι τοὺς 
Ἀθηναίους ἐνόμιζον διπλοῦν τὸν πόλεμον ἔχοντας, πρός τε σφᾶς 
καὶ Σικελιώτας, εὐκαθαιρετωτέρους ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι τὰς σπονδὰς 
προτέρους λελυκέναι ἡγοῦντο αὐτούς· ἐν γὰρ τῷ προτέρῳ 
πολέμῳ σφέτερον τὸ παρανόμημα μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι τε ἐς 
Πλάταιαν ἦλθον Θηβαῖοι ἐν σπονδαῖς, καὶ εἰρημένον ἐν ταῖς 
πρότερον ξυνθήκαις ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν, ἢν δίκας ἐθέλωσι διδόναι, 
αὐτοὶ οὐχ ὑπήκουον ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων. καὶ 
διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως δυστυχεῖν τε ἐνόμιζον, καὶ ἐνεθυμοῦντο τήν τε 
περὶ Πύλον ξυμφορὰν καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ 
Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσὶν ἐξ Ἄργους ὁρμώμενοι Ἐπιδαύρου 
τέ τι καὶ Πρασιῶν καὶ ἄλλα ἐδῄωσαν καὶ ἐκ Πύλου ἅμα 
ἐλῃστεύοντο, καὶ ὁσάκις περί του διαφοραὶ γένοιντο τῶν κατὰ τὰς 
σπονδὰς ἀμφισβητουμένων, ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν 
Λακεδαιμονίων οὐκ ἤθελον ἐπιτρέπειν, τότε δὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι 
νομίσαντες τὸ παρανόμημα, ὅπερ καὶ σφίσι πρότερον ἡμάρτητο, 
αὖθις ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὸ αὐτὸ περιεστάναι, πρόθυμοι ἦσαν ἐς 
τὸν πόλεμον.728 
                                            
726 Hornblower 3 648. 
727 T 7.18.1.  Compare the claim of Brasidas that his διδαχή will encourage his soldiers 
(4.126.4, discussed above in section 2.5) 
728 7.18.2-3: “A certain strength most of all had come to the Lacedaemonians, since they 
believed that Athenians, with a two-front war on their hands, against the Lacedaemonians and 
the Sicilians, would be more easily subdued; and because they thought the Athenians had 
broken the treaty first. In the earlier conflict, they thought they themselves were more at fault, 
since the Thebans attacked Plataea under treaty; and because it was stipulated in the earlier 
treaty that they would not take up arms if the two parties were willing to participate in 
arbitration, but they did not submit to arbitration when the Athenians asked.  Therefore, they 
believed it was right to suffer misfortune, and they took to heart the disaster at Pylos and 
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Thucydides uses ring composition both to enclose the digression on war guilt 
and within the digression itself.  ῾Ρώμη at the beginning of the sentence is 
picked up by πρόθυμοι at the end of the digression.  Furthermore, the 
repetition of παρανόμημα, first attributed to the Peloponnesians and then to 
the Athenians, enacts the “coming around” described by περιεστάναι.729  The 
foregrounding of this transgression explains why Thucydides shifts from ῥώμη 
to προθυμία.  Both the noun παρανόμημα and the verb ἐνεθυμοῦντο, which 
Thucydides uses to describe the Lacedaemoniansʼ reactions to their 
misfortunes, give the discussion of war guilt a quasi-religious undertone.730  
Thus, πρόθυμοι describes their emotional response to the Atheniansʼ 
perceived guilt, and their enthusiasm is also a reversal of the reaction to the 
earlier misfortunes that Thucydides described with ἐνεθυμοῦντο, another 
word from the same root.   
 The Lacedaemonian ῥώμη, however, is explained by two parallel 
clauses introduced by διότι and καὶ ὅτι, giving equal weight to the Atheniansʼ 
weakness due to the two front war and their violation of the treaty.  Although 
ῥώμη and προθυμία often have similar meanings, chapters four and five have 
shown that ῥώμη is exclusively positive and typically more rational, but 
προθυμία can be positive or negative and is more emotional.  This distinction 
can be seen in the current passage, since high morale is more rational and 
likely to bring victory when based on the enemyʼs strategic difficulties as well 
                                            
anything else that happened to them.  But after the Athenians setting off from Argos with thirty 
ships were ravaging the lands of Epidaurus, Prasiae, and other places and were mounting 
raids from Pylos, and were not willing to participate in arbitration whenever differences arose 
concerning something agreed in the treaty, even though the Lacedaemonians called for 
arbitration; then the Lacedaemonians considered the same fault that had formerly been their 
own to be the Atheniansʼ and were enthusiastic for war.” 
729 Hornblower 3 575. 
730 Hornblower 3 573-575. 
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as oneʼs own feelings of moral outrage.  Furthermore, Thucydides made the 
falling of the Atheniansʼ and the rising of their enemiesʼ ῥώμη a theme of 
books six and seven.  Alcibiades not only reinforces Lacedaemonian ῥώμη 
with his advice about Decelea, he also gives them the ῥώμη to send Gylippus 
to Syracuse (6.93.1), resulting in an increase in ῥώμη for the Syracusans and 
the Corinthians, too (7.2.1, 7.17.3). 
Alcibiades is not the only leader who has profound effects on morale 
during the war in Sicily.  Hermocrates, Gylippus, and Nicias also play major 
roles.  Since leaders most readily elicit the qualities that they themselves show 
from others, Thucydidesʼ descriptions of leaders and their speeches are often 
mutually reinforcing.  Hermocrates, whom Thucydides calls a man of ἀνδρεία 
and ἐμπειρία (6.72.2), convinces the Syracusans to take steps to augment 
their ἀνδρεία with skill and expertise (6.72.4).  Since this follows closely on 
Thucydidesʼ own explanation that the Syracusansʼ first defeat was due to a 
lack of ἐπιστήμη rather than a deficiency of τόλμα, προθυμία, or ἀνδρεία, 
the reader can infer that Syracuse will ultimately win and that Hermocrates will 
play a central role in the victory.  Hermocrates also repeatedly advises his 
countrymen to match Athenian τόλμα with their own, both before and after 
Thucydides himself vouches for Syracusan τόλμα.  In his first speech in favor 
of bold action against the Athenians, Hermocrates also emphasizes rational 
precautions (6.34.8).  Later, Hermocrates helps persuade the Syracusans to 
show the προθυμία for a sea battle by claiming that unexpected daring will 
overcome the Atheniansʼ advantage in expertise, even using the rare verb 
ἀντιτολμᾶν to describe setting their own daring against the Atheniansʼ 
(7.21.3-4).  Although the Syracusans lose this first sea battle, Hermocratesʼ 
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emphasis on τόλμα and προθυμία is part of a broader theme of Athenian-
Syracusan similarity that culminates in total Syracusan victory.   
The Spartan general Gylippus also contributes to the morale of the 
Syracusans and their allies in important ways.  Unlike the factious Athenians, 
Gylippus and the Syracusan leadership seem to work together smoothly. 
Thucydides reports Gylippus and Hermocrates working together to persuade 
the Syracusans to dare their first sea battle (7.21), and the speech of Gylippus 
and the generals before the climactic battle in the Great Harbor (7.67.1) picks 
up the themes of ἐπιστήμη, τόλμα, and προθυμία from Hermocratesʼ 
speeches and Thucydidesʼ early assessment of Syracusan morale (6.69.1).  
Gylippus argues that the Syracusansʼ constant τόλμα and recently acquired 
ἐπιστήμη will increase their προθυμία, and the narrative of the battle 
validates his claim.  Gylippus also has more immediate effects on the morale 
of the Syracusans and their Sicilian allies.  When he seems to arrive with 
προθυμία, some potential Syracusan allies become more enthusiastic (7.1.4), 
and the Syracusans themselves gain ῥώμη (7.2.1).  Gylippus subsequently 
goes around to ensure the προθυμία of any wavering allies (7.7.2), and after 
victory in their first battle against Demosthenesʼ relief force instills ῥώμη in the 
Syracusans, he goes to round up more troops (7.46.1).  Thus, Gylippus not 
only reinforces the values that lead to Syracusan success, he also capitalizes 
on his own reputation and that of his countrymen to raise Syracusan and allied 
morale at critical moments. 
The Athenian leaders, however, are not nearly as unified and effective 
during the war in Sicily as the Syracusan leadership.  Nicias has trouble 
raising the προθυμία and ῥώμη of the Athenian soldiers, and the only time he 
mentions the Atheniansʼ favorite quality, τόλμα, is in reference to the 
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Syracusans.  Nicias did not want to command the expedition (6.23.3), so it is 
no surprise that he advocates showing προθυμία for their Sicilian allies by 
quickly coasting around Sicily and then sailing home (6.47.1), rather than 
actually fighting with enthusiasm alongside them.  Before the first major land 
battle in Sicily, Nicias tells his men that the Syracusansʼ τόλμα cannot make 
up for their lack of ἐπιστήμη and exhorts them to show προθυμία (6.68.2, 
6.68.4).  Although Thucydides confirms that a lack of ἐπιστήμη hinders the 
Syracusans in this initial battle, he also emphasizes their τόλμα and 
προθυμία, setting the stage for the Syracusansʼ ultimate victory once they 
gain ἐπιστήμη.  Even when the soldiers under Nicias achieve victory, 
Thucydides emphasizes the moral qualities of their opponents.  Nicias also 
sees his menʼs ἀθυμία before the battle in the Great Harbor and tries to 
counteract it (7.60.5, 7.61.2). In the same speech, he concedes that the 
Syracusans have ῥώμη but claims his men will be able to overcome it 
(7.63.4).  Otherwise, Nicias only refers to his own lack of physical ῥώμη 
(7.15.2, 7.77.2), mirroring the withering of Athenian military ῥώμη under his 
command.  Although Nicias finally shows προθυμία when he is trying the 
encourage his defeated and desperate men, he is unable to improve their 
morale (7.76.1).  Furthermore, Thucydides emphasizes Niciasʼ προθυμία for 
Spartan interests when describing his execution (7.86.3), echoing the 
προθυμία Nicias showed for ending the Archidamian War. 
Unlike Nicias, Alcibiades is extremely effective at eliciting προθυμία  
and ῥώμη, so his defections greatly affect morale on both sides.  Furthermore, 
Alcibiades redefines the relationship between city and leader, claiming that a 
leader is on par with the city rather than being subordinate to it like other 
citizens, and Thucydidesʼ insistence on Athensʼ needing Alciabiades gives this 
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argument some merit.731  Alcibiades most enthusiastically supports the 
expedition to Sicily (6.15.2), arguing in part that Lacedaemonian ῥώμη cannot 
interfere, since it is limited to land (6.17.8).  After going over to Sparta, 
however, Alcibiades increases the προθυμία of the Lacedaemonians and 
helps unlock their ῥώμη.  Alcibiades makes a speech because the 
Lacedaemonian leaders are lacking προθυμία (6.88.10), aiming to convince 
the Lacedaemonians to aid Syracuse enthusiastically (6.92.1).  He also refers 
to his personal προθυμία during the earlier peace negotiations being rebuffed 
in favor of his enemy Nicias (6.89.2), and tries to excuse enthusiastically 
attacking Athens because it has become hostile to him (6.92.2).  These 
arguments highlight the divisions between Alcibiades and his former partners 
in command as well as the general political tensions at Athens.  Thucydides 
explains that the speech gives the Spartans ῥώμη, and they send Gylippus to 
Syracuse (6.93.1).  The arrival of Gylippus increases the ῥώμη of the 
Syracusans in turn (7.2.1), so Alcibiadesʼ defection represents a concrete 
transfer of power from Athens to Sparta and Syracuse.  The effects of 
Alcibiadesʼ advice about Decelea on Spartan morale have been discussed 
above, but Alcibiades also influences morale as the war moves into the 
Aegean.  Before his exile from Sparta, he claims he will convince the Ionians 
of Spartan προθυμία (8.12.1).  Later, Alcibiades enthusiastically attaches 
himself to Tissaphernes (8.52.1), but his betrayal ultimately causes 
Tissaphernes to lose ῥώμη (8.83.2).  Finally, a message from Alcibiades 
increases the ῥώμη of the Athenians who were disaffected with the oligarchy 
(8.89.1).  Thus, Thucydides personally implicates Alcibiades in many of the 
                                            
731 Forde (1989) 7.  Compare Thucydidesʼ explanation that every individual and city had ῥώμη 
at the beginning of the war (2.8.4). 
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critical changes in morale during the later phases of the Peloponnesian War.  
Although Alcibiades shares and inflames the uncontrolled desire that prompts 
the expedition to Sicily, he himself is not explicitly associated with the 
Atheniansʼ reckless τόλμα.  Instead, Thucydides implies that other Atheniansʼ 
τόλμα led to internal strife and the senseless recall of their ablest general in 
Sicily. 
This analysis of Athenian leadership in books six and seven invites a 
reappraisal of Thucydides judgment of the Sicilian expedition in book two.  
Rather than explicitly citing the leadership of the generals in Sicily, Thucydides 
attributes the failure to bad Athenian decision making.  Thucydides also 
associates the failure of the expedition with internal conflict at Athens: 
ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλά, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, 
ἡμαρτήθη καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς, ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης 
ἁμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπῇσαν, ὅσον οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες οὐ τὰ 
πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας 
διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας τά τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ 
ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις 
ἐταράχθησαν.732 
As Thucydides explains,733 Alcibiadesʼ personal enemies were responsible for 
stirring up public opinion against him, corresponding to the “private quarrels 
over the leadership of the People.”  In addition, the “discord first introduced in 
the cityʼs other affairs” means the beginnings of civil unrest that Thucydides 
highights through the tyrannicide digression as the Atheniansʼ passions led 
them to act irrationally.  Although the ἔρως and τόλμα related to the genesis 
                                            
732 T 2.65.11: “This, as might have been expected in a great and sovereign state, produced a 
host of blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian expedition; though this failed not so much 
through an error in judgment about those against whom it was sent, as through a fault in the 
senders in not making additional decisions beneficial to those who had gone out, but choosing 
rather to occupy themselves with private quarrels over leadership of the People, by which they 
not only paralyzed operations in the field, but also first introduced civil discord at home” 
(adapted from Crawleyʼs translation). 
733 T 6.61.1. 
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of the expedition can be seen to foreshadow its disastrous end, Athenian 
defeat was not inevitable.  Competent and respected leadership can moderate 
τόλμα, so that it destroys only oneʼs enemies.  Pericles was able to do so for 
the Athenians, and Hermocrates did the same for the Syracusans. The 
moderating power of a strong leader is crucial in controlling τόλμα.   
 Furthermore, my analysis of προθυμία and ῥώμη in Thucydidesʼ 
account of the Sicilian expedition fills in the details of Thucydidesʼ claim that 
the Athenians did not properly support the men in Sicily.  Connor argues that 
the failure of the Athenians to make the right decisions in support of those they 
sent out refers not only to the recall of Alcibiades but also the failure to recall 
Nicias, who tries to resign his command three times in Thucydidesʼ 
narrative.734  The loss of Alcibiadesʼ skills at reinforcing προθυμία and ῥώμη 
greatly hinders the war effort, especially since he applies those skills to the 
Atheniansʼ enemies.  Just as important, however, is Niciasʼ lack of personal 
ῥώμη and inability to control his menʼs προθυμία.  Nicias gives the Athenians 
clear indications that he is unable to manage his menʼs morale effectively, but 
they continue to trust him to command.  Thucydides shows that leaders are 
most successful at eliciting the qualities they show themselves from others, so 
the personal contrasts between Nicias and Alcibiades are also reflected in 
their command abilities.  Thus, continued trust in the unenthusiastic and sickly 
Nicias represents a clear failure of Athenian decision making, a failure that is 
symptomatic of the internal divisions that lead to stasis at Athens.  
 This analysis of morale in Thucydidesʼ narrative also points to a further 
conclusion, namely that Thucydides has what might be termed a conservative 
                                            
734 Connor (1984) 189, especially n9. 
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outlook.  Edmunds has argued, on the basis of the stasis description in 3.82-
83, that Thucydidesʼ ethical sympathies reflect a traditional and “archaic 
pattern of ethical thought.”735  He shows that the form of the ethical inversions 
that characterize stasis and Thucydidesʼ preference for qualities with 
“forethought and prudence” are also typical of traditional ethical thought 
evident as early as Hesiod.736  Thucydidesʼ views on morale also reveal a 
conservative military ethic.  My study identifies what might be termed a 
conservative bias in both Thucydidesʼ use of the vocabulary of ἀνδρεία and 
his depiction of the Atheniansʼ unrestrained and irrational passions in books 
six and seven.  The appearances of ἀνδρεία in the Histories show that 
Thucydides highly values the virtues associated with hoplite warfare.  The 
ambivalent portrayal of τόλμα, despite its frequent military effectiveness, also 
reflects Thucydidesʼ conservatism.  Irrational τόλμα characterizes not only the 
Athenians during the war in Sicily but also the actions of Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton.  This, coupled with his high praise of the Peisistratid regime, 
shows Thucydidesʼ preference for the Atheniansʼ traditional values of the 
Archaic period.  Although Thucydidesʼ narrative depicts the Peloponnesian 
War as a time of great upheaval and innovation, both politically and militarily, 
Thucydides himself is uncomfortable with these changes and looked back 
favorably on the simpler times of the past. 
 Thucydidesʼ military conservatism is rooted in hoplite values, as a 
comparison to Herodotusʼ judgment of the bravest Spartan at Plataea shows.  
The Spartans give no prize to Aristodemus, because he went berserk and left 
                                            
735 Edmunds (1975b) 74-75. 
736 Edmunds (1975b) 91-92. 
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his place to fight with no concern for his own or his comradesʼ safety, but 
Herodotus calls him the bravest:  
Καίτοι, γενομένης λέσχης ὃς γένοιτο αὐτῶν ἄριστος, ἔγνωσαν οἱ 
παραγενόμενοι Σπαρτιητέων Ἀριστόδημον μὲν βουλόμενον 
φανερῶς ἀποθανεῖν ἐκ τῆς παρεούσης οἱ αἰτίης, λυσσῶντά τε καὶ 
ἐκλείποντατὴν τάξιν ἔργα ἀποδέξασθαι μεγάλα, Ποσειδώνιον δὲ 
οὐ βουλόμενον ἀποθνῄσκειν ἄνδρα γενέσθαι ἀγαθόν· τοσούτῳ 
τοῦτον εἶναι ἀμείνω.737 
Herodotus is more in sympathy with the older, Homeric ideals of bravery, 
which allow for frenzied individual fighting.738  The Spartans, however, honor 
Posidonius, showing that they distinguish the semblance of courage that is 
“mad fury” from the true courage of someone who fights with awareness of 
what he may lose and performs bravely nonetheless.739  Thucydides 
associates the unambiguously good quality ἀνδρεία with the Spartans and the 
ambivalent quality τόλμα with the Athenians, reflecting his preference for the 
relatively ʻfairʼ clash of hoplite formations to the bold and impulsive actions that 
brought extraordinary but ultimately unsustainable successes in the 
Peloponnesian War.  Furthermore, his attribution of ἀνδρεία to the 
Syracusans, who defend themselves against the Athenians much like the 
Athenians defended themselves from the Persians, also implies a longing for 
the just wars of the past. 
 
                                            
737 Herodotus 9.71.3: “Nevertheless, when there was a general discussion about who had 
borne himself most bravely, those Spartans who were there judged that Aristodemus, who 
plainly wished to die because of the reproach hanging over him and so rushed out and left the 
battle column behind, had achieved great deeds, but that Posidonius, who had no wish to die, 
proved himself a courageous fighter, and so in this way he was the better man” (tr. Godley). 
738 Lendon (2005) 84. 
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